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The Impact of the New York City Fiscal Crisis on the Interest Cost of New Issue Municipal Bonds

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 April 2009

Extract

The default of a major corporation or municipality generates debate over the impact these failures have on the borrowing cost of other issuers. Theory suggests that in efficient markets individual failures by themselves should not increase the level of interest rates in a market unless the default provides unanticipated information about other issuers. The default of New York City in the summer of 1975 was believed by many to have provided information that increased the perceived risk of investors and consequently increased new issue borrowing costs in the municipal bond market. Empirical research by Forbes and Peterson [2] and Gramlich [3] supports this contention, reporting that borrowers paid as much as 119 basis points more because of the New York City crisis. A study by Hoffland [6] suggests that the impact of the default was not just temporary, but was felt long after 1975. Though less scientific, others note that during 1975 municipal borrowing costs rose to record high levels with most issues carrying their interest cost during the summer of 1975.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © School of Business Administration, University of Washington 1983

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