Union and public pension funds, the most prolific institutional activists employing low-cost targeting methods, are often accused of pursuing private benefits. Extant literature finds that unions representing workers, as stakeholders, are not aligned with shareholders. Limiting shareholder power may mitigate “special interest” activism but can also exacerbate managerial agency problems. In two different settings, majority approved and withdrawn shareholder proposals, we examine and find supportive evidence that the director labor market as a corporate governance mechanism can selectively mitigate the negative influence that conflicted stakeholder-shareholder union funds have over firms without stifling all influence of low-cost activists.

Using a novel data set that links individual investment bankers to the acquisition deals they advise on, we find that individual investment bankers with greater deal experience are associated with higher acquisition returns and post-acquisition operating performance, particularly for acquirers in complex and more opaque industries. The advisory fee on acquisitions is also positively associated with the investment banking team’s experience. Finally, when more experienced investment bankers switch to a new bank, acquirers are more likely to move with them. Overall, our results suggest that the human capital of individual investment bankers is valuable to acquirers.

Using panel data on top management characteristics and a management quality factor constructed using common factor analysis on individual management quality measures, we analyze the relation between top firm management quality and corporate innovation input and output. We show that top management quality is an important determinant of corporate innovation, with individual aspects of management quality affecting innovation in younger and older firms differently. Further, firms with higher top management quality engage in more risky (“explorative”) innovation strategies. Finally, hiring more and higher-quality inventors is an important channel through which firms with higher management quality achieve greater innovation output.

We uncover stylized facts of commodity futures’ price and volatility dynamics in the post-financialization period and find a factor structure in daily commodity volatility that is much stronger than the factor structure in returns. The common factor in commodity volatility relates to stock market volatility as well as to the business cycle. Model-free realized commodity betas with the stock market were high during 2008–2010 but have since returned to the pre-crisis level, close to 0. While commodity markets appear segmented from the equity market when considering only returns, commodity volatility indicates a nontrivial degree of market integration.

We show that market volatility of volatility is a significant risk factor that affects index and volatility index option returns, beyond volatility itself. The volatility and volatility of volatility indices, identified model-free as the VIX and VVIX, respectively, are only weakly related to each other. Delta-hedged index and VIX option returns are negative on average and are more negative for strategies that are more exposed to volatility and volatility-of-volatility risks. Further, volatility and volatility of volatility significantly negatively predict future delta-hedged option payoffs. The evidence suggests that volatility and volatility-of-volatility risks are jointly priced and have negative market prices of risk.

We proxy for board members’ opinions and values using directors’ ancestral origins and show that diversity has costs and benefits, leading to high performance volatility. Consistent with the idea that diverse groups experiment more, firms with ancestrally diverse boards have more numerous and more cited patents. In addition, their strategies conform less to those of the industry peers. However, firms with greater ancestral diversity also have more board meetings and make less predictable decisions. These findings suggest that diversity may lead to inefficiencies in the decision-making process and conflicts in the boardroom.

We study the theoretical implications of cointegrated stock prices on the profitability of pairs-trading strategies. If stock returns are fairly weakly correlated across time, cointegration implies very high Sharpe ratios. To the extent that the theoretical Sharpe ratios are “too large,” our results suggest that either i) cointegration does not exist pairwise among stocks, and pairs-trading profits are a result of a weaker or less stable dependency structure among stock pairs, or ii) the serial correlation in stock returns stretches over considerably longer horizons than is usually assumed. Empirically, there is little evidence of cointegration, favoring the first explanation.

I investigate whether bank exposures to sovereign debt during the European debt crisis affected the real economy. I show that a shock to the marked-to-market (MTM) value of bank exposures to sovereign debt led to credit tightening in 2010–2011 that had negative real effects on small and young firms. Because banks do not usually mark their holdings of sovereign bonds to market, I explore the transmission channels of the unrealized losses on credit supply. I show that a shock to MTM exposures reduced short-term bank funding from U.S. money market funds rather than affecting equity or working through alternative channels.

We propose a consistent and computationally efficient 2-step methodology for the estimation of multidimensional non-Gaussian asset models built using Lévy processes. The proposed framework allows for dependence between assets and different tail behaviors and jump structures for each asset. Our procedure can be applied to portfolios with a large number of assets because it is immune to estimation dimensionality problems. Simulations show good finite sample properties and significant efficiency gains. This method is especially relevant for risk management purposes such as, for example, the computation of portfolio Value at Risk and intra-horizon Value at Risk, as we show in detail in an empirical illustration.

We investigate the Dead Hand Proxy Put, a contractual innovation in corporate debt agreements that may impact hedge fund activism. We find the provision principally in loans, not bonds, and provide evidence linking the adoption of the provision to hedge fund activism. Furthermore, controlling for endogeneity, we find that the provision significantly reduces the cost of loans. Bondholder wealth also increases. Moreover, cross-sectional analysis of share returns reveals that the provision is positively associated with repeat banking relationships and negatively associated with free cash flow problems, suggesting a cost-benefit tradeoff.

