Legal rights of investors are recognized as an essential component of corporate governance. We assess the efficacy of these rights by examining board changes surrounding the filings of shareholder derivative lawsuits. We find that the incidence of derivative lawsuits is higher for firms with a greater likelihood of agency conflicts. We also find that derivative lawsuits are associated with significant improvements in the boards of directors. In particular, the proportion of outside representation on the board of directors increases. There is also some evidence that other board characteristics change favorably. These findings suggest that shareholder derivative lawsuits are not frivolous as is often claimed, but rather that they can serve as an effective corporate governance mechanism.

Beginning in the 1990s, firms often continue to trade on the major national exchanges after Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings. For bankruptcies filed from 1993–2003, we find that the more negative the filing period price reaction, the more favorable the immediate post-filing returns, on average. This reversal is not attributable to bid-ask bounce, it holds after controlling for other factors associated with post-filing returns, and it appears more attributable to the activities of large traders than to small traders. Supplementary tests reveal that the pattern of post-filing returns differs significantly for bankruptcies filed in bull versus bear markets. Bankruptcies filed during the 1993 to 1999 bull market enjoy substantial but short-lived reversals averaging one-third of the filing period price plunge. These reversals are inconsistent with efficient assimilation of the bankruptcy information. In contrast, we find no evidence of post-filing reversals for bankruptcies filed from 2000 to 2003.

I study the dynamics of investor cash flows in socially responsible mutual funds. Consistent with anecdotal evidence of loyalty, the monthly volatility of investor cash flows is lower in socially responsible funds than in conventional funds. I find strong evidence that cash flows into socially responsible funds are more sensitive to lagged positive returns than cash flows into conventional funds, and weaker evidence that cash outflows from socially responsible funds are less sensitive to lagged negative returns. These results indicate that investors derive utility from the socially responsible attribute, especially when returns are positive.

This paper examines the valuation impacts of outside independent directors in Korea, where a regulation requiring outside directors was instituted after the Asian financial crisis. In contrast to studies of U.S. firms, the effects of independent directors on firm performance are strongly positive. Foreigners also have positive impacts. The effects of indigenous institutions such as chaebol or family control are insignificant or negative. This implies that the effect of outsiders depends on board composition as well as the nature of the market in which the firm operates.

The forward bias anomaly implies that currency excess returns are predictable by the forward premium. Yet, recent studies suggest that statistical inference problems may spuriously account for this predictability. This article demonstrates that while currency excess returns are not predictable out of sample using a standard mean square forecast error criterion, the forward premium nonetheless has directional predictability. This directional forecasting accuracy translates into statistically significant profits from trading on the forward bias anomaly.

We investigate how price discovery occurs in the options markets through traders' trade size choice. By employing transactions data on all options traded on a sample of 100 firms, we show that informed traders fragment their orders into small (medium) trades for low (high) volume contracts. We also find that almost 60% of the price discovery occurs in the exchange with the largest market share for a given option, where informed traders favor medium size trades. Upon examining distinct option series for a given stock, we find that at-the-money calls display the highest information share.

In recent years, a number of firms and banks have decided to “go dark,” i.e., deregister with the Securities and Exchange Commission and delist from the major exchanges despite having a large number of outside shareholders. This paper seeks to answer two important questions: Why do firms choose to go dark? What are the consequences for shareholders? We find that firms with fewer valuable growth opportunities, greater insider ownership, lower institutional ownership, higher leverage, and lower market momentum are more likely to go dark. Furthermore, the cost of regulatory compliance is a driving force behind the going dark phenomenon.

This paper studies the interaction among financing, entry, and exit decisions of firms in a competitive industry subject to aggregate uncertainty. In contrast to Fries, Miller, and Perraudin (1997), I do not assume that a firm in default leaves the industry immediately. The implications on the optimal leverage ratios and equilibrium credit spreads are discussed. By incorporating the effect of competition, I show that the model results in significantly higher credit spreads than those predicted by traditional single firm models. Dynamic capital structure strategies in a competitive industry are also examined. The model renders a number of empirical predictions regarding leverage ratios and credit spreads of firms in a competitive industry.

Bayesian learning claims that the strength of the price impact of unanticipated information depends on the relative precision of traders' prior and posterior beliefs. In this paper, we test for this implication of Bayesian models by analyzing intraday price responses of T-bond futures to U.S. employment announcements. By employing additional detailed information in addition to the widely used headline figures, we extract release-specific precision measures. We find that the price impact of more precise information is significantly stronger, even after controlling for an asymmetric price response to “good” and “bad” news. This result strengthens previous findings that differences in earnings response coefficients across companies are related to proxies for the credibility of the reported financial information.

The proliferation of electronic limit order books operating without dealers raises questions regarding the need for intermediaries with affirmative obligations to maintain markets. We develop a simple model of dealer participation and test it using a sample of less liquid firms that trade on the Paris Bourse. The results indicate that firms with designated dealers exhibit better market quality, and that younger firms, smaller firms, and less volatile firms choose a designated dealer. Around the announcement of dealer introduction, stocks experience an average cumulative abnormal return of nearly 5% that is positively correlated with improvements in liquidity. Overall, these findings emphasize the potential benefits of designing better market structures, even within electronic limit order books, and suggest that purely endogenous liquidity provision may not be optimal for all securities.

