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Bolivian Tariff Policy during the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries: High Average Tariff and Unbalanced Regional Protection

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2016

JOSÉ ALEJANDRO PERES-CAJÍAS
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Abstract

This article demonstrates that Bolivian tariff policy during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was not as passive as previously assumed and that the average tariff ratio remained high. However, high average tariffs coexisted for a long time with free-entry rights for different products which represented the main economic activity of certain Bolivian regions. Furthermore, the competitiveness of products was sometimes mostly determined by the geographic fragmentation of the country and the uneven pattern of railway construction rather by than tariffs. Therefore, beyond its high average level, the protectionist effect of tariffs was sometimes constrained by institutional and geographical restrictions.

Spanish abstract

Este artículo demuestra que la política tarifaria boliviana al final del siglo XIX y comienzos del XX no fue tan pasiva como se asumió previamente y que el rango tarifario promedio permaneció alto. Sin embargo, las tarifas altas coexistieron por un periodo largo con los derechos de entrada libre de diferentes productos que constituían la mayor actividad económica de ciertas regiones bolivianas. Aún más, en ciertos casos, la fragmentación geográfica del país y el patrón desigual de la construcción ferroviaria fueron más determinantes que las tarifas en establecer la competitividad de estos productos. Por lo tanto, más allá de este nivel alto en promedio, el efecto proteccionista de las tarifas fue en algunas ocasiones limitado por las restricciones institucionales y geográficas.

Portuguese abstract

Este artigo demonstra que, durante o final do século XIX e princípio do século XX, a política tarifária boliviana não foi tão passiva quanto se pensava anteriormente e que a tarifa média permaneceu alta. No entanto, médias tarifárias elevadas coexistiram por muito tempo com os direitos de livre entrada de diferentes produtos que representavam a principal atividade econômica de algumas regiões bolivianas. Ademais, em certas ocasiões, a competitividade de determinados produtos era determinada principalmente pela fragmentação geográfica do país e pelo padrão desigual de construção de ferrovias e não pelas tarifas. Deste modo, além dos níveis médios elevados, o efeito protecionista das tarifas foi por vezes limitado pelas restrições institucionais e geográficas.

Keywords

Boliviatariff autonomytrade agreementstransport costsBoliviaautonomía tarifariaacuerdos comercialescostos de transporteBolíviaautonomia tarifáriaacordos comerciaiscusto de transporte
Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Latin American Studies , Volume 49 , Issue 3 , August 2017 , pp. 433 - 462
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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References

1 Rodríguez, Gustavo, ‘Las regiones bolivianas a la hora del Censo de 1900’, in Bolivia en 1900. Edición facsimilar y estudios del Censo General de la República de Bolivia (Sucre: Fundación Cultural del Banco Central de Bolivia-ABNB-UNFPE, 2012), p. 315 Google Scholar (my translation). Similar claims can be found in widespread Bolivian history textbooks: Mesa, Carlos, de Mesa, José and Gisbert, Teresa, Historia de Bolivia (La Paz: Editorial Gisbert y Cía, 2012), pp. 402–3Google Scholar; or, Cajías, Fernando and Cajías, Magdalena, Historia de Bolivia (Madrid: Cultural S. A, 1996), p. 234 Google Scholar. These claims can also be found in historical studies focused on specific Bolivian regions: Roca, José Luis, Economía y sociedad en el Oriente boliviano (Siglos XVI–XX) (Santa Cruz: Cotas, 2001), p. 560 Google Scholar; or, Cajías, Fernando, Barragán, Rossana, Cajías, Magdalena and Medinaceli, Ximena, La Paz. Historia de contrastes (La Paz: Fundación Nuevo Norte, 2007), p. 119 Google Scholar. See also footnotes 2 and 3.

