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The Relevance of Fiduciary Conflict-of-Interests in Control versus Issue Proxy Contests

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 April 2009

Robert A. Jarrow  and
J. Chris Leach
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Abstract

The role of fiduciaries with conflicting interests has received considerable attention recently. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the role of a fiduciary casting votes under conflicting interests in proxy contests that seek to control the corporation and those waged solely for the purpose of deciding an issue. By deriving comparisons across types of contests, we provide implications concerning differences in success probabilities and resolution effects for the two types of contests. The empirical verification (refutation) of such effects would provide insight regarding the (ir)relevance of fiduciary conflict-of-interests in proxy contests.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis , Volume 26 , Issue 4 , December 1991 , pp. 533 - 547
Copyright
Copyright © School of Business Administration, University of Washington 1991

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