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Information, Investment Horizon, and Price Reactions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 April 2009

Anjan V. Thakor
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Abstract

This paper studies the dynamic investment policies of firms under asymmetric information.Managers make decisions to maximize the wealth of existing shareholders. In equilibrium, the superior firms invest “myopically”, choosing intrinsically lower-valued projects that produce “early” cash flows. The inferior firms follow the socially preferred rule of investing in intrinsically higher-valued projects that produce “late” cash flows. In addition to explaining investment myopia, the model generates numerous predictions regarding announcement effects of equity issues and attempts by firms to stockpile cash, firms' preferences for limits on mandatory disclosure rules, and the effects of managerial entrenchment motives.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis , Volume 28 , Issue 4 , December 1993 , pp. 459 - 482
Copyright
Copyright © School of Business Administration, University of Washington 1993

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