We show that dividend-growth predictability by the dividend yield is the rule rather than the exception in global equity markets. Dividend predictability is weaker, however, in large and developed markets where dividends are smoothed more, the typical firm is large, and volatility is lower. Our findings suggest that the apparent lack of dividend predictability in the United States does not uniformly extend to other countries. Rather, cross-country patterns in dividend predictability are driven by differences in firm characteristics and the extent to which dividends are smoothed.

Many studies have documented that daily realized volatility estimates based on intraday returns provide volatility forecasts that are superior to forecasts constructed from daily returns only. We investigate whether these forecasting improvements translate into economic value added. To do so, we develop a new class of affine discrete-time option valuation models that use daily returns as well as realized volatility. We derive convenient closed-form option valuation formulas, and we assess the option valuation properties using Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 return and option data. We find that realized volatility reduces the pricing errors of the benchmark model significantly across moneyness, maturity, and volatility levels.

Contrary to the prediction of the standard portfolio diversification theory, many investors place a large fraction of their stock investment in a small number of stocks. I show that underdiversification may be caused by solvency requirements. My model predicts that for quite general preferences and return distributions: (1) underdiversification decreases in discretionary wealth; and (2) expected return and covariance determine which stocks to invest in, but variance, higher moments, and Sharpe ratio do not matter for this choice. In addition, a less-diversified stock portfolio has a higher expected return, a higher volatility, and a higher skewness, and idiosyncratic risks are priced.

Does the momentum effect arise naturally from the determination of asset prices in market equilibrium? We calibrate a standard endowment model of multiple assets under recursive preferences. The momentum effect partly comes from investors’ aversion to consumption risks. An unexpected dividend increase generates a positive return and increases the asset’s proportion of consumption, raising the correlation between its future dividend growth and consumption growth. This is compensated by a higher expected return, generating the momentum effect. The cross-sectional difference in expected returns is also a key contributor. The quantified model produces sizable momentum profits, often close to the observed profits.

We survey theoretical and empirical research on antitakeover provisions, focusing on the relation between antitakeover provisions and shareholder value. We divide the empirical studies based upon the evidence that they provide: short-term event studies, studies on performance and policy changes around adopting antitakeover provisions or passing state antitakeover laws, studies on the impact of antitakeover provisions on takeovers, studies on the relation between antitakeover provisions and firm characteristics, and long-term studies on the relation between antitakeover provisions and firm performance or policies. We also discuss the place of antitakeover provisions in the current debate about “good governance” practices.

Using data on over 4,000 individual residential addresses, we find that geographic distance between directors and corporate headquarters is related to information acquisition and board decisions. The fraction of a board’s unaffiliated directors who live near headquarters is higher when information-gathering needs are greater. When the fraction of unaffiliated directors living near headquarters is lower, nonroutine chief executive officer (CEO) turnover is more sensitive to stock performance. Also, the level, intensity, and sensitivity of CEO equity-based pay increase with board distance. Overall, our results suggest that geographic location is an important dimension of board structure that influences directors’ costs of gathering information.

We demonstrate that personal political preferences of corporate managers influence corporate policies. Specifically, Republican managers who are likely to have conservative personal ideologies adopt and maintain more conservative corporate policies. Those firms have lower levels of corporate debt, lower capital and research and development (R&D) expenditures, less risky investments, but higher profitability. Using the 9/11 terrorist attacks and Sept. 2008 Lehman Brothers bankruptcy as natural experiments, we demonstrate that investment policies of Republican managers became more conservative following these exogenous uncertainty-increasing events. Furthermore, around chief executive officer (CEO) turnovers, including CEO deaths, firm leverage policy becomes more conservative when managerial conservatism increases.

We develop a theory to show how external and internal corporate governance mechanisms affect innovation. We predict a U-shaped relation between innovation and external takeover pressure, which arises from the interaction between expected takeover premia and private benefits of control. Using ex ante and ex post innovation measures, we find strong empirical support for the predicted relation. We exploit the variation in takeover pressure created by the passage of antitakeover laws across different states. Innovation is fostered either by an unhindered market for corporate control or by antitakeover laws that are severe enough to effectively deter takeovers.

We study the informativeness of trades via discount and full-service retail brokers. We find that trades via full-service retail brokers are statistically and economically more informative than are trades via discount retail brokers. This finding holds in every year over the 12-year sample period and in various subsamples. We also find that past returns, volatility, and news announcements positively relate to the net volume of discount retail brokers, but these variables are unrelated to the net volume of full-service retail brokers. Our results suggest that broker type selection bias is an important consideration in studying individual investors’ trades.

We study whether asset-class risk dynamics can help explain the predominantly negative stock-bond return relation and movements in the term structure’s slope over 1997–2011. Using option-derived implied volatilities to measure risk, we find i) the negative stock-bond return relation largely disappears when controlling for risk movements, at both monthly and weekly horizons; ii) the partial relation between equity-risk changes and 10-year T-bond excess returns (term-slope movements) is reliably positive (negative); and iii) a stronger link between equity risk and stock returns implies a more negative stock-bond return correlation. Our results suggest a flight-to-quality influence between equity-risk dynamics and longer-term Treasury pricing.