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6 Whereas the link between high tariffs and protectionism has been challenged (see below), no major claims have been made in relation to the idea of high tariff levels in Latin America. See, for instance, Garavaglia, Juan Carlos, ‘La disputa por la nación: rentas y aduanas en la construcción estatal argentina, 1850–1865’, Investigaciones en Historia Económica, 10 (2014), pp. 34–45 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

7 Mar Rubio, ‘Protectionist but Globalised? Latin American Customs Duties and Trade During the Pre-1914 Belle Époque’, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Economics Working Papers (2006). Rubio shows that Latin American imports per capita from 1890 to 1912 were clearly higher than in other regions of the world in which tariff rates were much lower.

8 Federico, Giovanni and Vasta, Michaelangelo, ‘What Do We Really Know about Protection before the Great Depression: Evidence from Italy’, 75: 4, The Journal of Economic History (2015), pp. 993–1029 Google Scholar.

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12 See International Bureau of the American Republics, Handbook of Bolivia. Bulletin No. 55 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1892), pp. 90–1Google Scholar.

13 Oficina Nacional de Inmigración, Estadística y Propaganda Geográfica, Censo General de la Población de la República de Bolivia (La Paz: Taller Tipo-Litográfico José M. Gamarra, 1904), p. LXXVII Google Scholar; de Bolivia, República, Bolivia en su primer centenario (La Paz: 1925), p. 471Google Scholar.

14 Dirección General de Aduanas, Comercio Especial de Bolivia Año 1912 (La Paz: Dirección General de Aduanas).

15 Import duties were obtained from Peres-Cajías, José, ‘Bolivian Public Finances, 1882–2007. The Challenge to Make Social Spending Sustainable’, Revista de Historia Económica, 32: 1 (2014), pp. 77–117 Google Scholar.

16 For methodological issues, see Coatsworth and Williamson, ‘Always Protectionist?’, pp. 205–32; Clemens, Michael and Williamson, Jeffrey, ‘Why Were Latin America's Tariffs So Much Higher than Asia's before 1950?’, Revista de Historia Económica, 30 (2012), pp. 11–44 Google Scholar.

17 Oficina, Censo General, p. LXXIV; McQueen, Charles, Bolivian Public Finance (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1925)Google Scholar.

18 For instance, tariffs set by the municipalities of Cochabamba, La Paz, Oruro, Potosí, Santa Cruz de la Sierra and Sucre for ten different food imports were higher than the national ones in 1916. See de Aduanas, Dirección General, Comercio Especial de Bolivia Año 1917 (La Paz: Imprenta y Litografía Boliviana Heittman, 1918), pp. 4–5 Google Scholar.

19 Peres-Cajías, ‘Bolivian Public Finances’, pp. 77–117.

20 Societé des Nations, ‘Bolivie’, in Memorandum sur le commerce international et sur les balances des paiements (Géneve: 1927), p. 139 Google Scholar.

21 Oficina, Censo General, p. LXXVIII (my translation).

22 Societé des Nations, ‘Bolivie’, p. 139.

23 For a description of Bolivian tariffs from the early 1910s to the early 1920s, see McQueen, Bolivian Public.

24 Coatsworth and Williamson, ‘Always Protectionist?’, p. 27.

25 For instance, a devaluation of the Bolivian currency would increase import prices but, if duties are specific, this increase in prices would cause a decrease in the average tariff ratio. Whereas the first effect would imply a protection increase, the second would represent a decrease, and a detailed analysis is necessary to identify the net effect of both movements. Ibid. In a slightly different way, Irigoin suggests that, if custom duties were paid with depreciated currency, financial and monetary policies might have ended up affecting the protection level of the economy. See Irigoin, Alejandra, ‘Gresham on Horseback: The Monetary Roots of Spanish American Political Fragmentation in the Nineteenth Century’, Economic History Review, 62 (2009), p. 569 Google Scholar.

26 Mitre, Antonio, El monedero de los Andes. Región económica y moneda boliviana en el siglo XIX (La Paz: Hisbol, 1985)Google Scholar; Erick Langer, ‘Espacios coloniales y economías nacionales: Bolivia y el norte argentino (1810–1930), Historia y Cultura, 17, pp. 73–81.

27 This relative stabilisation was related to the Bolivian government's decision to join the gold standard, although its effective membership was sporadic (from 1908 to 1914 and from 1928 to 1931). The Bolivian currency's loss of value resumed in 1931, once the Bolivian government decided to abandon the gold standard by devaluating its currency and defaulting on most of its external debt.

