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The dynamic properties of institutional reform: an analysis of US states

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 November 2018

J. Brandon Bolen*
Affiliation:
School of Business, Mississippi College, Clinton, Mississippi, United States
*
*Corresponding author. Email: bbolen@mc.edu

Abstract

Decades of research show that economic freedom is highly correlated with desirable economic outcomes both internationally and locally. Yet we still know little about the transition from low to high levels of economic freedom, particularly for institutions under local control. This research shows that while economic freedom in the United States is decreasing with regard to institutions under national control, it is increasing with regard to institutions under state and local control. Economic freedom increases gradually among the states, driven primarily by increasing labor market freedom. Decreases in economic freedom, on the other hand, occur sharply, often following stark changes to state fiscal policies.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Millennium Economics Ltd 2018 

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