The bull and bear markets of this century have suggested that large stock market swings reflect irrational “fads and fashions.” We argue instead that investors perceived shifts in the long-run rate of future growth and that stock prices are sufficiently sensitive to expectations about the future that these perceived shifts plausibly generated the swings of the twentieth century. We document that analysts often viewed as “smart money” assessed fundamentals, based on their perceptions of future economic growth, in a way that tracked decade-to-decade swings closely.

We revisit Max Weber’s hypothesis on the role of Protestantism for economic development. We show that nationalism is crucial to both, the interpretation of Weber’s Protestant Ethic and empirical tests thereof. For late nineteenth-century century Prussia we reject Weber’s suggestion that Protestantism mattered due to an “ascetic compulsion to save.” Moreover, we find that income levels, savings, and literacy rates differed between Germans and Poles, not between Protestants and Catholics, using pooled OLS and IV regressions. We suggest that this result is due to anti-Polish discrimination.

We present new wage indices for skilled and unskilled construction workers in Italy. Our data avoid multiple issues pestering earlier wages, making our new indices the first consistent ones for early-modern Italy. Our improved wages, obtained from the St. Peter’s Church in Rome, consolidate the view that urban Italy began a prolonged downturn during the seventeenth century. They also offer sustenance to the idea that epidemics instigated the decline. Comparison with new construction wages for London shows that Roman workers outearned their early-modern English counterparts. This suggests that high wages alone were not enough to trigger industrialization.

The success of fiscal centralization and military buildup in colonial Mexico contrasts with failed similar attempts elsewhere. Why did powerful elites comply with fiscal-military reforms in eighteenth-century Mexico? I argue that the Seven Years' War provided incentives for the Crown to centralize and elites to comply by accentuating the free rider problems inherent in the provision of military defense under fiscal fragmentation. Fiscal data and history document that reforms were more successful in regions more militarily vulnerable and where benefits were more aligned between the elites and the Crown. Centralization served the elites to commit to collective cooperation.

We examine in this paper both the causes and consequences of inheritance laws in the colonies. We argue that the continuation of intestate inheritance laws over the colonial period was due in part to their compatibility with economic efficiency. In the North, multigeniture helped motivate family labor, whereas the passive acceptance of the British inheritance system of primogeniture in the South rested on its promotion of large plantations that could capture economies of scale. In terms of effects, a strong bequest motive in the colonies adopting multigeniture reduced the variability in demographic experiences across colonies with different inheritance systems.

This article explores the risks and returns to currency speculation during the 1920s and 1930s. We study the performance of two well-known technical trading strategies (carry and momentum) and compare them with that of a fundamentals-based trader: John Maynard Keynes. Technical strategies were highly profitable during the 1920s and even outperformed Keynes. In the 1930s, however, both technical strategies and Keynes performed relatively poorly. While our results reveal the existence of profitable opportunities for currency traders in the interwar years, they suggest that such profits were necessary compensation for enduring the substantial risks that all strategies entailed.

This article illustrates the impact of Jewish lenders on private credit markets and public finance in medieval and Renaissance Italian towns. In Tuscan private credit markets, Jewish lending helped households to smooth consumption, buy working capital, and provide dowries for daughters. Jewish lenders also helped the public fmances of the communes in which they resided. This article shows that public-finance considerations affected the choice of the interest-rate ceiling Jews were allowed to charge. In many instances, the communes raised the interest-rate ceiling for Jewish lenders in order to tax or borrow the proceeds.

This article investigates interstate differences in banking market structure during the 1920s. It finds that the number of banks per capita and the ratio of state-chartered to federally chartered banks were highest in states with deposit insurance systems, low minimum capital requirements, and branching restrictions. In the 1920s banking consolidation was greatest where falling incomes caused high failure rates, in states with deposit insurance, and where branching increased. After 1920, the high failure rate of insured state banks caused the ratio of state–chartered to federally chartered banks to decline relatively more in states with insurance systems.

The First World War radically altered the political landscape of Central Europe. The new borders after 1918 are typically viewed as detrimental to the region's economic integration and development. We argue that this view lacks historical perspective. It fails to take into account that the new borders followed a pattern of economic fragmentation that had emerged during the late nineteenth century. We estimate the effects of the new borders on trade and find that the “treatment effects” of these borders were quite limited. There is strong evidence that border changes occurred systematically along barriers which existed already before 1914.

