We examine Cuban GDP over time and across space. We find that Cuba was once a prosperous middle-income economy. On the eve of the revolution, incomes were 50 to 60 percent of European levels. They were among the highest in Latin America at about 30 percent of the United States. In relative terms, Cuba was richer earlier on. Income per capita during the 1920s was in striking distance of Western Europe and the Southern United States. After the revolution, Cuba slipped down the world income distribution. Current levels of income per capita appear below their pre-revolutionary peaks.

This article reexamines theories previously advanced to explain Lancashire's slow adoption of ring spinning. New cost estimates show that although additional transport costs and technical complementarities reduced ring adoption rates, these supply-side constraints were not dominant. Instead what mattered most were demand-side factors. Lancashire produced far more fine yarns than other countries, and this yarn was better spun on mules. Furthermore, Lancashire had a sizeable export trade in yarn, a market again more suited to mule spinning. Low ring adoption rates were thus a rational response to demand patterns dominated by high-quality goods.

Earl J. Hamilton's multiple theses on the price revolution, the decline of Spain, and the birth of capitalism have all placed American silver (and gold) at the forefront. This essay supports Hamilton's emphasis on the impact of New World treasure on the decline of Castile, but from a different angle. Mining profits rather than the quantity of imports supported the empire. When the profits dwindled, as was inevitable, international superiority was begrudgingly surrendered to the emerging powers of the north.

Few present-day historians of English society use the phrase “the landed gentry” with the same easy confidence that Lecky could muster. They hesitate to draw too hard and fast a line between the landed and commercial classes, for they see in the society of the gentry something more than fox-hunting squires and Church of England parsons. The works of Miss Scott Thomson and of A. S. Turberville, for example, have revealed a class more elusive in its activities and outlook, a class that was becoming increasingly amphibious: at home in two elements, the city and the countryside and engaged in economic enterprise that was by no means exclusively agrarian. In other words, the life of the country house may be as broad as English life itself; and it may come as no surprise, therefore, to discover that the growth of industrialism between 1830 and 1880 impinged on the society of the gentry, diversifying the nature of both its economic activities and its income.

Between the years 1860 and 1913 approximately twelve million people took passage from the United Kingdom to extra-European countries. The bulk of the migration stream (about 125,000 people per year) was directed toward the United States; it is this movement of population that is the subject of our article. The flow of individuals from the United Kingdom to the United States in this period ranged from 38,000 in 1861 to 202,000 in 1887 with marked cyclical fluctuations. For example, in 1873 the flow was 167,000 and by 1877 it was only 45,000. Variations of this magnitude pose the interesting intellectual question of whether or not they can be explained. This is not a new question; there are frequent references in the literature to the possible causes of this movement and the emigration from the United Kingdom that it implies. Studies focus on various economic influences on emigration. There is little in this period in the socio-political environment of the United Kingdom that would prompt individuals to emigrate in order to flee intolerable religious or political persecution.

A Major theme in the historiography of American slavery is the analysis of the slave plantation as a capitalist market oriented enterprise. Much of the controversy surrounding the work of such scholars as Stanley Elkins, Kenneth Stampp and Eugene Genovese stems from differing views of the interaction of commercial capitalism with the ancient institution of slavery. A recurrent topic in this literature is the impact of the profit motive and competitive market conditions on the relationship between master and slave. A major concern is the extent these capitalist incentives may have motivated the master to either brutalize or ameliorate the conditions of the slave's existence.

We wish to thank the following who read earlier drafts of this paper and made useful suggestions and criticisms: Professors Jerry Fastrup, George Jensen, Roger Ransom, Richard Roseman, and an anonymous referee. This study is part of a larger project, “The Optimal Accumulation and Utilization of Slaves” (forthcoming), which extends both static and dynamic neoclassical models of the firm to cases involving slavery.

The cross-sectional and secular variations in the fertility of the white population in pre-Civil War Ohio are analyzed with special regard to the role of population pressure in conditioning these patterns and trends. Other factors, such as urbanization, education, cultural heritage, and the sex ratio, all of which are often cited as major explanatory variables during the demographic transition are also introduced. Although each of these variables is shown to have some impact, none can account for more than a minor proportion of the Variance in human fertility. It appears that the major force affecting both inter-county fertility and the secular trend for the state was the Variation in the degree of population pressure as measured by the average assessed value of an acre of non-urban land.

In a notable article published in 1955, Robert A. Lively analyzed the body of new writing on “the role of government in the antebellum economy.” In it he coined the term, “The American System,” to describe the characteristic pattern of “public support for business development” or government “partnership with enterprise.” The greater part of the literature covered dealt with the government promotion of canals and railroads, and he credited the writers with achieving “the rescue of the internal improvements movement from the political historian.” Another bench mark is provided by the appearance in 1969 of the fourth edition of Edward C. Kirkland's History of American Economic Life. The revision devotes attention to the new trends that have appeared in the writing of economic history since the first edition in 1932, and Kirkland declares that the one that interested him the most was “the increasing attention to the interrelationships between government and economic activity.” His chapter on “Internal Improvements and Domestic Commerce” makes full use of the research on the role of governments in the promotion of canals and railroads but ends with the judgment that recent writers have tended to overstate the supposed social gains and to disregard the traditional but still valid concern with the financial losses. Meanwhile, Albert Fishlow, in his admirable book, American Railroads and the Transformation of the Ante-Bellum Economy, had challenged the writers on the American System on a number of issues, including the commonly accepted theory that railroads were built ahead of demand. His critique is summarized in the following statement: “the recent useful destruction of the myth of ideological laissez faire must not give rise to the equally erroneous impression of all-embracing, and essential, public promotion.”

