Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-j824f Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-15T12:27:26.076Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Heterogeneity of Beliefs and Trade in Experimental Asset Markets

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 December 2018

Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.

We investigate the relationship between traders’ expectations and market outcomes with experimental asset market data. The data show that those who have high price expectations buy more frequently and submit higher bids, and those who hold low price expectations sell more frequently and submit lower bids. Traders who have more accurate expectations achieve greater earnings. Simulations using only belief data reproduce the pricing patterns observed in the market well, indicating that the heterogeneity of expectations is a key to explaining market activity.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington 2018 

Footnotes

1

We gratefully acknowledge the comments of participants at the 2015 Experimental Finance Conference, the 2015 International Meeting on Experimental and Behavioral Sciences, the 2015 Thurgau Experimental Economics Meeting on Formation and Elicitation of Beliefs, and the 2017 Economic Science Association Meetings. We thank Iván Barreda-Tarrazona, Andreas Chouliaras, Sascha Füllbrunn, Nikolaos Georgantzis, Harry Grammatikos, Jarrad Harford (the editor), Ernan Haruvy, Cars Hommes, Julien Penasse, Marc-Oliver Rieger, and Jang Schiltz for their comments, which helped to improve the paper. The scientific research presented in this publication was financially supported by the National Research Fund of Luxembourg (F2R-368 LSF-PMA-13SYSB). Part of this paper was written while Neugebauer was at the University Jaume I, Castellon, Spain.

