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Shareholder-Initiated Class Action Lawsuits: Shareholder Wealth Effects and Industry Spillovers

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2009

Amar Gande  and
Craig M. Lewis
Amar Gande
Affiliation:
Cox School of Business, Southern Methodist University, 6212 Bishop Blvd., Dallas, TX 75205. agande@cox.smu.edu
Craig M. Lewis
Affiliation:
Owen Graduate School of Management, Vanderbilt University, 401 21st Ave. S., Nashville, TN 37203. craig.lewis@owen.vanderbilt.edu
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Abstract

This paper documents significantly negative stock price reactions to shareholder-initiated class action lawsuits. We find that shareholders partially anticipate these lawsuits based on lawsuit filings against other firms in the same industry and capitalize part of these losses prior to a lawsuit filing date. We show that the more likely a firm is to be sued, the larger the partial anticipation effect (shareholder losses capitalized prior to a lawsuit filing date) and the smaller the filing date effect (shareholder losses measured on the lawsuit filing date). Our evidence suggests that previous research that typically focuses on the filing date effect understates the magnitude of shareholder losses, and that such an understatement is greater for firms with a higher likelihood of being sued.

Type
Research Articles
Information
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis , Volume 44 , Issue 4 , August 2009 , pp. 823 - 850
Copyright
Copyright © Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington 2009

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