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Institutions, rule-following and conditional reasoning

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 March 2018

CYRIL HÉDOIN
CYRIL HÉDOIN*
Affiliation:
Economics and Management Research Center REGARDS, University of Reims Champagne-Ardenne, Reims, France
*
*Email: cyril.hedoin@univ-reims.fr
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Abstract

This paper is a contribution to the advancement of a naturalistic social ontology. Individuals participate in an institutionalized practice by following rules. In this perspective, I show that the nature, the stability, and the dynamics of any institution depend on how people reason about states of affairs that do not occur. That means that counterfactual reasoning is essential in the working of institutions. I present arguments for the importance of counterfactuals as well as a game-theoretic framework to account for them. Since the role of counterfactuals does not directly transpire in people's behavior, the whole discussion can be seen as a broad argument against behaviorism in philosophy and the social sciences.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Institutional Economics , Volume 15 , Issue 1 , February 2019 , pp. 1 - 25
Copyright
Copyright © Millennium Economics Ltd 2018 

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