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Interpreting Common Stock Returns around Proxy Statement Disclosures and Annual Shareholder Meetings

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 April 2009

James A. Brickley
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Abstract

Numerous studies have analyzed the stock market reaction to information released in proxy statements. Two possible biases in proxy statement research are suggested frequently: misspecification of the return benchmark and a sample selection bias from analyzing only “clean” events. This paper presents evidence that most of the conclusions of existing studies are not affected by these potential biases. A significantly positive abnormal return was found around a random sample of shareholder meeting dates. The result indicates that interpreting event study results for announcements occurring around annual shareholder meetings must be conducted carefully. The results are consistent with the findings of Kalay and Loewenstein [14], who argue that risk and expected return can increase around predictable, information-producing events. Alternatively, the study can be viewed as being consistent with several recent studies that find anomalous results, using daily return data and large samples.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis , Volume 21 , Issue 3 , September 1986 , pp. 343 - 349
Copyright
Copyright © School of Business Administration, University of Washington 1986

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References

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