Survey assessments have found limited evidence of benefits of executive attractiveness. We use an objective measure of facial attractiveness that is correlated with survey assessments but less noisy and identify several benefits from executive facial attractiveness previously found in the general population but heretofore empirically elusive among executives. We examine the effect of both measures on executive compensation, promotion to CEO and the corresponding shareholder reaction, and promotion to board chair. The objective measure identifies significantly positive labor market effects for executive attractiveness in all outcomes in contrast to survey assessments of attractiveness that do not correlate with any outcome.

We present a dynamic, continuous-time model in which risk averse inside equityholders set a bank’s lending, payout, and financing policies, and the exposure of bank assets to crashes. We examine whether bailouts encourage excessive lending and risk taking compared to liquidation or bail-ins with debt-to-equity conversion or debt write-downs. The effects of the prevailing insolvency resolution mechanism (IRM) on the probability of insolvency, loss in default, and the bank’s value suggest no single IRM is a panacea. We show how a bailout fund financed through a tax on bank dividends resolves bailouts without public money and without distorting insiders’ incentives.

We develop an approach that combines the estimation of monthly firm-level expected returns with an assignment of firms to (possibly) latent groups, both based on observable characteristics, using machine learning principles with linear models. The best-performing methods are flexible two-stage sparse models that capture group-membership predictive relationships. Portfolios formed to exploit such group-varying predictions based on a parsimonious set of characteristics deliver economically meaningful returns with low turnover. We propose statistical tests based on nonparametric bootstrapping for our results, and detail how different characteristics may matter for different groups of firms, making comparisons to the existing literature.

I study the effect of patent-infringement claims by patent trolls on acquisitions of small firms. Exploiting staggered adoption of state anti-patent troll laws, I find that the laws have two effects. First, the number of acquisitions of small firms declines after these laws are adopted. Second, the anti-troll laws increase the acquisition price for acquirers. The market reflects the increased cost of acquisition as measured by lower acquisition announcement returns. Large firms increase R&D after the adoption of state laws, replacing external innovation. Using a sample of acquisitions that are plausibly unaffected by the laws, I disentangle alternative explanations.

Using a standardized methodology, we empirically evaluate 55 proposed determinants of capital structure in terms of statistical significance, economic significance, and identification. We find that robust and economically important determinants of debt ratios are relatively few in number. Nevertheless, because each determinant relates to one of five market imperfections—taxes, distress costs, information asymmetry, agency costs, or supply frictions—we draw conclusions from the evidence as a whole regarding the explanatory power of different capital structure theories. We find greater support for pecking order theory and supply-related theories, with less support for traditional tradeoff theory and agency theory.

We study the importance of peer effects among sell-side analysts who work at the same brokerage house, but cover different firms. By mapping the information network within each brokerage, we identify analysts who occupy central positions in the network. Central analysts incorporate more information from their coworkers and produce better research. Using shocks to network structures around brokerage mergers, we identify the influence of peer effects and the importance of industry expertise on analysts’ performance. A portfolio strategy that exploits the forecast revisions of central analysts earns up to 24% per annum.

Exploiting the random assignment of judges to corporate bankruptcy filings, we estimate financial costs of judicial inexperience. Despite new judges’ prior legal experience, formal education, and rigorous hiring process, their public Chapter 11 cases spend 19% more time in bankruptcy, realize 31% higher legal and professional fees, and 21% lower creditor recovery rates. Examining possible mechanisms, we find that new judges take longer to rule on motions and cases assigned to these judges file more plans of reorganization. Conservative estimates suggest that minor policy adjustments could increase creditor recoveries by approximately $16.8 billion for the public firms in our sample.

We study how the U.S. government’s anti-counterfeiting enforcement actions through Special 301 Reports influence U.S. businesses. We show that anti-counterfeiting enforcement in foreign countries improves U.S. firms’ sales, profitability, and valuations. Firms significantly reduce capital and research and development investments when their brands and products are protected from counterfeiting activities. Anti-counterfeiting enforcement measures also improve brand asset value, brand profitability, brand inventiveness, market penetration, and customer loyalty.

We study 6,083 European firms that were acquired between 1999 and 2015. Soon after the acquisition, the acquired firms promptly and substantially close the gap between their actual leverage ratios and their target (optimal) ratios. Firms that were over- (under-) leveraged at the start of their acquisition year move their debt-to-assets ratio from 34.1% to 20% (10% to 18.5%) by the end of the following year. Under-leveraged firms expand their assets rapidly following acquisition, as they gain improved access to investable resources. Our results are consistent with the trade-off theory of capital structure and with the existence of firm-specific target leverage ratios.

In this study, we examine the effect of worldwide board reforms on the cost of debt financing. We document an increase of loan spread after a country initiates the reform. The increase is larger among firms that are more exposed to shareholder–debtholder conflicts. The results suggest that board reforms empower shareholders at the cost of debtholders. However, we also find that, while the reform component related to board independence leads to the increase in the cost of debt, the component related to audit committee independence helps decrease the cost.