In closed-end funds, a managed distribution policy (MDP) is a dividend commitment potentially requiring the liquidation of assets. We argue that MDPs lower managerial claims on fund assets and, when the fund is at a discount, increase shareholder value. This transfer of wealth can be rationalized by managers wishing to deter a challenge from activist shareholders through a costly proxy vote. We find strong empirical evidence that managers respond to the presence of activists using MDPs, that MDPs constitute an effective wealth transfer to shareholders, and that activists are less likely to challenge management when an MDP is in place.

Although stock returns of intangibles-intensive firms tend to exceed physical assets-intensive firms, risk-adjusted returns of actively managed mutual funds significantly decrease (increase) with their portfolios’ exposure to intangibles-intensive (physical assets-intensive) firms. Fund managers tend to exhibit skill when they focus on difficult-to-value (e.g., small) firms, except when the firms are intangibles-intensive. In sum, the worst-performing funds are in areas of the market that seem to offer ample opportunities for professional investors due to exacerbated mispricing. The negative impact of investments in intangibles-intensive firms on fund performance appears to be driven by extrapolation bias and decreases with learning from experience.

This article investigates the options market around a revision in the financial analysts’ consensus recommendation. The results demonstrate that options investors trade in the correct direction of the upcoming revision approximately 3 days prior to the announcement. We find this behavior in option-implied prices, implied volatilities, and options trading volume. Tests confirm that the options market leads the stock market before the financial analysts’ revision. Moreover, using all firms with outstanding options, an out-of-sample analysis produces a profitable zero-cost trading strategy net of transaction costs based on the relative valuations between the synthetic and the underlying equity security.

Investment managers are subject to personal and institutional norms that can constrain their investment choices. We conjecture that norm-constrained investors deviate from such norms only when they have compelling information, and we predict that deviating investments earn relatively high abnormal returns ex post. Consistent with our conjecture, we find that institutions averse to holding lottery-like stocks or sin stocks earn relatively high abnormal returns when they choose to hold such stocks. We find similar but weaker results for deviations from broader style categories. Overall, our evidence indicates that deviations from established institutional or social norms signal informed investing.

We investigate the risk choices of risk-averse CEOs. Following recent theoretical work, we expect CEO risk aversion to be more pronounced in firms with high leverage or high default probability. We find that the CEOs of these firms reduce firm risk, even in the presence of strong risk-taking incentives. Our results are robust to controls for the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock price changes, firm risk determinants, the endogenous feedback effects of firm risk on CEO incentives, unobserved firm and market effects, and debt governance. The impact of CEO risk aversion is economically significant.

Using an innovative random regime shift detection methodology, we identify and confirm two distinct regime types in the dynamics of credit spreads: a level regime and a volatility regime. The level regime is long lived and shown to be linked to Federal Reserve policy and credit market conditions, whereas the volatility regime is short lived and, apart from recessionary periods, detected during major financial crises. Our methodology provides an independent way of supporting structural equilibrium models and points toward monetary and credit supply effects to account for the persistence of credit spreads and their predictive power over the business cycle.

We extend the Fama-French (1992) model by considering growth option (as well as distress/leverage) variables in explaining the cross section of stock returns. We find that growth option variables, namely growth in capital investment and yet-unexercised growth options (GO), are significantly and negatively related to stock returns. Investors may be willing to accept lower average returns from growth stocks in exchange for a more favorable (positively skewed) risk-return profile. Book-to-market (BM) ratio seems to proxy for omitted distress/leverage variables. When these are explicitly accounted for, BM is not that significant. Our growth options variables have added explanatory power.

We derive a macroeconomic asset pricing model in which the key factor is the opportunity cost of money. The model explains well the cross section of stock returns in addition to the excess market return. The interest rate factor is priced and seems to drive most of the explanatory power of the model. In this model, both value stocks and past long-term losers enjoy higher average (excess) returns because they have higher interest rate risk than growth/past winner stocks. The model significantly outperforms the nested models (capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and consumption CAPM (CCAPM)) and compares favorably with alternative macroeconomic models.

We analyze the impact of institutional and cultural differences on success in global venture capital (VC) investing. In both developed and emerging economies, superior legal rights (and enforcement) and better developed stock markets significantly enhance VC performance. Remarkably, cultural distance between countries of the portfolio company and its lead investor positively affects VC success. Further analysis reveals that cultural differences create incentives for rigorous ex ante screening, improving VC performance. Finally, local VC participation enhances success and mitigates foreign VCs’ “liability of foreignness,” albeit only in developed economies. Our findings follow from analyzing VC investments in nearly 10,000 companies across 30 countries.

Rather than assuming a fixed recovery rate in estimation, we estimate recovery rates from credit default swap spreads, using 3 years of daily data on 152 corporations. We use a quadratic pricing model, which ensures nonnegative default probabilities and recovery rates. The estimated cross section of recovery rates is plausible, with an average recovery rate of 54% and substantial cross-sectional variation. Estimated 5-year default probabilities are on average 67% higher than default probabilities obtained using the standard 40% recovery assumption. This finding critically impacts the valuation of structured credit products. Larger firms and firms with more tangible assets have higher recovery rates.