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ΓΝΩΣΙΣ and ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ in Socrates' Dream in the Theaetetus
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 December 2013
Extract
It has been alleged by many commentators that Plato never developed a precise philosophical vocabulary, and this view is strengthened when one investigates the employment of many of Plato's key terms: εἶδος, ἰδέα, αἴσθησις, δόξα, to name but a few. In the early and middle dialogues, Plato uses these terms in a variety of contexts without giving the slightest indication of which of the many possible senses is to be understood. Indeed, in the Euthydemus, Socrates is represented as ridiculing those who attempt to draw precise distinctions for they ‘… would only be able to play with men tripping them up and oversetting them with distinctions of words’ (Jowett, 278). Yet one must be cautious in simply assuming that Plato never attempted to clarify the meaning of his central philosophical terms; in particular, one must note that the Theaetetus contains several attempts to mark off various senses of λόγος, and that the entire dialogue is directed toward a precise account of what is, or ought to be meant by ‘knowledge’. Thus while it is true to say that Plato usually fails to mark off distinctions between various senses of the same term, the Theaetetus shows that this is not always the case.
In this paper, I shall argue (1) that Plato attempts to separate two distinct senses of the comprehensive Greek term for knowledge, εἰδέναι, reserving γνῶσις for what we should term ‘knowledge by acquaintance’ and employing ἐπιστήμη for ‘intellectual knowledge’ or ‘knowledge that something is the case’, and (2) that the statement and refutation of Socrates' dream theory in the Theaetetus show this.
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- Copyright © The Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies 1969
References
1 Hamlyn, D. W., ‘Forms and Knowledge in Plato's Theaetetus: A Reply to Mr. Bluck’, in Mind xvi (1957) 547.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2 Cornford, F. M., Plato's Theory of Knowledge (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962)Google Scholar; unless otherwise noted, all translations from the Theaetetus are from this work.
3 Runciman, W. G., Plato's Later Epistemology (Cambridge: University Press, 1962) 43.Google Scholar
4 Gulley, Norman, Plato's Theory of Knowledge (London: Methuen, 1962) 102.Google Scholar
5 Lyons, John, Structural Semantics (Oxford: University Press, 1963) 199.Google Scholar
6 It is true that what is ἄλογον is said to be ἄγνωστον at 205c, e, but Plato is still arguing here on the basis of the dream theory. It should not be concluded that this conjunction of ἄλογον and ἄγνωστον refutes the present interpretation. The conjunction occurs within Plato's refutation which is essentially a drawing out of the dream theory's implications, and showing that an absurdity arises. At this stage of the argument (205e) Plato is maintaining that if the elements are ἄλγον and, for that reason, ἄγνωστον, then so are the complexes composed of them. This is quite different from affirming that since the elements are ἄλογα, they must be ἄγνωστα.
7 Ibid., 45.
8 Hicken, Winifred, ‘The Character and Provenance of Socrates' Dream in the Theaetetus’ in Phronesis iii (1958) 126–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
9 Snell, Bruno, The Discovery of the Mind, trans. Rosenmeyer, T. G. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953) 13.Google Scholar Snell notes that in Homer, ‘Frequently it [νόος] is combined with ἰδεῑν, but it stands for a type of seeing which involves not merely visual activity but the mental act which goes with vision. This puts it close to γιγνώσκειν. But the latter means “to recognize”; it is more properly used in the identification of a man, while νοεῑν refers more particularly to situations …’ Snell's work also figures prominently in John Gould's The Development of Plato's Ethics (Cambridge, 1955); Gould concludes his discussion of the pre-Socratic employment of ἐπιστήμη by summarizing Snell's account: ‘ἐπίσταμαι and ἐπιστήμη, like αοφία and unlike γιγνώσκειν and συνιέναι, have as their primary meaning “efficiency in practice”, practical intelligence; sometimes denoting a restricted technique (ability in some specified field), sometimes a generally intelligent approach to living’ (p. 15). Gould attempts to show that ἐπιστήμη should be understood in terms of Ryle's sense of knowing how, but this view has been effectively criticized by Vlastos, R. E. Allen, and others.