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Comment: Bhattacharya Paper

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 April 2009

Extract

Sudipto Bhattacharya's paper, “An Exploration of Nondissipative Dividend–Signaling Structures,” is in two parts. The first develops a nondissipative “quota–based” signaling model. Optimal contingent (wage) contracts are shown to induce workers, whose productivity is not directly observable, to “self–select” by the choice of level of committed productivity. However, the most novel feature of the paper is the attempt to apply the quota–based signaling model to the problem of dividend signaling in the capital– –market that is, the modeling of the “information content” of corporate dividends as an ex–ante signal of future earnings. As Bhattacharya notes, the “information content” of hypothesis of dividend payment is somewhat ill–defined to date, so such an application of the quota–based signaling model, if successful, would be a definite contribution to dividend theory.

Type
I. Incentive Signaling Models and Rational Expectations
Copyright
Copyright © School of Business Administration, University of Washington 1979

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References

REFERENCES

[1]Bhattacharya, S.An Exploration of New Dissipative Dividend–Signaling Structures.” University of Chicago working paper (11 1977, revised April 1979).Google Scholar
[2]Muth, J. “Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements.” Econometrica (1961).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[3]Ross, S. “The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem.” American Economic Review (05 1973), pp. 134139.Google Scholar