This study investigates whether the difference in individual shareholder tax rates between dividend income and capital gain (the dividend tax penalty) affects a firm's choice between distributing funds to shareholders through dividends or share repurchases. The results of this study suggest that, in periods in which the dividend tax penalty increases, firms are more likely to distribute funds to shareholders through share repurchases as opposed to dividends. The results also indicate that the relation between the dividend tax penalty and corporate payout choice is affected by the types of shareholders who own stock in the firm. As tax-disfavored institutional ownership increases and the dividend tax penalty increases, firms are more likely to repurchase shares as opposed to distributing dividends. In contrast, as tax-favored institutional ownership increases and the dividend tax penalty increases, firms are less likely to repurchase shares as opposed to distributing dividends. As senior managerial share ownership increases and the dividend tax penalty increases, firms are more likely to make distributions to shareholders in the form of share repurchases.

This paper compares the newer uniform-price U.S. Treasury auctions to the traditional discriminatory mechanism and examines the extent to which the auction mechanisms are responsible for underpricing. Empirically, I find that even for the newer uniform-price auctions, the average price received by the Treasury is less than the price of the same securities in the concurrent secondary market although this underpricing is reduced by half relative to the older mechanism. From the summary statistics released by the Treasury, I calibrate common value auction models for the two mechanisms and predict the level of underpricing in each auction. I find that the observed magnitude of underpricing in the auctions is consistent with the model's predictions.

When market returns follow a long memory volatility process, standard approaches to estimating dynamic minimum variance hedge ratios (MVHRs) are misspecified. Simulation results and an application to the S&P 500 index document the magnitude of the misspecification that results from failure to account for basis convergence and long memory in volatility. These results have important implications for the estimation of MVHRs in the S&P 500 example and other markets as well.

Real option analysis typically assumes that projects are continuously evaluated and launched at precisely the time determined to be optimal, but real world projects cannot be managed in this way because of the costs of formally evaluating an investment opportunity. This paper shows that immediate investment is more attractive if evaluation costs are high or the amount of information to be revealed by an evaluation is large. The optimal delay until a reevaluation is long if evaluation costs are high or the amount of information to be revealed by an evaluation is small. The reduction in the value of project rights is especially severe when the value of the completed project is strongly mean reverting because then precision in investment timing is particularly important.

This study investigates the role of corporate boards following large declines in share value surrounding acquisition announcements. The results indicate that firms with independent boards are less likely to complete these value-decreasing bids, suggesting that boards influence corporate responses to information in stock prices. Board independence is also associated with unusually high frequencies of asset restructuring for bids that are completed, suggesting that independent boards promote restructuring in mergers the market believes are difficult to integrate. These results complement existing evidence on the board's exante role in averting bad outcomes by showing that independent boards intervene following value-decreasing events.

This paper generalizes and tightens Chen and Yeh's (2002) analytical upper bounds for American options under stochastic interest rates, stochastic volatility, and jumps, where American option prices are difficult to compute with accuracy. We first generalize Theorem 1 of Chen and Yeh (2002) and apply it to derive a tighter upper bound for American calls when the interest rate is greater than the dividend yield. Our upper bounds are not only tight, but also converge to accurate American call option prices when the dividend yield or strike price is small or when volatility is large. We then propose a general theorem that can be applied to derive upper bounds for American options whose payoffs depend on several risky assets. As a demonstration, we utilize our general theorem to derive upper bounds for American exchange options and American maximum options on two risky assets.

We demonstrate analytically that cross-sectional variation in the effects of events, i.e., in true abnormal returns, necessarily produces event-induced variance increases, biasing popular tests for mean abnormal returns in short-horizon event studies. We show that unexplained cross-sectional variation in true abnormal returns plausibly produces nonproportional heteroskedasticity in cross-sectional regressions, biasing coefficient standard errors for both ordinary and weighted least squares. Simulations highlight the resulting biases, the necessity of using tests robust to cross-sectional variation, and the power of robust tests, including regression-based tests for nonzero mean abnormal returns, which may increase power by conditioning on relevant explanatory variables.

Prior research concludes that option introductions improve the average liquidity of the underlying stocks. We develop an improved, generalizable test to assess whether market quality changes occur on or near an event date. Applying this method to option listing events, we conclude that options do not systematically improve the market quality of the underlying security; rather, the market quality of the underlying security improves before the listing decision. Hazard model tests indicate that improving liquidity is a selection criterion in the option listing decision. Moreover, these tests suggest that the size of a stock's bid-ask spread is the single most important option listing determinant.

We develop empirical tests for stochastic dominance efficiency of a given investment portfolio relative to all possible portfolios formed from a given set of assets. Our tests use multivariate statistics, which result in superior statistical power properties compared to existing stochastic dominance efficiency tests and increase the comparability with existing mean-variance efficiency tests. Using our tests, we demonstrate that the mean-variance inefficiency of the CRSP all-share index relative to beta-sorted portfolios can be explained by tail risk not captured by variance.

We find that in allocating initial public offerings (IPOs), underwriters favor institutions they have previously worked with. Regular investors benefit more than casual investors in IPOs through greater participation in underpriced issues. Relationship participation is more important in the distribution of IPOs with stronger demand, IPOs of less liquid firms, and deals by less reputable underwriters. Overall, our results are consistent with book-building theories of IPOs. Interestingly, for 1999–2000 we find that regular investors receive even more underpriced IPOs relative to previous years while we do not find evidence that they provide additional services in IPOs.