In a rich, calibrated life-cycle model, we show that well-designed mandatory pension plans significantly improve the welfare of individuals procrastinating on savings, and even improve most rational individuals’ welfare through a return tax advantage and fair annuitization. For a group of heterogeneous savers, in terms of preferences and sophistication, the best plan has contributions of 10% of income from age 30, a glidepath investment strategy, payouts following a variable lifelong annuity, and options to choose a different investment strategy and to modify the annuitization feature. This plan generates an average welfare gain of $175,000 per individual.

Recent studies on agency problems in private equity fueled the suspicion that fund managers strategically manipulate performance estimates around fundraising times. While these studies use aggregated portfolio data, this paper offers the first analysis of “window dressing” in private equity based on deal-level performance. In contrast to previous findings of a smoking gun at the fund level, I do not find any evidence of inflated performance at the deal level. Fund performance peaks are driven by a cohort effect whereby late investments are made under pressure before fundraising and have lower returns than those made earlier in the fund’s life.

We link equity and treasury bond markets via an informational channel. When macroeconomic state shifts are more probable, informed traders are more likely to have valid signals about fundamentals, so that uninformed traders are less willing to trade against informed ones. This implies low volume and high volatility, that is, a high volatility–volume ratio (VVR). Central banks react to state shifts, but their actions are uncertain. Therefore, a higher state shift likelihood implies larger bond risk premia. These arguments together imply that VVR should positively predict bond excess returns. We empirically test and confirm this prediction, both in- and out-of-sample.

Using a large and novel data set over the period of 1976 to 2019 tracking inventors’ career paths following mergers and acquisitions, we show that collaboration between acquirer and target inventors post-merger is associated with more path-breaking patents than those filed by either acquirer or target inventor-only teams. We further show that such collaboration is more important in improving acquirers’ innovation capabilities than hiring target inventors and knowledge spillovers. Finally, we show that recombining tacit knowledge embodied in the human capital of acquirer and target inventors is likely the mechanism. We conclude that inter-firm inventor collaboration is one key means for achieving synergies.

In a sample of non-U.S. regulatory regime shifts, we find that expanded short selling is associated with stock price declines, reductions in capital expenditure, and lower asset growth. In a reversal of results found for U.S. stocks in a study of Regulation SHO by Grullon, Michenaud, and Weston (2015), our results are stronger for large firms than for small firms. We also show that this investment effect is stronger for firms that previously relied on outside financing. Our results suggest that short-sale policies affect corporate investment and that this effect is not driven by capital constraints.

There are significant differences among sell-side analysts in how frequently they revise recommendations. We show that much of this variation is an analyst-individual trait. Analysts who change recommendations more slowly make recommendations that are more influential and generate better portfolio returns. Slower-revising analysts tend to change recommendations following corporate news that are harder to interpret by nonstock experts, and our evidence suggests that their investment value derives from their ability to better interpret hard-to-assess information. On average, analysts change recommendations less frequently as their career progresses; however, recommendation speed-style is the dominant predictor of their recommendation value.

We document statistically significant relations between mutual fund betas and past market returns driven by fund feedback trading. Against this backdrop, evidence of “artificial” market timing emerges when standard market timing regressions are estimated across periods that span time variation in fund systematic risk levels, as is typical. Artificial timing significantly explains the inverse relation between timing model estimates of market timing and stock selectivity. A fund’s feedback trading relates to its past performance and remains significant after accounting for trading on momentum. Fund flows suggest that investors value feedback trading, which helps hedge downside risk during bear markets.

We decompose long-term nominal bond yields into real and inflation components in an international context using inflation-linked and nominal bonds. In contrast to extant results, real rate variation dominates the variation in inflation-linked and nominal yields. Cross-country nominal and inflation-linked yield correlations have declined since the Great Recession. Real rates are the main source of the correlation between nominal yields. Our results are robust to various alternative measurements of inflation expectations and the liquidity premium. They continue to hold when a no-arbitrage term structure model with real, nominal, and inflation factors is used to effect the yield decomposition.

We analyze whether industry competition influences analyst coverage decisions and whether analysts benefit from covering product market competitors. We find that analysts are more likely to cover a firm when this firm competes with more firms already covered by the analyst. We also find that the intensity of competition among these competitors is additionally important to the coverage decision. Moreover, we find that analysts who cover product market competitors are more likely to obtain analyst star status. These results are consistent with the importance to analysts of industry competition and product market knowledge accumulated through covering product market competitors.

In theory, financial markets promote innovation by selectively allocating capital to high-quality projects. In this article, I show that equity markets can also inhibit innovation. In public firms, I find that short-term equity market declines cause pharmaceutical companies to abandon early-stage drug developments, irrespective of drug quality or changes in a firm’s stock price. I show that financing constraints drive this behavior, highlighting that even short-term market fluctuations can have long-term effects on pharmaceutical innovation and prevent potentially life-saving drugs from progressing to the market.