28 Hans Huber, ‘Finanzas públicas y estructura social en Bolivia, 1825–1872’, unpubl. master's diss., Free University of Berlin, 1991, Apéndice IV.

29 Dalence, José María, Bosquejo estadístico de Bolivia (La Paz: Universidad Mayor de San Andrés, 1975 [1851]), p. 268 Google Scholar.

30 Ministerio de Hacienda, ‘Resumén general de los artículos ultramarinos y peruanos internados a Bolivia durante el año de 1880 – por las aduanas del norte’, in Memoria del Ministerio de Hacienda correspondiente a 1882 presentada al Honorable Congreso Nacional (La Paz: Ministerio de Hacienda).

31 Ministerio de Hacienda, ‘Aduanas Nacionales’, in Informe del Ministro de Hacienda (La Paz: Ministerio de Hacienda), pp. 12–13.

32 Rojas, Casto, Historia financiera de Bolivia (La Paz: Universidad Mayor de San Andrés, 1977 [1915]), pp. 200–1Google Scholar.

33 Mitre, Antonio, Los patriarcas de la plata: estructura socioeconómica de la minería boliviana en el siglo XIX (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1981), pp. 67–70 Google Scholar.

34 Rojas, Historia financiera, pp. 314–16.

35 The fluctuations in the ratio may be explained by the changes in tariff legislation, but also by changes in the composition of imports or by political instability – i.e. the Civil War of 1898–99 and the Acre War against Brazil in 1903.The main legal changes were the creation of the Código de Avaluos in 1894, its modification in 1901 and its replacement by the Código de Avaluos of 1905. See Ministerio de Hacienda, Memoria del Ministerio de Hacienda presentada al Congreso Nacional de 1898 (Sucre: Ministerio de Hacienda), pp. 68–70; Ministerio de Hacienda e Industria, Memoria presentada a la Legislatura de 1900 (La Paz: Ministerio de Hacienda e Industria), pp. 18–19; Memoria presentada a la Legislatura de 1905 (La Paz: Ministerio de Hacienda e Industria), pp. iv–x.

36 McQueen, Bolivian Public, p. 26; República de Bolivia, Presupuesto Nacional de 1931 (La Paz: República de Bolivia), p. 53.

37 Estevadeordal, Frantz and Taylor, ‘The Rise and Fall of World Trade’, pp. 384–6.

38 Rodríguez, Elites, mercado y cuestión regional.

39 Contreras, Manuel, ‘Debt, Taxes, and War: the Political Economy of Bolivia, c.1920–1935’, Journal of Latin American Studies, 22 (1990), pp. 265–87Google Scholar; Huber, Hans, ‘La deuda pública externa y sus renegociaciones entre 1875 y el arreglo Ad Referéndum de 1948’, in Huber, Hans, Pacheco, Napoleón, Villegas, Carlos, Aguirre, Álvaro and Delgadillo, Hugo, La deuda externa de Bolivia – 125 años de renegociaciones y cuantos más?: desde la operación secreta del gobierno y los Meiggs hasta la iniciativa HIPC (La Paz: CEDLA-OXFAM, 2001), pp. 25–193 Google Scholar.

40 McQueen, Bolivian Public, p. 26.

41 Drake, Paul, The Money Doctor in the Andes: The Kemmerer Missions, 1923–1933 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989), pp. 205–6Google Scholar.

42 See Decreto Supremo de 1/06/1936; Decreto Supremo de 30/09/1938; and Decreto Supremo de 30/06/1939.

43 For an analysis of the use of multiple exchange rates in Bolivia during the 1930s, see Guerra, René Gutiérrez, Situación económica y financiera de Bolivia (La Paz: Editorial Universo, 1940)Google Scholar. Data in Figure 1 end in 1935 for two reasons. On the one hand, tariffs were systematically reduced after the Chaco War which significantly reduced the Bolivian average tariff ratio; see José Peres-Cajías, ‘Bolivian Public Finances’, pp. 92–4 or Gallo, Carmenza, Taxes and State Power: Political Instability in Bolivia, 1900–1950 (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1991), pp. 67–74 Google Scholar. However, multiple exchange rates played a crucial role during this period. Thus, the coexistence of tariffs with a multiple exchange rate regime requires further research in order to identify the protectionism effects of Bolivian trade policy from the mid-1930s to the mid-1950s. This task is beyond the scope of the present article.