Using a newly constructed panel data set, which includes annual estimates of lending rates for 47 Japanese prefectures, we analyze why interest rates converged over the period 1884–1925. We find evidence that technological innovations and institutional changes played an important role in creating a national capital market in Japan. In particular, the diffusion in the use of the telegraph, the growth in commercial branch banking networks, and the development of Bank of Japan's branches reduced interest rate differentials. Bank regulation appears to have played little role in impeding financial market integration.

Extensive amounts of geographic mobility and high rates of labor turnover before World War I gave rise to the notion that the industrial labor force was “casual” and “impermanent.” But data from firms' payrolls and from nineteenth-century surveys conducted by state labor statistics bureaus show that male workers averaged about four years of experience in their current jobs. Data from an 1892 survey of San Francisco workers show that the average non-union male could expect to remain with his current employer almost 13 years.

Historical accounts of banking developments in the pre-1860 period of U.S. history focus almost exclusively on banking institutions chartered by state and federal governments. Private, unincorporated banks, although known to have existed, are generally ignored as either unimportant numerically or not truly commercial banks in terms of their functions. This paper draws on a variety of literary and quantitative evidence to infer that such views are perhaps in error. Some potential implications of the findings for antebellum banking and monetary history are essayed.

For almost 25 years between 1797 and 1821, the gold standard in Britain was suspended in order to finance the Napoleonic Wars, creating a paper pound or a fiat currency. Suspension was accompanied by substantial inflation and the accumulation of public debt. By identifying shifts in the spot exchange rate of paper pounds for gold, I document how contemporaries' expectations of how debt would be stabilized in the future shaped the pound's internal value. Thus, it is argued that during the “paper pound” period, fiscal prospects provided a third mechanism, beyond monetary and real factors, affecting the price level.

In historical studies of industrialization prominent attention is usually given to the development of large-scale industry and whenever small industry is considered at all, it is usually introduced only as the starting point of, or a contrast to, large industrial enterprises. This concern with large industry also predominated in the earliest post-war discussions on the economic development of underdeveloped countries and from this period stem the famous and often ridiculed schemes of giant steel plants and other large industrial establishments in littleadvanced countries. During the last few years, however, the general climate of opinion has changed and increasing attention has been paid to small scale and even cottage industries. This has been especially pronounced in the countries of southern and southeastern Asia and is strongly supported by various studies and conferences of the Economic Commission on Asia and the Far East and other organizations associated with the United Nations operating in this part of the world.

The gradual yet cumulative advance of West European capitalism was in large part epitomized by the developments of its textile trades. They were the first to carry the seeds of economic change into the stagnant preserves of guild conservatism, and subsequently they again proved to be the pioneers of the new factory system. In Germany the sequence of economic change was not quite as uniform. Each German textile district emerged as a specific case of economic growth with contours of industrial evolution that manifested unique deviations from the broad pattern of development. The heterogeneity of the German lands, particularly marked before the advent of the railways, was both cause and effect of this diversity.

This article examines the role of capital-deepening technical change in promoting the growth of large firms and concentrated markets in the late nineteenth-century United States. Translog production functions allowing nonconstant returns to scale and biased technical change are estimated in pooled cross-section time series for 16 major industries over the period 1850–1890 based on Census data. It is shown that substantial increases in optimal firm size, dictating natural monopoly or tight oligopoly market structures, occurred in some but not all of the industries experiencing substantial increases in concentration over this period. In a number of markets high concentration levels did not appear to have been compelled by changes in technology.

The paper examines in detail revised estimates of unemployment and gross national product for the United States before 1929. It first discusses the nature of the revisions to each series and contrasts the assumptions underlying the new data with those underlying the Kuznets GNP series and the Lebergott unemployment rate series. It then examines the business cycle properties of the new prewar estimates. In analyzes the volatility and serial correlation properities of the new macroeconomic series and investigates the Okun's Law relationship between unemployment and GNP, concluding with an evaluation of the assumptions underlying the old and new data.

Agricultural improvement, as analysts of economic growth often stress, plays an important role in a developing economy. Recent quantitative research has expanded our knowledge of developments in American agriculture during the period when the economy was becoming industrialized. The purpose of this article is to compute new estimates of average milk yields (output per milk animal) in American dairy agriculture and to analyze the sources of changes in these yields between 1850 and 1910.