This paper documents significantly negative stock price reactions to shareholder-initiated class action lawsuits. We find that shareholders partially anticipate these lawsuits based on lawsuit filings against other firms in the same industry and capitalize part of these losses prior to a lawsuit filing date. We show that the more likely a firm is to be sued, the larger the partial anticipation effect (shareholder losses capitalized prior to a lawsuit filing date) and the smaller the filing date effect (shareholder losses measured on the lawsuit filing date). Our evidence suggests that previous research that typically focuses on the filing date effect understates the magnitude of shareholder losses, and that such an understatement is greater for firms with a higher likelihood of being sued.

Individual and institutional investors can trade German initial public equity offerings on an as-if/when-issued basis before the start of secondary trading. Using actual when-issued trades made by a sample of clients at a large German retail broker during 1999 and 2000, the paper documents that retail buyers consistently overpay for initial public offerings (IPOs) in the when-issued market relative to the immediate aftermarket. The observed willingness to overpay points to sentiment as a driver of retail trading decisions. Consistent with this interpretation and with sentiment affecting prices, IPOs that are aggressively bought by individuals in the when-issued market exhibit high first-day returns as well as poor aftermarket returns relative to benchmarks of similar stocks.

We use a unique database on ownership stakes of equity mutual fund directors to analyze whether the directors’ incentive structure is related to fund performance. Ownership of both independent and nonindependent directors plays an economically and statistically significant role. Funds in which directors have low ownership, or “skin in the game,” significantly underperform. We posit two economic mechanisms to explain this relation. First, lack of ownership could indicate a director’s lack of alignment with fund shareholder interests. Second, directors may have superior private information on future performance. We find evidence in support of the first and against the second mechanism.

We analyze the impact of the press on the behavior of various economic agents by examining how media exposure of board ineffectiveness affects corporate governance, investor trading behavior, and security prices. Our focus on board quality is motivated by the strong media criticism to which corporate boards and corporate America, in general, have been recently subjected. The results indicate that media releases of (noisy) information have significant economic consequences. In particular, media exposure of board ineffectiveness forces the targeted agents to take corrective actions and enhances shareholder wealth. Individual investors appear to react negatively to the media exposure, whereas investment firms act as if they anticipate the targeted firms’ corrective actions.

We conduct a comprehensive study of commonality in liquidity using intraday spread and depth data from 47 stock exchanges. We find that firm-level changes in liquidity are significantly influenced by exchange-level changes across most of the world’s stock exchanges. Emerging Asian exchanges have exceptionally strong commonality, while those of Latin America exhibit little if any commonality. After documenting the pervasive role of commonality within individual exchanges, we examine commonality across exchanges. We find evidence of a distinct, global component in bid-ask spreads and depths. Local (exchange-level) sources of commonality represent roughly 39% of the firm’s total commonality in liquidity, while global sources contribute an additional 19%. We also investigate potential sources of exchange-level and global commonality. We show that commonality is driven by both domestic and U.S. macroeconomic announcements.

This study shows that individual investors systematically shift their preferences across extreme style portfolios (small vs. large, value vs. growth). These preference shifts are influenced by past style returns and earnings differentials, and advice from investment newsletters, but are unaffected by innovations in macroeconomic variables or shifts in expectations about future cash flows. Furthermore, investors’ dynamic style preferences influence returns along multiple dimensions: i) the contemporaneous relation between style returns and style-level preference shifts is strong, ii) there is weak evidence of style return predictability, and iii) the correlations among stocks within a style increase when investors move into or out of the style with greater intensity. Overall, the results indicate that stock categorization influences investors’ portfolio decisions and stock returns.

Previous empirical studies on the “rationality” of economic and financial forecasts generally test for generic properties such as bias or autocorrelated errors but provide only limited insight into the behavior behind inefficient forecasts. This paper tests for a specific form of forecast bias. In particular, we examine whether expert consensus forecasts of monthly economic releases are systematically biased toward the value of previous months’ releases. Such a bias would be consistent with the anchoring and adjustment heuristic described by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) or could arise from professional forecasters’ strategic incentives. We find broad-based and significant evidence for this form of bias, which in some cases results in sizable predictable forecast errors. To investigate whether market participants’ expectations are influenced by this bias, we examine interest rate reactions to economic news. We find that bond yields react only to the residual, or unpredictable, component of the forecast error and not to the component induced by anchoring, suggesting that expectations of market participants anticipate this bias embedded in expert forecasts.

This paper uses investor-level data to provide direct evidence for an intuitive but surprisingly untested proposition that investors make larger investment mistakes when valuation uncertainty is higher and stocks are more difficult to value. Using multiple measures of valuation uncertainty and multiple behavioral bias proxies, I show that individual investors exhibit stronger behavioral biases when stocks are harder to value and when market-level uncertainty is higher. I also find that informed trading intensity is higher among stocks where individual investors exhibit stronger behavioral biases. Collectively, these results indicate that uncertainty at both stock and market levels amplifies individual investors’ behavioral biases and that relatively better informed investors attempt to exploit those biases.

Variables that in theory determine credit spreads have limited explanatory power in existing empirical work on corporate bond data. We investigate the linear relationship between theoretical determinants of default risk and default swap spreads. We find that estimated coefficients for a minimal set of theoretical determinants of default risk are consistent with theory and are significant statistically and economically. Volatility and leverage have substantial explanatory power in univariate and multivariate regressions. A principal component analysis of residuals and spreads indicates limited evidence for a residual common factor, confirming that the theoretical variables explain a significant amount of the variation in the data.