I investigate how distraction affects the trading behavior of professional asset managers. Exploring detailed transaction-level data, I show that managers with a large fraction of portfolio stocks that have an earnings announcement are significantly less likely to trade in other stocks, suggesting that these announcements divert attention from trading decisions for other stocks. This distraction effect is more pronounced for nonpassive managers who engage in active stock selection choices. Finally, I identify three channels through which distraction hurts managers’ performance: Distracted managers trade less profitably, incur slightly higher transaction costs, and are less likely to close losing positions.

We find that the controlling family holds both the chief executive officer and chair positions in 79% of Norwegian family firms. The family holds more governance positions when it owns large stakes in small, profitable, low-risk firms. This result suggests that the family trades off expected costs and benefits by conditioning participation intensity on observable firm characteristics. We find that the positive effect of performance on participation is twice as strong as the positive effect of participation on performance. The endogeneity of participation, therefore, should be carefully accounted for when analyzing the effect of family governance on the family firm’s behavior.

Using within-loan estimations to remove the impact of demand-side factors, we find that the capital levels of banks participating in the same syndicated loan are positively associated with the banks’ contributions to the loan. Consistent with the argument that higher capital reduces the cost of uninsured debt, the positive effect of bank capital on lending is stronger among banks that rely more on wholesale funding. Furthermore, we find that banks increase their contributions to syndicated loans after receiving Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funding. Taken together, we provide new evidence on the importance and causal effect of bank capital on lending.

Stocks that hedge sustained market downturns should have low expected returns, but they do not. We use ex ante firm characteristics and covariances to construct a tradable safe minus risky (SMR) portfolio that hedges market downturns out of sample. Although downturns (peaks to troughs in market index levels at the business-cycle frequency) predict significant declines in gross domestic product growth, SMR has significant positive average returns and 4-factor alphas (both around 0.8% per month). Risk-based models do not explain SMR’s returns, but mispricing does. Risky stocks are overpriced when sentiment is high, resulting in subsequent returns of -0.9% per month.

We examine the effects of chief executive officer (CEO) turnover in banks. Incoming bank CEOs face problems of information asymmetry because banks’ operations are opaque and bank risk can change dramatically in a short time. These CEOs may therefore change bank policies to manage their personal risks. Since CEO turnover is usually endogenous, we utilize a setting in which CEO turnover is based solely on retirement age and is thus exogenous to bank performance. Consistent with our thesis, incoming CEOs increase provisioning for future delinquencies and shrink lending. Bank stock prices decline following these changes. Politically motivated lending or ever-greening cannot explain our results.

We study consumption and investment decisions given realistic time-varying constraints on borrowing. We first consider the case where borrowing is constrained by a maximum debt-to-income ratio. We then consider collateral borrowing with a maximum loan-to-value ratio. The resulting implications for optimal policies differ considerably from those obtained in the existing literature based on fixed borrowing limits but are consistent with those documented in the empirical literature.

Using mergers as shocks to fund size, I analyze the return-to-scale property of mutual funds. I find that acquiring funds’ performance deteriorates after experiencing a positive shock in size resulting from mergers, and liquidity plays an important role in the negative relationship between size and performance. I also find that the decline in performance is not due to higher performance prior to the merger, nor driven by higher integration costs after the event. These findings are consistent with mutual funds having decreasing returns to scale and thus provide empirical evidence that supports the theoretical model of Berk and Green (2004).

This article investigates the gap-filling explanation for corporate debt maturity choices in a multi-country setting. We argue that companies adjust their debt maturity in response to shocks in government debt maturity both at home and abroad; the difference between the two effects depends on the markets’ relative size and level of integration. Focusing on the European case and treating the Economic and Monetary Union as a shock in market integration, we find strong empirical support for our predictions. Our results have relevant implications for the opportunity for individual governments to use their debt maturity structure as a policy tool.

Advances in variance analysis permit the splitting of the total quadratic variation of a jump-diffusion process into upside and downside components. Recent studies establish that this decomposition enhances volatility predictions and highlight the upside/downside variance spread as a driver of the asymmetry in stock price distributions. To appraise the economic gain of this decomposition, we design a new and flexible option pricing model in which the underlying asset price exhibits distinct upside and downside semivariance dynamics driven by the model-free proxies of the variances. The new model outperforms common benchmarks, especially the alternative that splits the quadratic variation into diffusive and jump components.

We investigate the relationship between traders’ expectations and market outcomes with experimental asset market data. The data show that those who have high price expectations buy more frequently and submit higher bids, and those who hold low price expectations sell more frequently and submit lower bids. Traders who have more accurate expectations achieve greater earnings. Simulations using only belief data reproduce the pricing patterns observed in the market well, indicating that the heterogeneity of expectations is a key to explaining market activity.