44 From 1870 to 1938, the average tariff ratio was, on average: 22 per cent (Argentina), 33 per cent (Brazil), 20 per cent (Chile), 37 per cent (Colombia), 25 per cent (Cuba), 20 per cent (Mexico), 24 per cent (Peru), 28 per cent (Uruguay), see Clemens and Williamson, ‘Why Were Latin Americas Taxes So Much Higher’, p. 25. The unweighted average tariff of Asian and Western Europe countries was constantly below 10 per cent from 1865 to 1925; see Coatsworth and Williamson, ‘Always Protectionist?’, p. 210. The average tariff ratio in the United States was 29 per cent (1890 and 1901) and 21 per cent (1910). In Denmark, Norway and Sweden the average tariff ratio was around 10 per cent in 1890, 1901 and 1910; see Rubio, ‘Protectionist but Globalised?’, p. 37.

45 The use of official values from 1895 to 1918 would involve an underestimate of the real value of Bolivian imports and an overestimate of the average tariff ratio. Thus, the actual Bolivian rates before 1919 would probably have been significantly lower than those reported, with a likely maximum bias of 100 per cent. In other words, before 1919 the actual Bolivian average tariff rate would have been between c. 10 per cent and 20 per cent approximately, i.e. in the lower ranks of the Latin American countries but still higher than most Asian and Western European countries. Likewise, the protection upsurge of the 1920s would bring the Bolivian rate close to the Latin American average, the highest worldwide.

46 North, Douglass, Weingast, Barry and Wallis, Joseph, Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009)Google Scholar.

47 Dye, Alan, ‘The Institutional Framework’, in Bulmer-Thomas, Victor, Coatsworth, John and Conde, Roberto Cortés (eds.), The Cambridge Economic History of Latin America, vol. 2: The Long Twentieth Century (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 178–9Google Scholar.

48 Mitre, Los patriarcas de la plata.

49 See Huber, Finanzas públicas.

50 The contribución indígena was reintroduced in Bolivia in 1827, the year when the fiscal reform proposed by Sucre failed. This reform involved the implementation of: a) an annual flat tax of 3 pesos for every man aged between 18 and 60; b) an urban and rural property tax; c) a revenue tax on industrial earnings. All the affected agents, including the indigenous population, rejected this project. Ibid. On the indigenous head tax, see the seminal work by Sánchez-Albornoz, Nicolás, Indios y tributos en el Alto Perú (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1978)Google Scholar.

51 Prado, Gustavo, ‘Efectos económicos de la adulteración monetaria en Bolivia, 1830–1870’, Revista de Humanidades y Ciencias Sociales, 1 (1995), pp. 35–76 Google Scholar; Platt, Tristan, ‘Producción, tecnología y trabajo en la rivera de Potosí durante el siglo XIX’, Cuadernos de Historia Latinoamericana, 3 (1996), pp. 1–58 Google Scholar.

52 See also Klein, Herbert, A Concise History of Bolivia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 134 Google Scholar.

53 This was due to the lower distance between this port and some of the most important Bolivian cities, and to the lack of transport facilities in Bolivia. Thanks to the railway connection with Puno (1874), Mollendo also attracted a significant share of Bolivian foreign trade. Puno was connected by steamships with the Bolivian port of Puerto Pérez on Lake Titicaca (60 km from La Paz); Fifer, Valerie, Bolivia. Territorio, situación y política, desde 1825 (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Francisco de Aguirre, 1976), pp. 53–77 Google Scholar, 104–8.

54 Most of Bolivia's population was concentrated in the highlands or in the valleys in the west and centre of the country. For instance, in 1846 more than 80 per cent of Bolivia's population lived in the Departments of La Paz, Oruro, Potosí, Cochabamba, Chuquisaca and Tarija (see Dalence, Bosquejo).

