Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 January 2018
Mounting Anxieties, frustrations, and fears in Brazil effected a change of government by military force at the end of March of 1964. President Joáo Goulart fled to an Uruguayan exile. Congress, urged by the military, conferred supreme executive power on Marshal Humberto Castelo Branco. Many other sweeping changes followed. None was more complete than the about-face taken in foreign policy.
Castelo Branco spoke out early and unequivocally in his regime in favor of a return to more traditional policies. The graduation exercise of the foreign service school, the Instituto Rio-Branco, on July 31, 1964, provided the propitious place and moment for him to outline the foreign policy goals of his government. He paid homage to the ideals consecrated by tradition: world peace, disarmament, selfdetermination, non-intervention, and anti-colonialism. Moving into the more pragmatic realm of national interests, the president emphasized that his government's foreign policy aimed to increase national power through social and economic development.
1 Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco, A Diplomacia da Revolucáo Brasileña (Rio de Janeiro: Ministerio das RelacSes Exteriores, 1964).Google Scholar
2 Rio-Branco to Domício da Gama, Sept. 28, 1911, Arquivo Histórico do Itamaraty (hereafter cited as AHÍ), Despachos 235/2/8.
3 Rio-Branco's statements to this effect were frequent. As examples see: Rio-Branco to Brazilian Minister, Washington, Jan. 5, 1903, AHI, Teleg. Exp. 235/3/15; or Rio- Branco to American Legation, Feb. 20, 1903, AHI, Rep. Americanas, Notas, EUA, 208/3/15.
4 Rio-Branco to Brazilian Embassy, Washington, Nov. 22, 1909, AHI, Teleg. Exp. 235/4/1; Da Gama to Rio-Branco, Jan. 31, 1912, AHI, Oficios 234/1/3.
5 Da Gama to Lauro Muller, Anexo 1, May 30, 1912, AHÍ, Oficios 234/1/13. The speech given on May 27, 1912, was widely reported and commented on in the American press.
6 The context in which the quoted phrase appeared was as follows: “We do not need a hypothetical protection, but we do want a friendship without any dependency…. In such a way we would soon reach the stage where we could deal with the Americans as equals.” Da Gama to Lauro Muller, Jan. 18, 1913, AHÍ, Oficios 234/2/1. On March 3, 1912, Da Gama sent a long letter to Foreign Minister Muller recommending an independent foreign policy “which will allow us to appear before the world as a self-made nation … conscious of our responsibility and zealous of our sovereignty.” AHÍ, Oficios 234/1/13. Two Brazilian scholars have commented on the implications of this course of action suggested by Da Gama: Mendonca, Renato de, Fronteira em Marcha. Ensato de Geopolítica Brasileira (Rio de Janeiro: Companhia Editora Americana, 1956), p. 262 Google Scholar; and Rodrigues, José Honorio, Interésse Nacional e Política Externa (Rio de Janeiro. Civilizacáo Brasileira, 1966), pp. 31–32.Google Scholar
7 Da Gama to Lauro Muller, May 30, 1912, AHÍ, Oficios 234/1/13.
8 Correio da Manhá (Rio de Janeiro), Feb. 11, 1939, p. 3.
9 lnterésse Nacional, p. 91.
10 An excellent outline of their ideas is contained in “Apresentacáo” Política Externa Independents, No. 1 (May 1965), p. 7.
11 Janio Quadros, “Brazil's New Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 40, No. 1 (October 1961), p. 24.
12 Scarpino, Clevis and Aguiar, Jorge, “Brasil A Escalada do Negro,” Mánchete (Dec. 3, 1966), p. 75.Google Scholar
13 Rodrigues, lnterésse Nacional, p. 176.
14 In this particular case, it was Assis Chateaubriand, head of a vast journalistic empire, who spoke out in an article whose content is summarized adequately in the title: “O nosso reino nao é o déste mundo indú-árabe,” O Jornal (Rio de Janeiro), Feb. 12, 1961, p. 3. In part he said, “For the benefit of Brazil we cannot and we ought not to expect anything from the United Arab Republic, India, or Yugoslavia. The trips planned by the heads of government of those nations will be purely touristic excursions, devoid of any practical ends.”
15 President Castelo Branco frequently hurled the charge of “false nationalists” against his opponents. As examples see the Brazil Herald (Rio de Janeiro), June 14, 1965, p. 13; and Jornal do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro), Dec. 4, 1966, p. 22.
16 Interview on national network of radio and television, July 6, 1964.
17 The speech was distributed in mimeographed form by the Ministerio das Relates Exteriores.
18 Quoted in Cameiro, Mario Afonso, “Opiniáo Militar,” Cadernos Brastieiros, No. 38 (Nov.-Dec. 1966), p. 25.Google Scholar
19 Carvalho, Delgado de, Historia Diplomática do Brasil (Sao Paulo: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1959), pp. 273, 276-7.Google Scholar
20 For an example see the editorial in the Jornal do Commercio (Rio de Janeiro), Nov. 22, 1966, p. 4. It emphasizes that military force is a poor method of fighting communism in Latin America and that only economic development will insure the establishment and prosperity of democracy in this hemisphere.
21 “Questionário proposto pela Revista Civilizacáo Brasileira a Personalidades da Vida Pública Nacional,” Revista Civilizacáo Brasileira, No. 7 (May 1966), pp. 15-73.
22 Recently there has been an adverse reaction to Brazilian policies from some African states. The diplomatic representatives of Algeria, Ghana, Senegal, and the United Arab Republic publicly asked for some clarification from the Brazilian government on 1) the declarations made in Lisbon by Marshal Artur Costa e Silva with respect to the Portuguese colonies in Africa; 2) the projected visit of Brazilian naval vessels to ports of Angola; and 3) the possible political implications of the increased Brazilian economic interest in Angola and Mozambique. Correio da Manhá (Rio de Janeiro), Jan. 7, 1967, p. 2.