This paper explores the phenomenon of “job-loan trading”—in which employers offered jobs in exchange for substantial loans from their new employees—as practiced in mid-nineteenth-century California. A sample of newspaper advertisements from 1857–76 reveals that despite the obvious inefficiencies of linking labor and capital markets, job-loan trading was both common and profitable. I assess labor market bonding against moral hazard or adverse selection as a possible explanation, but conclude that the job-loan trades primarily provide evidence of substantial Pacific Coast capital market imperfections. This conclusion has implications for the broader question of how financial markets develop.

This paper applies a feminist analysis to the measurement of living standards during the 1970s. It suggests that widely made assumptions of homogeneous pooling and redistribution of income, labor, and expenditures within families mask inequalities and uneven changes in the living standards of wage-working husbands and wives. Two waves of the Panel Study of Income dynamics are used to create two rough indicators, that is, reproduction pay and surplus, to test for inequalities and uneven changes in 1968 and again in 1979. In general, the findings show differential living standards between husbands and wives when assumptions of homogeneous pooling and redistribution are not made. The paper concludes that the suggested rough indicators are useful for the measurement of living standards.