Bank notes were the largest component of the antebellum money supply despite losses as high as 5 percent in some years. Using a comprehensive bank-level panel of note discounts in New York City and Philadelphia, I explain this contradiction by showing that the secondary market reduced losses by accurately discounting notes based on their individual risk of default. Note discounts were almost exclusively sensitive to those factors which increased a bank's probability of default: specie suspensions, falling bond prices, and undiversified portfolios. Thus, by accounting for a bank's composition and environment, the market protected noteholders and allowed notes to circulate throughout the economy.

The article employs a general equilibrium model to describe Italy's response to commodity and factor market integration during the expansion of the Roman Empire. This novel approach constructs a comprehensive story of the Italian economy that corroborates established developments and sheds light on controversial and unanswered questions. The success of the model supports arguments that Romans were rational economic actors and that the Roman economy was a well-integrated market system.

The theory of proto-industrialization holds that a major expansion of rural industry, primarily in textiles, formed a phase precursory to industrialization in many European regions. This phase was characterized by sweeping economic and demographic changes, including increasing population density, land subdivision, and agricultural intensification. Domestic industry boosted marriage rates and may have lowered the average age of marriage of rural dwellers. The present research examines the tenets of this theory for the case of Ireland, a country affected by rural industrialization in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The data are cross-sectional and are drawn primarily from the 1841 census.

In terms of revenues and expenditures, local government was the largest component of the U.S. federal system in 1902. Although it has been conjectured that this was also true during most of the nineteenth century, the evidence to support the conjecture is weak. We present a summary of a large sample of data for individual cities in 1850, 1860, and 1870, and link it to census data for 1880, 1890, and 1902.We study effects of city size and geographical location, and trends over time in city fiscal activity. Our provisional conclusion is that local government became the largest of the three components in the federal system only toward the end of the nineteenth century.

The Postan thesis is that medieval agriculture had low yields because there was insufficient pasture to keep the arable land fertile. This argument (and variants of it) has become an orthodox technological explanation for low preindustrial yields. Yet the thesis, on its face, implies that early cultivators were ignorant, irrational, or completely custom bound. This article develops a revised Postan thesis, in which medieval cultivators knew that pasture restored fertility but were unwilling to employ it. Impatience made this way of increasing yields unattractive because it required large capital investments in the soil nitrogen stock.

In prosperous and depressed areas sectors of industry representing structural transformation in interwar Britain tended to draw upon new types of workers rather than upon workers displaced in declining export industries. Data on the age and sex composition of people in expanding and declining industries, on new entrants to the labor force, and on interindustry mobility are examined to support this claim. The process reflects a general tendency of capitalist economies to grow through incorporation of new elements.

In 1855 the volume of immigration to the United States dropped precipitously, signaling the end of the first mass migration of Europeans. Although other work blames the decline on an economic depression, the outbreak of the Crimean War, or the improvement of conditions in Europe, this article argues that the rise of nativism was the initiating cause of the decline. This result is important because it affects our view of the factors that have cyclical effects on the volume of immigration.

Premodern human capital accumulation helps to explain the exceptional growth performance of the Japanese economy in the last hundred years. Prior to this century informal institutions were more important for human capital formation than were the more formal ones familiar today. This paper examines a few seminal changes—national market formation, population control, and the involvement of farmers in rural administration—that were primarily responsible for the emergence of economically responsive, more productive individuals in rural Japan.

Standard productivity measures indicate large fluctuations in technology during the Great Depression. This article's historical technology series (1892–1966), controlled for aggregation effects, varying input utilization, non-constant returns, and imperfect competition, does not indicate technology regress such that could trigger the downturn. In contrast, technology improvements in the recovery were so rapid that, over the whole Great Depression period, technology growth was highest among pre-WWII decades. This article also finds that output changed little and inputs fell when technology improved in the pre-WWII period. Real-business-cycle models have difficulty in explaining pre-WWII business cycles characterized by such responses.

The U.S. home ownership rate rose by 10 percentage points between 1940 and 1945, despite severe restrictions on construction during World War II. I investigate whether wartime rent control played a role in this shift. The empirical test exploits variation in rent reductions across cities that had similar increases in rents prior to control. This variation does not appear to be correlated with underlying trends also driving home ownership. Greater initial rent reductions led to larger increases in home ownership; rent control can account for a significant share of the increase in home ownership over the early 1940s.

Private property in the industry of the Third Reich is often considered a mere nominal provision without much substance. However, that is not correct, because firms, despite the rationing and licensing activities of the state, still had ample scope to devise their own production and investment profiles. Even regarding war-related projects, freedom of contract was generally respected; instead of using power, the state offered firms a number of contract options to choose from. There were several motives behind this attitude of the regime, among them the conviction that private property provided important incentives for increasing efficiency.

Focusing on the New York banking sector, we analyze a neglected, but profound impact of the National Banking Acts. By resisting federal banking legislation and “boycotting” newly chartered national banks, the New York Clearing House Association members created market opportunities for the new entrants to dominate the correspondent banking market. The new entrants’ aggressive tactics including interest payments on deposits increased their vulnerability to panicky withdrawals by country banks. They also magnified conflicts of interest within the clearinghouse, which weakened its central banking functions and further destabilized the macroeconomy.