55 Pérez, Alexis, El estado oligárquico y los empresarios de Atacama (1871–1878) (La Paz: Ediciones Gráficas EG, 1994)Google Scholar.

56 Rojas, Historia financiera, p. 207. Peru could offer this subsidy thanks to the increase of fiscal revenues derived from guano exploitation. See Contreras, Carlos and Cuesto, Marcos, Historia del Perú contemporáneo (Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2004)Google Scholar.

57 Percentages calculated on the basis of the Bolivian government revenues as estimated by Huber, Finanzas públicas. The original amount of the subsidy was changed in 1870 (see Rojas, Historia financiera, p. 280). Anyway, official records show that this item was the second most important revenue source of the Bolivian central government in 1875, accounting for 20 per cent of total revenues. See Ministerio de Hacienda, ‘Cuadro de liquidación definitiva del presupuesto’, in Memoria presentada al Honorable Congreso de 1875 (Sucre: Ministerio de Hacienda).

58 The problem arose in the late 1850s, with the discovery of nitrate deposits in the Bolivian region of Mejillones (between Parallels 24° and 25°) and the development of the port of Antofagasta, which were exclusively the result of Chilean and British capitalists’ initiatives. Thereafter, the Chilean government extended its territorial claims to include the Mejillones nitrate fields and did not recognise the jurisdiction of Bolivian justice in 1863, when Bolivian authorities intended to judge a Chilean and British financed mining company. As a consequence and as an alternative to a violent clash, Bolivian authorities decided to sign the treaty. See Klein, A Concise History of Bolivia, pp. 129–32.

59 Rojas, Historia financiera.

60 Ibid. , pp. 280–1.

61 Rodríguez, ‘Las regiones’, p. 216.

62 Rojas, Historia financiera, pp. 313–16.

63 The 1905 figure is not an outlier. For instance, for 1903, see Sisson, W. L., Informe del reconocimiento sobre el proyecto sistema de ferrocarriles bolivianos (La Paz: Imprenta y Litografía Boliviana, 1905), p. 60 Google Scholar. Alternatively, taking into account the relative importance of Peruvian and Chilean imports on total imports and assuming that all these trade flows were free of taxes, 15 to 25 per cent of total Bolivian imports would not have been affected by the Bolivian tariff legislation from 1895 to 1905. See Oficina, Censo General, pp. LXXVII–LXXXII and the yearly reports of the Ministry of Finance.

64 These complaints can be found in different yearly reports of the Ministry of Finance: Informe 1885, p. 15; Informe 1886, p. 6; Informe 1890, pp. 72–91; Informe 1891, pp. 41–57; Memoria 1898, pp. 68–70. See also International Bureau of the American Republics, Handbook, pp. 108–9.

65 Ministerio de Hacienda e Industria, Informe del Ministro de Hacienda e Industria al Congreso Nacional de 1895 (Sucre: Ministerio de Hacienda e Industria), pp. 66–7.

66 See Ministerio de Hacienda, Memoria del Ministro de Hacienda al Congreso Nacional de 1898 (Sucre: Ministerio de Hacienda), p. 57.

67 Clemens and Williamson, ‘Why Were Latin America's Taxes So Much Higher’, p. 15.

68 The Bolivian government signed similar trade treaties with Argentina and Brazil (Rojas, Historia financiera, pp. 210–11). Its economic implications, however, seem to have been less important than those generated by the trade treaties signed with Peru and Chile. For an analysis of trade relationships between Bolivia and Argentina, see Langer, Eric and Conti, Vivian, ‘Circuitos comerciales tradicionales y cambio económico en los Andes Centromeridionales (1830–1930)’, Desarrollo Económico, 31 (1991), pp. 91–111 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

69 Klein, A Concise History of Bolivia, p. 135.

70 Memoria 1898, p. 56 (my translation).

71 This process started with the connection of the port of Antofagasta with Uyuni (1889) and Oruro (1892). Uyuni is at the heart of the mining district of Potosi and Oruro is the capital of the second most relevant mining district in the country. Likewise, the inauguration of the railway line between La Paz and Guaqui (1905), a port on Lake Titicaca, provided access to the Pacific Ocean by using the Peruvian railway line Puno–Mollendo.

