We examine how creditor rights affect the trade-off between non-debt and debt tax shields. Using four bankruptcy reforms and a panel of private and public firms from Italy, we show that laws empowering creditors reduce tax avoidance and increase debt financing, consistent with firms substituting non-debt tax shields with debt tax shields. We corroborate the validity of our findings using a panel of public firms across 33 countries. Additionally, we document that the impact of creditor protection laws is mitigated by tax system characteristics, which significantly reduce the incentives to substitute tax avoidance with debt.

This article uses FAS 123R regulation to examine how reduction in CEO compensation incentives affects managerial “playing it safe” behavior. Using proxies reflecting deliberate managerial efforts to change firm risk, difference-in-difference tests show that affected firms drastically reduce both systematic and idiosyncratic risks, leading to an 8% decline in total firm risk. These reductions in risk are achieved by shifting to safer, but low-Q, segments while closing the riskier ones, without significant changes in investment levels. Our findings suggest that decrease in risk-taking incentives provided by option compensation, when not compensated for by alternative incentives or governance mechanisms, exacerbates risk-related agency problem.

This study highlights the positive impact of a stock market listing on workplace safety. We find that workplace injuries in publicly listed firms are lower than those in comparable private firms, and this effect relates to heightened monitoring by the media and regulators. The media pays more attention to public firms’ safety issues than to those of private firms, and the reduced media scrutiny due to local newspaper closures leads to greater increases in injuries in public firms. Regulators also monitor public firms more strictly, evidenced by a higher likelihood of nonroutine inspections and larger penalties for detected violations.

Firm-level variables that predict cross-sectional stock returns, such as price-to-earnings and short interest, are often averaged and used to predict market returns. Using various samples of cross-sectional predictors and accounting for the number of predictors and their interdependence, we find only weak evidence that cross-sectional predictors make good time-series predictors, especially out-of-sample. The results suggest that cross-sectional predictors do not generally contain systematic information.

How does trading in one venue affect the quoting strategies of market makers in other venues? We develop a two-venue imperfect competition model in which market makers face quadratic costs when absorbing shocks. Nonconstant marginal costs imply that absorbing a shock in one venue simultaneously changes marginal costs in all other venues. Moreover, market makers strategically choose which shock(s) to absorb. These two forces may intensify competition, leading to enhanced liquidity. Using Euronext proprietary data, we track individual best bid and ask quotes of intermediaries in each venue. We uncover evidence of strategic cross-venue market-making behavior which is uniquely predicted by our model.

This article examines the effect of board governance on investment efficiency. I use the staggered enactment of board reforms in 41 countries as a shock to board structure that exogenously improves the quality of board oversight of managers. I find that investment-Q sensitivity improves by roughly half post-reform. This effect is more pronounced for firms that are more exposed to the reforms or when external governance mechanisms are less likely to discipline managers. These findings suggest that increased board oversight strengthens managers’ incentives to make investment decisions that are more in line with their firms’ growth opportunities.

We present an equilibrium model of hedging for commodity processing firms. We show the optimal hedge ratio depends on the convexity of the firm’s cost function and the elasticity of the supply of the input and the demand for the output. Our calibrated model suggests that hedging tends to be ineffective. When uncertainty comes exclusively from either the supply or from the demand side, updating the hedge dynamically, and using nonlinear contracts improves hedging effectiveness. However, with both supply and demand uncertainty, hedging effectiveness can be low even with option-based and dynamic hedging strategies.

How synchronized are short sellers? We examine a unique data set on the distribution of profits across a stock’s short sellers and find evidence of substantial dispersion in the initiation of their positions. Consistent with this dispersion reflecting “synchronization risk,” that is, uncertainty among short sellers about when others will short sell, more dispersed short selling signals i) greater stock overpricing and ii) longer delays in overpricing correction. These effects are prevalent even among stocks facing low short-selling costs or other explicit constraints. Overall, our findings provide novel cross-sectional evidence of synchronization problems among short sellers and their pricing implications.

An important literature emphasizes that finance grew rapidly after WWII relative to the full economy and the services sector, but these are poor benchmarks because they mask a broad structural shift from low- to high-skill services. We show that i) finance is among the most skill-intensive service industries, ii) the evolution of the finance income share closely tracks other high-skill service industries, and iii) finance grew much slower than the rest of high-skill services in the post-WWII period. The rise of modern finance is not as remarkable as prior research suggests, providing context for debates about the size of finance.

We identify a novel way of evergreening loans in India. A low-quality bank lends to a related party of an insolvent borrower, and the loan recipient transfers the funds to the insolvent borrower using internal capital markets. Incremental investments, interest rates charged, and loan delinquency rates collectively indicate evergreening. These loans are unlikely to represent arm’s length transactions or rescue of troubled related firms by stronger firms to prevent group-wide spillover effects. Indirect evergreening is less likely to be detected by regulatory audits. It has significant real consequences at the firm and industry levels.

