The purpose of this paper is to describe briefly the administrative organization and planning system of the typical large Soviet steel plant, and then show how the plant director carries out one of his essential functions both with the help of and in spite of the institutional framework within which he has to operate. Our attention will be focused primarily at the level of the individual firm, but in order to appreciate the problems of firm management we must first see how the individual enterprise fits into the all-pervading Soviet industrial bureaucracy.

During the century which culminated in the First World War, Great Britain was the principal source of capital supply for countries that drew upon foreign resources. Until 1940 her claims as creditor remained substantially greater than those of any other nation. Investments grossing from forty to fifty billion dollars have been made in the course of her virtually continuous process of capital outlay abroad. The outstanding total in 1914 amounted to twenty billion dollars, yielding an annual income of about one billion, which was nearly one tenth of the national income of the United Kingdom. This was the result of a process of accumulation which reached its greatest intensity during the periods 1868–1875, 1884–1893, and 1905–1912, when annual public issues of foreign and colonial securities averaged 6 or 7 per cent of those outstanding. During the latter period, at least, more than half of all British investment of new capital was being made abroad.

The article entitled “Economic Growth in England Before the Industrial Revolution: Some Methodological Issues,’ published in the March 1969 issue of this Journal, was written by R. M. Hartwell(Ronald Max, if Christian names are required) and not by Richard M. Hartwell. The Editor regrets the error and any misunderstandings that may have resulted.

Discussion of the role of internally generated funds as a dynamic and influential determinant of investment decisions has been renewed lately in the macroeconomic investment literature. While there is a current revival, the hypothesis is not a new one. In the classic study of the financial history of eight leading American automobile manufacturers over the period 1910 to 1926, Lawrence H. Seltzer concludes that “the greatest part of the growth in their capital resources was derived from reinvested profits; and that this source accounts for much the greater part of their present invested capital.” He estimates that for the period through 1926 net aggregate reinvested profits were equal, on average, to almost 80 percent of the value of tangible invested capital.3 Seltzer suggests that this remarkably high percentage was the result of the unique situation of the automobile industry, although carefully pointing out that the general importance of internal funds may be greater than commonly realized.