Sorting Equilibria in Financial Markets: The Incentive Problem

Extract

In a recent paper [3] we developed a theory of financial intermediariesas information producers. We argued that financial intermediaries are one class of market participants who specialize in the production of information and sell that informationtofirms with investments to finance which can profit from its distribution. In order to focus on financial intermediation, we sacrificed considerable generality in our model ofcompetitive information production in capital markets. In particular we assumed that there were only two types of assets available in the market known as type A and type B firms. Second, we assumed that information would be produced about all assets by only one information producer or that information was a declining cost industry. The approach we utilized is actually a special case of what has been called a screening or certification process (see Stiglitz [6] and Viscusi [7]), and what we prefer to callsorting. The sorting market is a market where high value and low value assets are distinguished by market participants who specialize in sorting. It is similar, but not identical, to the process of signaling developed by Spence [5] and applied to financial markets by Ross [4] and Bhattacharya [1]. Yet, the extant literature on sorting has, by and large, ignored the opportunity for thosewho stand to lose from sorting to offer side payments to thwart the sorting process. While the problem of side payments may be of minor significance for some applications of sorting and signaling models, the prospect of side payments appears to be an important if not crucial issue infinancial markets.