If We are to have a discussion of fabian England, it may be well at the outset to specify what we nean by fabian, even though we take England for granted. Under present circumstances in the world, die German methodology, which dictates beginning with definitions, should perhaps be employed in its Russian variant, which requires that serious discussion of any scholarly subject shall be prefaced widi an indication of what Lenin had to say on the topic. Lenin was interested i n the Fabians, interested enough to translate Industrial Democracy into Russian. It is therefore with special authority that he was able to say, “The most perfect expression of opportunism and of liberal labour politics is undoubtedly the Fabian Society.” His opinion took on added weight because he was echoing “Engels, who treats Messrs. Sidney Webb and Co. as a band of bourgeois humbugs whose aim it is to demoralize die workers, to influence them in a counter-revolutionary direction.” Lenin did recognize that “the Fabians are more sincere and honest than Kautsky and Co. because they have not promised to stand for a revolution; politically, however, diey are the same.” As we all know, in 1915, in the heat of the effort to “convert the imperialist war into civil war,” nothing more damning could be said than diat the Fabians were the same as the “pseudo-Marxist renegade” Kautsky.

Perhaps in no other stage in history has a rapidly changing pattern of economic life raised so many acutely disturbing economic problems as it did in England during the last decade of the eighteenth and the first few decades of the nineteenth century, even as there have been few periods in which the body of economic thought has been more enriched. The era that included the Napoleonic Wars (1793–1814) and the postwar period witnessed such historic events as the suspension of specie payments by the Bank of England, modification of the corn laws, industrial depression, widespread introduction of machine technology, and the Luddite riots. Little wonder that the brilliant minds of Malthus, Ricardo, James Mill, Bentham, and many others were stimulated by the troublesome issues of the day.

The author of the earliest general treatise on economics, writing in the middle of the eighteenth century, regarded the entrepreneur as a key factor in production. Later economists have in general had the same feeling, though they have not defined the word entrepreneur in precisely the same manner. By some the entrepreneur has been considered to be primarily a risk or uncertainty bearer, by others an innovator, by still others a superintendent or manager. The list could easily be expanded. The tendency for economists to emphasize now one and now another aspect of entrepreneurship derives, I believe, from several factors: the variations in the volume and nature of economic opportunities, the increasing size of the business unit, and the changes in the legal forms of business organization.

As the American South commenced its modern industrialization in the late nineteenth century, it found itself handicapped not simply by its poverty, but also by its lack of institutionalized means for mobilizing investment capital for manufacturing. Using evidence from the first major southern manufacturing region, the Carolina Piedmont, we argue that the resulting high information and transactions costs forced industrial promoters to rely heavily upon small, local investors who preferred safety to innovation. As a result, southern manufacturing firms were hampered in their flexibility, and southern industrial structure was skewed toward mature industries with little developmental potential.

Although it has not been our practice to publish issues devoted to single themes, the nearly simultaneous submission of three manuscripts treating the economic history of the elderly inspired us to highlight the new research in this area by publishing the articles together and by inviting Professor Stanley Engerman of the University of Rochester to write an introduction.

Present interest in communication research in the social and physical sciences raises some interesting and difficult questions for the economic historian. Arthur Cole, who claims that he is merely trying to carry further the work of Harold Innis and others at Toronto, but who is surely the moving spirit in this session, has suggested that we might begin by pin-pointing a few leading questions for examination. Is this comparatively recent development to be regarded as merely a passing phase in the history of fashions in thought? Is the process of relating communication to economic change mainly a process of sophistication and is there anything to argue about in this relationship? Or, on the other hand, does it in fact amount to a major break-through in scientific and historical analysis, something comparable to the impact made on economics about a century ago by the Austrian School?

This article offers a comparative analysis of the inflationary exeriences of Weimar Germany and post-Soviet Russia, applying theories about money and government budget constraints in the manner of Thomas Sargent and François Velde. The comparison looks beyond economic policy itself to the political and social consequences of the two inflationary crises. The parallel is fairly close: close enough to suggest that Russia, despite its recent quiescence, may not have seen the end of its monetary—or political—travails.

