Is the decision to go public or private a stock-market-driven “sideshow” or does it have significant effects on investment and profitability? We address this issue using a comprehensive data set of private and public companies in the U.K. during 1996–2006. Firms with high investment-financing needs, lower information-production costs, and high industry market-to-book ratios are more likely to go public. In contrast to the literature, we find that capital investment and profitability increase substantially after the initial public offering (IPO). Consistent with the agency-cost-based theories of going private, firms decrease investment but increase profits after going private, especially firms bought out by private equity investors. Our analysis also highlights the effects of market conditions on the ownership structure decision.

In this paper, we examine the effect of shareholder rights on reducing the cost of equity and the impact of agency problems from free cash flow (FCF) on this effect. We find that firms with strong shareholder rights have a significantly lower implied cost of equity after controlling for risk factors, price momentum, analysts’ forecast biases, and industry and year effects than do firms with weak shareholder rights. Further analysis shows that the effect of shareholder rights on reducing the cost of equity is significantly stronger for firms with more severe agency problems from FCFs.

In this paper, we identify jumps in U.S. Treasury-bond (T-bond) prices and investigate what causes such unexpected large price changes. In particular, we examine the relative importance of macroeconomic news announcements versus variation in market liquidity in explaining the observed jumps in the U.S. Treasury market. We show that while jumps occur mostly at prescheduled macroeconomic announcement times, announcement surprises have limited power in explaining bond price jumps. Our analysis further shows that preannouncement liquidity shocks, such as changes in the bid-ask spread and market depth, have significant predictive power for jumps. The predictive power is significant even after controlling for information shocks. Finally, we present evidence that post-jump order flow is less informative relative to the case where there is no jump at announcement.

Corporate events happen in waves. In this paper, we examine the timing patterns of 5 different types of corporate event waves (new stock and seasoned equity issues, stock- and cash-financed acquisitions, and stock repurchases) using a comprehensive data set of more than 151,000 corporate transactions over the 25-year period from 1980 to 2004. We document a distinctive pattern, previously not found in the literature, in the way stock-related waves form. Corporate waves seem to start with new issue waves (seasoned equity offering preceding initial public offering waves), followed by stock-financed merger waves, followed in turn by repurchase waves. Our results hold over separate decades and across industries. Our results seem consistent with both the neoclassical efficiency hypothesis and the misvaluation hypothesis, and there are distinct periods when one or the other appears dominant.

We study a transitional economy where state-controlled banks make loan decisions based on noisy inside information on prospective borrowers, and may lend to avert unemployment and social instability. In China, poor financial performance and high managerial expenses increase the likelihood of obtaining a bank loan, and bank loan approval predicts poor subsequent borrower performance. Negative event study responses occur at bank loan announcements, particularly for borrowers measuring poorly on quality and creditworthiness, or for lenders or borrowers involved in litigation regarding loans. Our results highlight dilemmas in a state-led financial system and the local stock market’s sophistication in interpreting news.

We consider a Lucas-type exchange economy with two heterogeneous stocks (trees) and a representative investor with constant relative risk aversion. The dividend process for one stock follows a geometric Brownian motion with constant and known parameters. The expected dividend growth rate for the other tree is stochastic and in general unobservable, although there may be a signal from which the investor can learn about its current value. We find that the equilibrium quantities in our model significantly depend on the information structure and on the level of risk aversion. While an observable stochastic drift mainly makes the economy more risky, a latent expected growth rate process with learning significantly changes the equilibrium price-dividend ratios, price reactions to dividend and drift innovations, expected returns, volatilities, correlations, and differences between the stocks. These effects are the more pronounced the more risk averse the representative investor.

We study optimal replacement and abandonment decisions for real assets, when both revenues and costs are uncertain and deteriorate with age. We develop an implicit representation of the renewal boundary as the solution to a set of simultaneous equations. This quasi-analytical method has the merit of computational ease and transparency. We show that the correlation between revenues and operating costs has a significant influence on the renewal boundary, and that the increase in revenue immediately following a renewal has a greater relative influence on the boundary than either operating cost or renewal cost. The quasi-analytical method is sufficiently flexible to deal with other real option models involving 2 variables.

We explain the currency carry trade (CT) performance using an asset pricing model in which factor loadings are regime dependent rather than constant. Empirical results show that a typical CT strategy has much higher exposure to the stock market and is mean reverting in regimes of high foreign exchange volatility. The findings are robust to various extensions. Our regime-dependent pricing model provides significantly smaller pricing errors than a traditional model. Thus, the CT performance is better explained by a time-varying systematic risk that increases in volatile markets, suggesting a partial resolution of the uncovered interest parity puzzle.

In this study we examine the relation between corporate governance and institutional ownership. Our empirical results show that the fraction of a company’s shares that are held by institutional investors increases with the quality of its governance structure. In a similar vein, we show that the proportion of institutions that hold a firm’s shares increases with its governance quality. Our results are robust to different estimation methods and alternative model specifications. These results are consistent with the conjecture that institutional investors gravitate to stocks of companies with good governance structure to meet fiduciary responsibility as well as to minimize monitoring and exit costs.

This study constructs a firm-level measure of large foreign ownership (LFO) and investigates its impact on stock return volatility in 31 emerging markets. We find a negative relationship between LFO and volatility, even after controlling for potential endogeneity and the impact of major domestic shareholders. This suggests a stabilizing role of LFO in emerging markets, which is consistent with previous suggestions in the literature on the strong commitments and potential monitoring role of large foreign shareholders. Overall, our study highlights the importance of recognizing the heterogeneity among foreign investors and the benefits of large foreign shareholders to emerging stock markets.