72 For instance, during the early 1840s the average freight paid to move a ton from England to several Latin American countries was more or less similar, but the cost of moving it from the port to the capital city varied significantly; in the Bolivian case, this figure was around £19.3, the second highest in the region; de la Escosura, Leandro Prados, ‘Lost Decades? Economic Performance in Post-Independence Latin America’, Journal of Latin American Studies, 41 (2009), p. 291 Google Scholar. More evidence can be found in Bowman, Isaia, ‘Trade Routes in the Economic Geography of Bolivia. Part I’, Bulletin of the American Geographical Society, 42 (1910), p. 25 Google Scholar.

73 Eastern plains and valleys traditionally supplied western areas and, particularly, mining districts, with products such as sugar, rice, wheat, maize, wood, vegetables, different kinds of textiles and different kinds of alcoholic beverages. See Rodríguez, Elites, mercado y cuestión regional; Bowman, ‘Trade Routes. Part II’, p. 102.

74 Bauer, Arnold, ‘Expansión económica en una sociedad tradicional: Chile Central en el siglo XIX’, Historia, 9 (1970), pp. 137–235 Google Scholar.

75 Robles-Ortiz, Claudio, ‘La producción agropecuaria chilena en la era del salitre (1880–1930)’, América Latina en la Historia Económica, 32 (2009), pp. 113–34Google Scholar.

76 Larson, Brooke, Colonialismo y transformación agraria en Bolivia. Cochabamba, 1500–1900 (La Paz: CERES/HISBOL, 1992)Google Scholar. In particular see pp. 22, 24, 357, 372, 375, 380.

77 Platt, Estado boliviano, p. 70.

78 Sater, William, ‘La agricultura chilena y la Guerra del Pacífico’, Historia, 16 (1981), pp. 125–49Google Scholar.

79 Data were taken from Rodríguez, ‘Las regiones’, p. 317 and from Chilean official foreign trade statistics. The yearly growth rate of wheat flour imports from 1862 to 1902 was 2.7 per cent, a much higher rate than that of the Bolivian population (0.45 per cent). This increase affected wheat production in Cochabamba and Potosí, the regions which produced 80 per cent of total wheat in Bolivia during the mid-nineteenth century, see Dalence, Bosquejo.

80 Fernando Armas-Asín, ‘Tierras, mercado y poder: el sector agrario en la primera centuria republicana’, in Cosamalón, Jesús, Armas, Fernando, Deustua, José, Monsalve, Martín and Salinas, Alejandro, Compendio de historia económica del Perú, Tomo 4: Economía de la primera centuria independiente (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 2011), pp. 93–164 Google Scholar.

81 ‘The amount of sugar cane that could be grown in the department of Santa Cruz was enormous but the primitive methods used was a drawback to the development of this industry’, International Bureau of the American Republics, Bolivia. Geographical Sketch, Natural Resources, Laws, Economic Conditions, Actual Development, Prospects of Future Growth (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1904), p. 88 Google Scholar. For an analysis of the sugar industry during the 1940s and 1950s, see Sandoval et al., Santa Cruz.

82 See Rojas, Historia financiera, p. 208.

83 See the Ministerio de Hacienda e Industria, Informe del Ministro de Hacienda e Industria al Congreso Ordinario de 1896 (Sucre: Ministerio de Hacienda e Industria), p. 76.

84 Langer (‘Espacios coloniales’, p. 84) has suggested that these trade agreements fragmented the old colonial economic space into three different spheres which were determined by the economic influence of Argentina, Chile and Peru.

85 See Isserlis, L., ‘Tramp Shipping Cargoes, and Freights’, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A, 101 (1938), pp. 53–146 Google Scholar.

86 Sisson, Informe, p. 157.

87 Mitre, Antonio, Bajo un cielo de estaño: fulgor y ocaso del metal en Bolivia (La Paz: Asociación Nacional de Mineros Medianos, 1993), p. 74 Google Scholar.

