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Intermediation in Private Equity: The Role of Placement Agents
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 15 May 2019
Abstract
Intermediation in private equity involves illiquid investments, professional investors, and high information asymmetry. We use this unique setting to empirically evaluate theoretical predictions regarding intermediation. Using placement agents has become nearly ubiquitous, but agents are associated with significantly lower abnormal returns in venture and real estate funds, consistent with investor capture and influence peddling. However, returns are higher for buyout funds employing a top-tier agent and for first-time real estate and venture funds employing an agent, and are less volatile for agent-affiliated funds, consistent with a certification role. Our results suggest heterogeneous motives for intermediation in the private equity industry.
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- Research Article
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- Copyright
- Copyright © Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington 2019
Footnotes
The authors thank an anonymous referee, Jean-Noël Barrot, John Chalmers, Diane Del Guercio, Ro Gutierrez, Yael Hochberg, Paul Malatesta (the editor), Youchang Wu, and conference and seminar participants at the 2015 American Finance Association Annual Meeting, 2015 Private Equity Research Consortium (PERC) Meeting, 2014 Argentum Centre for Private Equity Symposium, 2014 American Law and Economics Association Annual Meeting, 2015 Conference to honor John McConnell’s contributions in the field of finance, The Brattle Group, Indiana University, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, the University of Notre Dame, and the University of Oregon for helpful comments. They also thank James Hicks for his research assistance.
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