We study individual portfolio choice in a laboratory experiment and find strong evidence for heuristic behavior. The subjects tend to focus on the marginal distribution of an asset, while largely ignoring its diversification benefits. They follow a conditional 1/n diversification heuristic as they exclude the assets with an “unattractive” marginal distribution and divide the available funds equally between the remaining “attractive” assets. This strategy is applied even if it leads to allocations that are dominated in terms of first-order stochastic dominance and is clearly irrational. In line with these findings, we find that framing and problem presentation have substantial influence on portfolio decisions.

This paper focuses on the defaultable lease rate term structure with endogenous default. We combine the competitive lease market argument proposed by Grenadier (1996) and the endogenous default structural model proposed by Leland and Toft (1996) to examine the interaction between the lessee’s capital structure and the equilibrium lease rate. Under this framework, determining the lease rate is a simultaneous equation problem that captures the trade-off between debt and lease financing. Using data on 2,482 real estate lease transactions, we empirically confirm the predictions derived from the numerical analysis of the model.

I develop new results for long-horizon predictive regressions with overlapping observations. I show that rather than using autocorrelation robust standard errors, the standard t-statistic can simply be divided by the square root of the forecasting horizon to correct for the effects of the overlap in the data. Further, when the regressors are persistent and endogenous, the long-run ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator suffers from the same problems as the short-run OLS estimator, and it is shown how similar corrections and test procedures as those proposed for the short-run case can also be implemented in the long run. An empirical application to stock return predictability shows that, contrary to many popular beliefs, evidence of predictability does not typically become stronger at longer forecasting horizons.

We assess the impact of institutions on Chinese firms’ corporate investment in an investment Euler equation framework. We allow the variables measuring institutions to affect the rate at which firm managers discount future investment payoffs. Applying generalized method of moments estimators to large samples of Chinese firms, we estimate the stochastic discount rates derived from actual investment and examine how they vary across institutional variables. We document robust evidence that ownership is the primary institutional factor affecting corporate investment in China. The derived discount rate for a nonstate firm is approximately 10 percentage points higher than that of an otherwise equal state firm. State firms tend to use higher discount rates to invest after they are partially privatized. We also find that firms with higher levels of corporate governance use higher discount rates to make investment.

We posit the opportunity cost of time required to manage risky investments, including conducting research and performance monitoring, as a potential explanation for the equity premium puzzle. An economic agent, who should allocate a limited amount of time to labor, leisure, and risky investment, is subject to the opportunity time cost of investment activity, which is foregone labor or leisure. Our model envisages its impact on equity premium and volatility in the presence of such a time constraint, in particular, with closed-form solutions to the risky asset returns, volatility, and risk-free rate in a simple equilibrium framework wherein agents have log utility. The model is shown to yield excess return and volatility consistent with historical values observed in the U.S. stock market, even with a small amount of time cost. In addition, the model enables us to sort out the impact of endogenous labor/leisure choice on return dynamics by comparing it with the exogenous labor income case.

Using a unique database of aggregate daily flows to equity mutual funds in Israel, we find strong support for the “temporary price pressure hypothesis” regarding mutual fund flows: Mutual fund flows create temporary price pressure that is subsequently corrected. We find that flows are positively autocorrelated, and are correlated with market returns (R2 of 20%). Our main finding is that approximately one-half of the price change is reversed within 10 trading days. This support for the “temporary price pressure hypothesis” complements microstructure research concerning price impact and price noise in stocks by indicating price noise at the aggregate market level.

This paper examines the relation between corporate lobbying and fraud detection. Using data on corporate lobbying expenses between 1998 and 2004, and a sample of large frauds detected during the same period, we find that firms’ lobbying activities make a significant difference in fraud detection: Compared to nonlobbying firms, on average, firms that lobby have a significantly lower hazard rate of being detected for fraud, evade fraud detection 117 days longer, and are 38% less likely to be detected by regulators. In addition, fraudulent firms on average spend 77% more on lobbying than nonfraudulent firms, and they spend 29% more on lobbying during their fraudulent periods than during nonfraudulent periods. The delay in detection leads to a greater distortion in resource allocation during fraudulent periods. It also allows managers to sell more of their shares.

This paper documents the existence of a slowly evolving trend in the log dividend-price ratio, DPt, determined by a demographic variable, MYt: the middle-aged to young ratio. Deviations of DPt from this long-run component explain transitory but persistent fluctuations in stock market returns. The relation between MYt and DPt is a prediction of an overlapping generation model. The joint significance of MY and DPt in long-horizon forecasting regressions for market returns explains the mixed evidence on the ability of DPt to predict stock returns and provide a model-based interpretation of statistical corrections for breaks in the mean of this financial ratio.

Derivative warrants typically have higher prices than do otherwise identical options. Using data from the Hong Kong market during 2002–2007, we show that the price difference reflects the liquidity premium of derivative warrants over options. Newly issued derivative warrants are much more liquid than options with similar terms. As a result, long-term derivative warrants are preferred by traders who trade frequently. In spite of their higher prices, short-term returns on long-term derivative warrants are, in fact, higher than the hypothetical short-term returns on options. The differences in price and liquidity measures decline as the contracts get closer to maturity.

We study the role played by the informal links, or “connections,” between the chief executive officer (CEO) and the divisional managers of conglomerate organizations. Using data on a large sample of multisegment U.S. corporations from 1996 to 2004, we show that segments run by connected managers receive more investment and exhibit lower sensitivity to cash flow shortfalls (and exhibit higher sensitivity to other segments’ cash flow). At the firm level, having more connected managers presiding over segments with high Tobin’s Q improves resource allocation and increases firm value. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the mutual trust associated with connections reduces the need for wasteful reallocation of resources across divisions of conglomerate firms.