There is now a rough consensus of opinion among English economic historians about the broad chronology of English population history. According to this chronology there were three main phases of rapid growth. The first occurred in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and was brought to an end by a marked fall in population in the fourteenth century. The second phase occupied most of the sixteenth century and the early seventeendi, after which there was some slowing down in the later seventeenth century and possibly an absolute check in the 1720's and 1730's. And finally tliere was the sustained cumulative increase that started in the later eighteenth century.

Corporate farming is not new in the United States. The companies of “gentlemen adventurers” setting out in the seventeenth century to establish settlements in the New World were not corporations in a modern sense, but in organizational form and motivation they bear a striking resemblance to corporation farming ventures of recent decades. The twin lures of short-run profits and long-run capital gains have been major forces in shaping land use patterns and institutional structures throughout America's history. For over 300 years repeated efforts were made to use large scale organizational forms to reap these rewards in agriculture. Up to 1950 the record was one of almost consistent failure.

Did macroconomic interventions make any contribution to Argentina's revovery from the Great Depression? Macroeconomic policy deviated from gold-standard orthodoxy after the final suspension of convertibility in 1929. Fiscal policy was conservative. Monetary policy became unorthodox after 1931, when the Caja de conversión began rediscounting to sterilize gold outflows and avoid deflation. This change predated the creation of the central bank in 1935. A wider literature links the interwar depression in the core to flaws in the gold standard, and active monetary policy to escape from defaltion and slump; our work extends this idea to the periphery.

Few recent intellectual currents have been so self-consciously controversial as the New Economic History. It has been a rare meeting patronized by historians or economists that has not featured a discussion of the merits and defects of applying theoretical and quantitative constructs to historical problems. This occasion is obviously no exception. Yet milestones must be respected, and on this thirtieth anniversary, a review of the profitability, if not the viability, of the new techniques being applied to economic history seems very much in order.

Interindustry factor mobility is a crucial determinant of the income-distribution effects of exogenous changes in relative commodity prices. This examination of interindustry variation in wages and profits using data from manufacturing industries from 1820 to 1990 suggests that interindustry factor mobility may be strongly related to the processes of industrialization. Development in the nineteenth century produced a sharp rise in mobility (a decline in interindustry wage and profit differentials) due to rapid improvements in transportation and the introduction of factory production. Twentieth-century industrialization, involving greater reliance on specialized equipment and knowledge, reduced levels of interindustry mobility.

The sustained unemployment in the United States during the recovery from the Great Depression has proved difficult to explain, as has the rapid elimination of unemployment in Germany. I argue that employment in the United States was restricted by high wages, which government policy raised above the level of efficiency wages. Socialist control and military expansion by the Nazis reduced unemployment, but also held down consumption.

We construct longitudinal data from U.S. census records to study the economics of the Dust Bowl migration of the 1930s. Most of our findings contradict long-standing perceptions. While migration rates were high relative to elsewhere in the United States, they were similar to migration rates from the region in the 1920s. Relative to other occupations, farmers were the least likely to move. Furthermore, migrants from the Dust Bowl were not exceptionally likely to move to California. Finally, there was negligible migrant selectivity, and migration was not associated with long-lasting negative labor market outcomes; indeed, for farmers, the gains from migration were positive.

Infrastructure construction is often associated with excessive, even corrupt, profits. This article argues that construction profits earned in Spanish railroads in the mid-nineteenth century were a response to the lack of credibility of the Spanish state. It also makes the first attempt to document excess construction profits in Spanish railroads by demonstrating, for example, financial links between railroad stockholders and the providers of construction goods and services and by directly estimating construction profits. The estimated excess construction profits only provided railroad entrepreneurs with a normal rate of return to their entire railroad-related investments.

This article presents an analysis of empirical research on the course of agricultural prices and wages in Maryland over the century 1750 to 1850. An attempt has been made to present the data in a form comparable to other studies for other regions. In addition to the long-term movement of price and wage series the paper focuses on the use of these data to draw inferences on changes in the standard of living and productivity growth.

This paper examines several recent arguments about the role of slavery in the settling of the New World, the viability of slavery as an economic institution in the nineteenth century, and the causes and consequences of slave emancipation in the Americas. Comparisons are made between the analysis of slavery and that of other labor institutions, such as serfdom and free labor.

