In The past few decades several approaches have been adopted with respect to the Molasses Act controversy of 1730–1733. It has been considered from the standpoint of Anglo-French commercial rivalry; as a conflict between two British colonial regions; as a measure designed to aid one group of British colonies at the expense of another; and as a source of precedents for parliamentary taxation of the colonies on the one hand and the colonists’ refusal to comply with such taxation on the other. While the trade between North America and the French West Indies was the chief target of attack, it is not always realized that proponents of the Molasses Act had other objectives in mind. British sugar planters were not only at odds with North American merchants who traded with the foreign sugar islands, but also with Irish merchants who pursued a similar course of trade and with the buyers of sugar in England. Failure to achieve results by means of restrictive legislation in one area did not necessarily preclude success in others. The controversy needs to be understood in terms of the international sugar economy, the changing nature of the British market for sugar and rum, and the planters’ attempt to adapt the Navigation Acts to these changes. From the planters’ standpoint, the Molasses Act was only one of several measures that were needed to adapt the Navigation Acts to the realities of the market, so it may be unrealistic to consider any one act in isolation.

This is frankly a paper with a purpose. It is a plea for the abandonment of that academic isolationism that marks our teaching of the economic history of the United States, and for at least an occasional glance at those other new countries to which Europeans flocked between the sixteenth century and the drying up of intercontinental migration less than two decades ago. The plea might be made on the high ground of promoting international understanding and of making our leadership in world affairs better informed. I am content to present it on the lower plane of improving our teaching of this country's economic and social development. If we examine the story of those areas that have had basically the same experience as ours, we begin to notice the significance of some things here that we have always taken for granted. Some of our problems lose their terror when we discover that other countries are also plagued with them; some of our ideas or methods may look better, or worse, when we contrast them with those of other regions; and some of our achievements may appear greater, or less, when we place them alongside the accomplishments of Australians, Canadians, New Zealanders, South Africans, Latin Americans, or Russians in Siberia. It used to be said that the study of the varied forms of government in the eastern Mediterranean made the Greeks good political scientists. Some comparative study of the quantity and character of material development among the peoples just listed might make us better American economic historians.

During World War II a system of labor participation and representation emerged in a series of national economic planning agencies. This study is primarily concerned with the representation and participation of organized labor in the activities of the National Defense Advisory Commission, the Office of Production Management, and the War Production Board. Some attention is also given to the War Manpower Commission and the Office of Price Administration.

It is generally recognized that the Dutch played a major part in financing British government deficits from the 1720s to the late 1770s. This article argues that even though the Dutch continued to hold large amounts of British debt after 1780, they stopped supplying new capital to the British and started a modest repatriation of some of their previous investments. A comparative econometric study of 3 percent consol yields during the two deficit-inducing wars Britain fought between 1750 and 1795 shows that as a result British interest rates became much more sensitive to increases in government borrowing.

Industry and commerce developed rapidly in China during the last three centuries before Christ, as they did also in the Mediterranean world. Contemporary Hellenistic and Roman businessmen made extensive use of slave labor, and slavery gradually developed an industrial character. Nothing comparable occurred in China. Private and government slavery had a marked growth under the Han empire, but the use of slaves for industrial purposes—even commercial farming— did not become an important characteristic of the Chinese institution. This fact raises questions concerning the “style” of ancient Chinese slavery, and concerning the economic organization of which it was a part.

My article on Prussian public finance in the December 1966 issue of this Journal contained some errors of calculation which partially affect the arguments I advanced there and which provide an excellent object lesson in the hasty use of quantitative evidence. After unaccountably converting current prices into constant ones by multiplication instead of division, I rushed the results off to the editors without checking them.

The factors responsible for the South Carolina Low Country's rapid economic rise in the eigthteenth century and for the area's subsequent lapse into stagnation and decline are described and analyzed. The conclusion is that the rise and fall of the Low Country grew out of the white settlers' early economic commitment to the production of plantation staples with bound labor. The Low Country was locked into a pattern of economic development that required a high demand for low country staples. When demand for low country staples abated, the area faced economic ruin.

The weakness of the Ch'ing land tax system is manifested in the gradual reduction of the tax burden. This weakness can be traced to two practices: that of commutation and a fixed tax quota. A model is provided to analyze these practices and their impact on the tax burden. The empirical data of Su-chou and Sung-chiang prefectures are used to implement the theoretical analysis. It is found that the tax burden was reduced enormously, about 50 percent by 1830. The article includes one table, five figures, and one appendix.

What are the new interests, the new methods, and the new conceptions of European economic development which over the past thirty years have formed or reformed our discipline? In partial answer to this difficult question, we shall first consider the economic history of what we may call traditional Europe, and which we shall extend, very roughly, from the early Middle Ages until the seventeenth century.

Historians in general are rather suspicious of theories—and who is to blame them? The temptation to do violence to historical reality is strong, and must be resisted with might and main. However, bad company will sooner or later corrupt even the best of manners; and the economic historian, owing to his long and intimate association with that bold and reckless crowd, the theorists, has finally learned to overcome his scruples and inhibitions. Like the children of Israel, he goes a whoring after Baalim: he tries to develop a general theory of economic growth.

In his rejoinder in the September 1983 issue of this JOURNAL to our comment on his article that appeared in December 1981, J. E. Inikori claims that we fail to address effectively any of the six major points raised by his article. We confess that we did not respond to his arguments about temporal fluctuations and interfirm variations in profit margins, largely because we regarded such arguments as commonplace and the subject of little debate among historians. We do have doubts, however, about Inikori's attempt to relate profit margins to the size of firms in the trade, as we indicate below. The main concern of our comment was with several more questionable assertions made by Inikori about the market structure and general profitability of the slave trade, and we sought to challenge these. Our criticisms centered on Inikori's classification of British slaving firms, his analysis of the elasticities of supply of trade goods and export credit, his method of calculating profits, and his interpretation of the career of one Liverpool slave merchant, William Davenport, for whose ventures we have exceptionally detailed accounts. Inikori's Rejoinder rejects all of our criticisms, but the arguments he advances remain conceptually unsound and rely upon questionable interpretations of slender evidence. We propose to deal only with the main points of our criticisms that Inikori either misunderstands or still fails to meet.