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Choosing Investment Managers
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 September 2023
Abstract
Investment managers connected to plans sponsors are more likely to be hired than not-connected managers. The magnitude of the selection effect is comparable to that of prior performance. Ex post, connections do not result in higher post-hiring returns. Relationships are thus conducive to asset gathering by investment managers but do not generate commensurate pecuniary benefits for plan sponsors.
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- Research Article
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- Creative Commons
- This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
- Copyright
- © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington
Footnotes
We thank Hendrik Bessembinder, Mara Faccio, Chris Hrdlicka, Alberto Rossi, Denis Sosyura, Michael Woeppel, Scott Yonker (the referee), and seminar participants at George Washington University, IDC Herzliya, Imperial College, Indian School of Business Hyderabad, Purdue University, University of Amsterdam, University of Miami, University of Missouri, European Pensions and Investments 2021 Summit, Inquire Europe 2022 Seminar, Notre Dame Investment Management Conference, Q Group 2021 Spring Seminar, and Western Finance Association 2021 meeting for helpful comments. We are grateful to Lili Ge for research assistance. We thank the Center for Responsible Investing at ASU for financial support. We gratefully acknowledge research funding from INQUIRE Europe. Sunil Wahal is a consultant to Avantis Investors. Avantis did not provide data or funding for this research.
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