In his recent article in this Journal, A. H. John has attempted to show how low grain prices in the first half of the eighteenth century stimulated economic growth. His argument runs that after the Restoration,

…there followed almost a century of comparative plenty, bringing an increasing flow of food and raw materials. The most pronounced fall in prices occurred in grains … Because [the bread grains] entered very largely into the diet of most groups in society, a fall in their prices lowered the cost of living and so raised per capita real incomes …. Income tended to move into the hands of people, who, through habit and/or necessity, were more likely to spend than hoard …. Many of the growth points stemmed from a buoyant home market.

Economics, like geology, is an historical science. Geology has made incredible advances by accepting it is an historical, rather than a laboratory science. Economic historians can help economics make similar advances by adopting the research strategies of modern geology. Intensely empirical and global in their range, today's geologists focus on the historical remains of shocking, usually catastrophic, events in the earth's past. Already empirical and global, economic historians have ample shocks to study whether their specialty is population, technology, or institutions. A few examples of the possibilities should stimulate us to reinvigorate our parent disciplines of economics and history.

The Great Depression of the 1930s involved a severe disruption in the supply of home mortgage credit. This paper empirically identifies a mechanism lying behind this credit crunch: the impairment of lenders’ balance sheets by illiquid foreclosed real estate. With data on hundreds of building and loans (B&Ls), the leading mortgage lenders in this period, we find that the overhang of foreclosed real estate explains about 30 percent of the drop in new lending between 1930 and 1935.

While it is inevitable that the word “capitalism” will be used by various participants at the Congress in various senses, some mutual understandings concerning the different meanings likely to be intended may help to clarify the discussions. The following is an attempt (a) to indicate the different usages which will probably occur, (b) to suggest modifying adjectives or substitute terms by which the different meanings may be distinguished, and (c) to indicate relevant historical questions.

My thesis examines the process of industrialization in nineteenthcentury New England before the Civil War. I have attempted to achieve three principal objectives: first, the purely descriptive task of beginning to fill our present vacuum of detailed information on the American economy before 1840; second, to test the specific hypothesis that New England and perhaps other American regions would exhibit concentrated spurts of industrial output similar to those which characterized the emergence of modern economies in nineteenth-century Europe; third, to construct an explanation of the forces which determined the particular course of development which was observed.

The scarcity of quantitative evidence on economic growth in the nineteenth century is a strong incentive for the use of representative indicators, instead of compound indexes or supplemented by them. Consumption series of coal, iron, and cotton are prominent candidates to serve this purpose, due to the central roles played by these materials in European industrialization. A further point in their favor is the relatively high availability and quality of mining and foreign trade statistics. The specific functions and link-ages of those three staples, however, were quite different, and thus their growth paths represent different aspects and processes. For the overall modernizing transformation of an economy, coal consumption evidently suggests itself as the best single indicator, at least until the end of the century. Its growth reflects the increasing output of industry, transportation, and even agriculture, inasmuch as they relied on coal for heat and/or for motive power. This means that coal stands for a broad cross-section of the economy, and furthermore, for a growing one. The substitution of mineral fuel for wood or charcoal and of steam for water power was not only the most general component of industrialization, in the wider sense of the term. It also was a prerequisite for the growth potential of firms and industries in many instances, among them such strategic sectors as iron and steel or overland transportation. Similarly, the introduction of steam engines was a characteristic of the innovating firm in agriculture and in land reclamation. On these grounds one would expect the growth of coal consumption to represent the pace of transition to modern economic growth, rather than the growth of industrial product only.

Fire destroyed the Patent Office on December 15, 1836. From the ensuing actions by the Congress and Commissioner, it is possible to create a comprehensive and accurate description of the scope and level of technology and changes therein, as the United States transformed itself into an industrial society. This paper reports the progress made toward that description (in the form of a unified reference work), illustrates some uses of the data, and suggests other uses of the final version in expanding understanding of the processes of sociocultural change, particularly those of capitalist development.