Why was the Industrial Revolution British? In a recent article published in this Journal, Robert Allen argues that only in England was the price of labor relative to capital high enough to justify the adoption of the labor-saving technologies which characterized the Industrial Revolution.1 To support his argument, he uses the spinning jenny as a case study. The jenny was indeed an important labor-saving technology that was invented and widely adopted in England but not in France. Allen explains this fact by calculating the returns to adopting the jenny in each country: according to his calculations the jenny was profitable in England but not in France.

The present note shows that Allen's conclusions rest on implausible profitability computations. In particular, Allen assumes that output remains constant after the adoption of the jenny while hours worked decrease dramatically. From a theoretical perspective, this is equivalent to an assumption that hours worked move inversely with the marginal product of labor. As soon as these restrictive assumptions are abandoned, the jenny turns out being profitable both in England and in France. Hence the mystery of the adoption of the jenny during the Industrial Revolution remains.

During the past few years new measures of growth have begun to emerge for the colonial period in American history which allow us to understand more fully the pace and pattern of long-run economic growth. This essay summarizes what we know about colonial growth and discusses rates of growth during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. After summarizing previous work on the subject, the paper estimates eighteenth-century agricultural productivity in one New England county. Data on total wealth, livestock, crops, land, and agricultural capital are generated from estate inventories. A consumer price index for the period also is constructed. From these data it appears that the seventeenth century experienced growth comparable to modern times, whereas the eighteenth century was a bleak period in our history. Although real wealth per inventory grew at a rate of 0.5 percent per year during the eighteenth century, agricultural productivity declined at a rate of 0.8 percent.

This paper should begin with a brief defense of its title. “Variety” and “unsuccessful” are doubtful if not dirty words to most economists and many economic historians. The “success stories” of rapid development in Western Europe, Russia and Japan have been the most frequent subject of this Journal's articles on non-American topics. And the discovery of uniformity in the past, rather than variety, is admittedly essential to the development economist's search for predictability in the future that has informed so much of the economic history written since the Second World War.

This article examines the effect of state-level legal innovations governing labor disputes in the late 1800s. This was a period of legal ferment in which worker organizations and employers actively lobbied state governments for changes in the rules governing labor disputes. Cross-state heterogeneity in the legal environment provides an unusual opportunity to investigate the effects of these laws. We use a unique data set with information on 12,965 strikes to show that most of these law changes had surprisingly little effect on strike incidence or outcomes. Important exceptions were maximum hours laws and the use of injunctions.

What role the railroad played and how changes in transportstimulated American economic advance, while puzzling questions, are not beyond all conjecture. And such questions never lacked for conjecture. But recent studies have given a rigorous and brilliant cast to that inquiry, if not a totally novel one. An older tradition was shaped by the historian's desire to see economic change “as it was,” by his recognition that every happening was indispensable to the actual course of history. The newer focus, on history “as it was not,” reflects a belief that in economic affairs, as in those of the heart, desire will find its object—or a sufficiently close substitute. It i s difficult for the economist to view any historic innovation as revolutionary or to equate technological novelty with economic importance. It is an easy step to use comparative statics; to measure history “as it was not”; and thereby to define economic importance.

This article asks: why were crop failures (dearths) so frequent in western India between 1870 and 1920, and why did dearth decreasingly result in famine, that is, in severe elevation of mortality and in major disruptions of the agricultural sector. It is concluded that deficient rainfall caused the crop failures and that after 1900 increasedtrade in agricultural products and increased demand for labor, coupled with increased credit and relief services from government, significantly reduced the probability that a crop failure could result in widespread famine.

This article contributes to the debate on relative levels of living in the early modern world by estimating the income and probable range of income growth in Bengal before European colonization. The exercise yields two conclusions, (a) average income in Bengal was significantly smaller than that in contemporary Western Europe, and (b) there is insufficient basis to infer either growth or decline in average income in the eighteenth century.

Earl J. Hamilton's multiple theses on the price revolution, the decline of Spain, and the birth of capitalism have all placed American silver (and gold) at the forefront. This essay supports Hamilton's emphasis on the impact of New World treasure on the decline of Castile, but from a different angle. Mining profits rather than the quantity of imports supported the empire. When the profits dwindled, as was inevitable, international superiority was begrudgingly surrendered to the emerging powers of the north.