References

Bao, T.; Hommes, C.; and Makarewicz, T.. “Bubble Formation and (In)Efficient Markets in Learning-to-Forecast and Optimise Experiments.” Economic Journal, 127 (2017), F581F609.Google Scholar
Barberis, N.; Greenwood, R.; Jin, L.; and Shleifer, A.. “X-CAPM: An Extrapolative Capital Asset Pricing Model.” Journal of Financial Economics, 115 (2015), 124.Google Scholar
Biais, B., and Bossaerts, P.. “Asset Prices and Trading Volume in a Beauty Contest.” Review of Economic Studies, 65 (1998), 307340.Google Scholar
Blanco, M.; Engelmann, D.; Koch, A. K.; and Normann, H. T.. “Belief Elicitation in Experiments: Is There a Hedging Problem?Experimental Economics, 13 (2010), 412438.Google Scholar
Brock, W. A., and Hommes, C. H.. “A Rational Route to Randomness.” Econometrica, 65 (1997), 10591095.Google Scholar
Brock, W. A., and Hommes, C. H.. “Heterogeneous Beliefs and Routes to Chaos in a Simple Asset Pricing Model.” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 22 (1998), 12351274.Google Scholar
Charness, G., and Neugebauer, T.. “A Test of the Modigliani-Miller Invariance Theorem and Arbitrage in Experimental Asset Markets.” Journal of Finance, forthcoming (2018).Google Scholar
Cheung, S. L.; Hedegaard, M.; and Palan, S.. “To See Is To Believe: Common Expectations in Experimental Asset Markets.” European Economic Review, 66 (2014), 8496.Google Scholar
Costa-Gomes, M. A., and Weizsäcker, G.. “Stated Beliefs and Play in Normal-Form Games.” Review of Economic Studies, 75 (2008), 729762.Google Scholar
Fischbacher, U., and Gächter, S.. “Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods Experiments.” American Economic Review, 100 (2010), 541556.Google Scholar
Forsythe, R.; Rietz, T. A.; and Ross, T. W.. “Wishes, Expectations and Actions: A Survey on Price Formation in Election Stock Markets.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 39 (1999), 83110.Google Scholar
Gillette, A. B.; Stevens, D. E.; Watts, S. G.; and Williams, A. W.. “Information Releases: An Experimental Approach Incorporating Traders’ Subjective Beliefs.” Contemporary Accounting Research, 16 (1999), 437479.Google Scholar
Greenwood, R., and Shleifer, A.. “Expectations of Returns and Expected Returns.” Review of Financial Studies, 27 (2014), 714746.Google Scholar
Harrison, J. M., and Kreps, D. M.. “Speculative Investor Behavior in a Stock Market with Heterogeneous Expectations.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 92 (1978), 323336.Google Scholar
Haruvy, E.; Lahav, Y.; and Noussair, C. N.. “Traders’ Expectations in Asset Markets: Experimental Evidence.” American Economic Review, 97 (2007), 19011920.Google Scholar
Hey, J. D., and Morone, A.. “Do Markets Drive Out Lemmings—or Vice Versa?Economica, 71 (2004), 637659.Google Scholar
Hirshleifer, J.Speculation and Equilibrium: Information, Risk, and Markets.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 89 (1975), 519542.Google Scholar
Hommes, C. H.Heterogeneous Agent Models in Economics and Finance.” In Handbook of Computational Economics, Vol. II, Tesfatsion, L. and Judd, K. L., eds. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: North-Holland, Elsevier (2006), 11091186.Google Scholar
Hommes, C. H., and Lux, T.. “Individual Expectations and Aggregate Behavior in Learning-to-Forecast Experiments.” Macroeconomic Dynamics, 17 (2013), 373401.Google Scholar
Hommes, C. H.; Sonnemans, J.; Tuinstra, J.; and Van de Velden, H.. “Coordination of Expectations in Asset Pricing Experiments.” Review of Financial Studies, 18 (2005), 955980.Google Scholar
Hong, H., and Stein, J. C.. “Disagreement and the Stock Market.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21 (2007), 109128.Google Scholar
Keynes, J. M. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press (1936).Google Scholar
Kirchler, M.; Huber, J.; and Stöckl, T.. “Thar She Bursts: Reducing Confusion Reduces Bubbles.” American Economic Review, 102 (2012), 865883.Google Scholar
Lahav, Y.Eliciting Beliefs in Beauty Contest Experiments.” Economics Letters, 137 (2015), 4549.Google Scholar
LeBaron, B.Agent-Based Computational Finance.” In Handbook of Computational Economics, Vol. II, Tesfatsion, L. and Judd, K. L., eds. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: North-Holland, Elsevier (2006), 11871233.Google Scholar
Lei, V.; Noussair, C. N.; and Plott, C. R.. “Nonspeculative Bubbles in Experimental Asset Markets: Lack of Common Knowledge of Rationality vs. Actual Irrationality.” Econometrica, 69 (2001), 831859.Google Scholar
Lei, V., and Vesely, F.. “Market Efficiency: Evidence from a No-Bubble Asset Market Experiment.” Pacific Economic Review, 14 (2009), 246258.Google Scholar
Marimon, R.; Spear, S. E.; and Sunder, S.. “Expectationally Driven Market Volatility: An Experimental Study.” Journal of Economic Theory, 61 (1993), 74103.Google Scholar
Milgrom, P., and Stokey, N.. “Information, Trade and Common Knowledge.” Journal of Economic Theory, 26 (1982), 1727.Google Scholar
Miller, E.Risk, Uncertainty, and Divergence of Opinion.” Journal of Finance, 32 (1977), 11511168.Google Scholar
Nagel, R.Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study.” American Economic Review, 85 (1995), 13131326.Google Scholar
Neugebauer, T.; Perote, J.; Schmidt, U.; and Loos, M.. “Selfish-Biased Conditional Cooperation: On the Decline of Contributions in Repeated Public Goods Experiments.” Journal of Economic Psychology, 30 (2009), 5260.Google Scholar
Noussair, C. N.; Robin, S.; and Ruffieux, B.. “Price Bubbles in Asset Markets with Constant Fundamental Values.” Experimental Economics, 4 (2001), 87105.Google Scholar
Nyarko, Y., and Schotter, A.. “An Experimental Study of Belief Learning Using Elicited Beliefs.” Econometrica, 70 (2002), 9711005.Google Scholar
Palan, S.A Review of Bubbles and Crashes in Experimental Asset Markets.” Journal of Economic Surveys, 27 (2013), 570588.Google Scholar
Palfrey, T. R., and Wang, S. W.. “Speculative Overpricing in Asset Markets with Information Flows.” Econometrica, 80 (2012), 19371976.Google Scholar
Rey-Biel, P.Equilibrium Play and Best Response to (Stated) Beliefs in Normal Form Games.” Games and Economic Behavior, 65 (2009), 572585.Google Scholar
Scheinkman, J. A., and Xiong, W.. “Overconfidence and Speculative Bubbles.” Journal of Political Economy, 111 (2003), 11831220.Google Scholar
Schotter, A., and Trevino, I.. “Belief Elicitation in the Laboratory.” Annual Review of Economics, 6 (2014), 103128.Google Scholar
Selten, R.Learning Direction Theory and Impulse Balance Equilibrium.” In Economics Lab: An Intensive Course in Experimental Economics, Friedman, D. and Cassar, A., eds. New York, NY: Routledge (2004), 133140.Google Scholar
Smith, V. L.; Suchanek, G. L.; and Williams, A. W.. “Bubbles, Crashes, and Endogenous Expectations in Experimental Spot Asset Markets.” Econometrica, 56 (1988), 11191151.Google Scholar
Stöckl, T.; Huber, J.; and Kirchler, M.. “Bubble Measures in Experimental Asset Markets.” Experimental Economics, 13 (2010), 284298.Google Scholar
Sunder, S.Experimental Asset Markets: A Survey.” In Handbook of Experimental Economics, Kagel, J. H. and Roth, A. E., eds. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (1995), 445500.Google Scholar
Tirole, J.On the Possibility of Speculation under Rational Expectations.” Econometrica, 50 (1982), 11631181.Google Scholar
Trautmann, S. T., and van de Kuilen, G.. “Belief Elicitation: A Horse Race among Truth Serums.” Economic Journal, 125 (2014), 21162135.Google Scholar
Van Boening, M. V.; Williams, A. W.; and LaMaster, S.. “Price Bubbles and Crashes in Experimental Call Markets.” Economics Letters, 41 (1993), 179185.Google Scholar
Varian, H. R.Divergence of Opinion in Complete Markets: A Note.” Journal of Finance, 40 (1985), 309317.Google Scholar
Varian, H. R.Differences of Opinion in Financial Markets.” In Financial Risk: Theory, Evidence and Implications, Stone, C. C., ed. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer (1989), 337.Google Scholar
Varian, H. R.Differences of Opinion.” In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance, Eatwell, J., Milgate, M., and Newman, P., eds. Cambridge, UK: Macmillan Press (1992), 668670.Google Scholar
Wooldridge, J. M. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. Boston, MA: MIT Press (2010).Google Scholar