We examine two hypotheses to explain stock mispricing: i) the money illusion hypothesis (Modigliani and Cohn (1979)) and ii) the resale option hypothesis (Scheinkman and Xiong (2003)). We find that the money illusion hypothesis may explain the level, but not the volatility, of mispricing in the U.S. market. In contrast, the stock resale option hypothesis, which stems from heterogeneous beliefs about future dividend growth rates and short-sale constraints, can explain both the level and the volatility of mispricing. The evidence suggests that while the two hypotheses complement each other in explaining the level of mispricing, the resale option hypothesis provides a more coherent explanation for asset price bubbles, in which extraordinarily high price levels are often accompanied by excessive volatility and frenzied trading.

We uncover a positive stock market risk-return tradeoff after controlling for the covariance of market returns with the value premium. Fama and French (1996) conjecture that the value premium proxies for investment opportunities; therefore, by ignoring it, early specifications suffer from an omitted variable problem that causes a downward bias in the risk-return tradeoff estimation. We also document a positive relation between the value premium and its conditional variance, and the estimated conditional value premium is strongly countercyclical. The latter evidence supports the view that value is riskier than growth in bad times, when the price of risk is high.

We examine the impact of block ownership on the firm’s trading activity and secondary-market liquidity. Our empirical results show that block ownership takes potential trading activity off the table relative to a diffuse ownership structure and impairs the firm’s market liquidity. These adverse liquidity effects disappear, however, once we control for trading activity. Our findings suggest that block ownership is detrimental to the firm’s market liquidity because of its adverse impact on trading activity—a real friction effect. After controlling for this real friction effect, we find little evidence that block ownership has a negative impact on informational friction. Our results suggest that the relative lack of trading, and not the threat of informed trading, explains the inverse relation between block ownership and market liquidity.

What drives the compensation demanded by investors in risky bonds? Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) predict that one key factor is the time-varying negative correlation between interest rates and the yield spreads on corporate bonds. However, the effects of callability and taxes also need to be considered in empirical analyses. Canadian bonds have no tax effects, yet, after controlling for callability, the correlation between riskless interest rates and corporate bond spreads remains negligible. Our results provide support for reduced-form models that explicitly define a default hazard process and untie the relation between the firm’s asset value and default probability.

This study explores the phenomena associated with conflicts of interest, particularly as they pertain to the brokerage and proprietary trading divisions of investment banks. This distinguishes it from past studies, which have researched conflicts of interest between underwriting and brokerage divisions. We examine whether or not an investment bank issues buy recommendations to the market and buys (sells) the same recommended stocks through its proprietary trading division before (after) recommendations, and if so, to what extent this goes on. We find that these conflicts of interest do exist and that these investment banks can profit from their recommendations in the short run.

In this paper, we examine how stock option usage affects total corporate payout. Using fixed-effects panel data estimators on various samples of ExecuComp firms from 1993 to 2005, we find the higher the executive stock options, the lower the total payout, ceteris paribus. We also find some evidence that firms increase payouts through repurchases in order to offset earnings per share dilution that occurs due to usage of executive and non-executive stock options. However, incentives from not having dividend protection for options appear to dominate those from antidilution, resulting in lower total payout for firms with higher options usage.

This paper examines the intertemporal relation between downside risk and expected stock returns. Value at Risk (VaR), expected shortfall, and tail risk are used as measures of downside risk to determine the existence and significance of a risk-return tradeoff. We find a positive and significant relation between downside risk and the portfolio returns on NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq stocks. VaR remains a superior measure of risk when compared with the traditional risk measures. These results are robust across different stock market indices, different measures of downside risk, loss probability levels, and after controlling for macroeconomic variables and volatility over different holding periods as originally proposed by Harrison and Zhang (1999).

This paper tests alternative theories about the effect of asset liquidity on capital structure. Using data from a broad sample of U.S. public companies, I find that leverage is positively related to asset liquidity. Further analysis reveals that the relation between asset liquidity and secured debt is positive, whereas the relation between asset liquidity and unsecured debt is curvilinear. The results are consistent with the view that the costs of financial distress and inefficient liquidation are economically important and that they affect capital structure decisions. In addition, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that the costs of managerial discretion increase with asset liquidity.

Using a proprietary database of currency trades, this paper explores the effects of trading gains and losses on risk-taking among large institutional investors. We find that institutional investors, unlike individuals, are not prone to the disposition effect. Instead, institutions aggressively reduce risk following losses and mildly increase risk following gains. This asymmetry is more pronounced later in the calendar year and among older and more experienced funds. We show that such performance dependence is consistent with dynamic loss aversion (Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001)) and overconfidence. In addition, prior institutional gains and losses have palpable implications for future prices.

Many financial markets, including electronic limit order markets, assign designated liquidity providers (LPs). We study the experience of the Stockholm Stock Exchange, where listed firms contract directly with LPs. Our analysis offers insights regarding situations where designated liquidity provision may be beneficial. In addition, we consider the form of liquidity provision contracts, including affirmative obligations required of the LP and compensation for LP services. We find that low current trading activity, wide spreads, and higher information asymmetry increase the attractiveness of contracted liquidity provision. The evidence indicates that LPs trade against market movements and in times of wide spreads. On balance, firms contracting with LPs experience a decreased cost of capital and significant improvements in market quality and price discovery.

We investigate the (sell-side) analyst rankings of Institutional Investor (I/I) and The Wall Street Journal (WSJ), using data from 1993–2005. We find that factors with a primary component of recognition are the most important determinants of the rankings, although performance measures are statistically significant determinants in some cases. The single exception to this finding is with existing WSJ stars, where industry-adjusted investment-recommendation performance is the only significant determinant of repeating as a star. Further, in the year after becoming stars, the recommendations of WSJ stars are significantly worse than those of nonstars; and the recommendations and earnings forecasts of I/I stars, as well as the earnings forecasts of WSJ stars, are not significantly different from those of nonstars. We conclude that these rankings are largely “popularity contests.”