I study venture capital firms’ (VCs) use of public market information and how attention to this information relates to private market investment outcomes. I link web traffic to public filings hosted on EDGAR to individual VCs. VCs analyze public information about industry peers before most deals. An increase in industry filing views relates positively to the probability of an exit through acquisition, suggesting that public information helps identify paths to acquisition. The effect is stronger when the VC has less access to private information, especially for low-reputation VCs. Policymakers should consider spillover effects on private markets when setting public disclosure requirements.

Do lenders securitize or price loans in response to credit risk? Exploiting exogenous variation in regional credit risk due to foreclosure law differences along U.S. state borders, we find that lenders securitize mortgages that are eligible for sale to the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) rather than price regional credit risk. For non-GSE-eligible mortgages with no GSE buyback provision, lenders increase interest rates as they are unable to shift credit risk to loan purchasers. The results inform the debate surrounding the GSEs’ buyback provisions, the constant interest rate policy, and show that underpricing regional credit risk increases the GSEs’ debt holdings.

Consistent with the empirical properties of the consumption data, I develop a model in which consumption and dividend growth follow regime-switching dynamics. I show that regime-shift risk is priced in the model. Regime-shift risk exhibits dominant influence on asset prices: It generates a high equity premium and also induces time-varying risk premiums. The model explains major business cycle-dependent asset market phenomena and, in particular, the stronger predictability of stock returns during recessions.

Informal risk sharing within social networks and formal financial contracts both enable households to manage risk. We find that financial contracting reduces participation in social networks. Specifically, increased crop insurance usage decreased local religious adherence and congregation membership in agricultural communities. Our identification utilizes the Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994 that doubled crop insurance usage nationally within a year, although changes in usage varied across counties. Difference-in-difference and Spatial First Difference tests confirm that households substituted insurance for religiosity. This substitution was associated with reductions in crop diversification and crop yields, indicating an increase in moral hazard.

Hand-collecting credit line drawdowns that firms classify as long-term debt, we first document how long-term drawdowns rise with high investment needs or weak external capital market conditions. Nearly all drawdown proceeds finance long-term investment, including M&A activity. Unrated and lower-rated firms rely more on long-term drawdowns than high or very poorly rated firms. We further find that credit lines have tighter covenants than terms loans. Drawdowns are repaid fairly quickly and often refinanced with other long-term debt. Our findings support the monitored liquidity insurance theory of credit lines and highlight that long-term drawdowns act as a valuable bridge financing mechanism.

Does proprietary knowledge protection (PKP) spur or hinder the product-market performance of new firms? Exploiting the staggered adoptions of the inevitable disclosure doctrine by U.S. State Courts, which enhance PKP, we show that treated firms increase industry-adjusted sales growth by 2% compared to control firms. The effect is concentrated among small and young firms and increases with the scope of proprietary knowledge and rivals’ access to external finance. PKP encourages firms to develop new products and stimulates initial public offering activity. Our results suggest that PKP alleviates predation risk associated with “deep-pocket” rivals by allowing firms to maintain competitive advantages.

We hypothesize that corporate takeover markets create significant constraints for short sellers. Both short sellers and corporate bidders often target firms with declining economic prospects. Yet, a target firm’s stock price generally increases upon a takeover announcement, resulting in losses for short sellers. Therefore, short sellers should require higher rates of return when the takeover likelihood is higher. Consistent with this prediction, the return predictability of monthly short interest increases with industry-level takeover probability and decreases as takeover defenses are implemented. Our results suggest that efficient takeover markets create trading frictions for short sellers and can therefore inhibit overall market efficiency.

This article examines the effectiveness of cooperation among bank supervisors using novel data on supranational agreements signed by 93 countries. Exploiting that globally operating banks are differently covered by these agreements, we show that supervisory cooperation generally improves bank stability. The magnitude of the effect is higher for smaller global banks, and when supervisors are more stringent and have access to higher quality information. We also show that actual supervisory cooperation varies across countries consistent with differences in economic costs and benefits of cooperation. This suggests that cooperation is not always desirable, despite being effective in reducing bank risk.

This article provides micro-level evidence for the role of foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) in the cross-border transmission of global financial uncertainty shocks. Using Chinese firm-level data, we find that rising uncertainty has a significantly larger contractionary effect on real investment for FIEs than their local counterparts. This effect is more pronounced for firms faced with greater investment irreversibility or financial constraints. The contractionary effect is mainly driven by downside uncertainty, whereas upside uncertainty is modestly expansionary. Similar effects are found for other firm-level performances. There is also a spillover effect to local private firms with FIEs concentrated in downstream sectors.

We find that organization capital is negatively related to the cost of bank loans. This finding is robust to additional analyses including those that address omitted variable bias and reverse causality. In addition, we find that organization capital reduces all-in-spread-undrawn. When we decompose the bank loan cost, we find that organization capital increases facility fees due to its risk-engendering characteristics. Finally, we find that organization capital is positively associated with a high likelihood of the presence of inventors and innovation output, consistent with the argument that organization capital is embedded in the key talent within a firm.