88 These differences in transport costs may help one understand why Bolivian rubber was not only exported through Antofagasta, but also through the Brazilian port of Pará or through Buenos Aires or Montevideo. See Oficina, Censo General, pp. LXXXV–LXXXVIII.

89 Bowman, ‘Trade Routes. Part II’, pp. 93–100.

90 Bowman, ‘Trade Routes. Part III’, p. 182.

91 These lines connected Oruro with Viacha (a town 30 km from La Paz) (1908); Uyuni with Río Mulatos and Potosí (1913); Uyuni with Atocha (1913); and Viacha with La Paz (1917); Sanz, Historia de los ferrocarriles.

92 Rodríguez, Elites, mercado y cuestión regional, pp. 47–54; Rosana Barragán and José Peres-Cajías, ‘El armazón estatal y sus imaginarios. Historia del Estado’, in Informe Nacional de Desarrollo Humano 2007. El Estado del Estado (La Paz: PNUD), pp. 127–218.

93 For a general overview on the Liberals, see Kent, María Luisa, ‘El segundo proyecto liberal, 1900–1930’, in Crespo, Albert, Crespo, José and Kent, María Luisa (eds.), Los Bolivianos en el tiempo. Cuadernos de historia (La Paz: UASB/EAA, 1993)Google Scholar, Fascículo 11.

94 Barragán and Peres-Cajías, ‘El armazón’.

95 Bieber, Enrique, Las relaciones económicas de Bolivia con Alemania, 1880–1920 (Berlin: Colloquium Verlag, 1984)Google Scholar; Vega, Alipio Valencia, Historia política de Bolivia, vol. 5 (La Paz: Juventud, 1986), pp. 1375–94Google Scholar.

96 Vera, Loreto Correa, ‘Del poder a los tratados: desarrollo y ferrocarriles en Bolivia, 1870–1904’, Historia, 46: 2 (2013), pp. 315–41Google Scholar.

97 Bignon, Vincent, Esteves, Rui and Herranz-Loncán, Alfonso, ‘Big Push or Big Grab? Railways Government Activism, and Export Growth in Latin America, 1865–1913’, The Economic History Review, 68: 4 (2015), pp. 1277–1305 Google Scholar.

98 Fifer, Bolivia, pp. 193–206.

99 This was critical for the Liberals since silver export taxes decreased dramatically since 1894 and tin export taxes were not still a reliable source of money; Peres-Cajías, ‘Bolivian Public’.

100 See Alfonso Herranz-Loncán and José Peres-CajíasJosé Peres-Cajías, ‘Tracing the Reversal of Fortune in the Americas. Bolivian GDP Per Capita since the mid-nineteenth Century’, Cliometrica, 10: 1, pp. 99–128.

101 For instance, the 1904 Peace Treaty with Chile was approved in the Bolivian parliament with 40 votes against 30. The ideas behind the defence of this pragmatic approach can be found in Correa, ‘Del poder’ and Ascarrunz, Moisés, El partido Liberal en el poder a través de los mensajes presidenciales (Arnó: Hermanos-Libreros Editores La Paz/Cochabamba/Oruro, 1917), 62–9Google Scholar.

102 Fernando Cajías, ‘Momentos emblemáticos de las relaciones entre Bolivia, Chile y Perú, 1880–1929’. Document presented at Encuentro de intelectuales e historiadores bolivianos y chilenos (La Paz, 2014).

103 See Fifer, Bolivia, pp. 111; Cajías, ‘Momentos emblemáticos’; Garay, Cristián, ‘El debate parlamentario sobre las negociaciones con Bolivia entre 1888 y 1904’, Cuadernos de Historia, 27 (2007), pp. 43–74 Google Scholar; Miranda, Sergio González, ‘Las históricas relaciones entre Tarapacá y Oruro: la frustrada tentativa de integración transfronteriza durante ciclo de expansión del salitre (1864–1928), Revista de Geografía Norte Grande, 50 (2011), pp. 63–85 Google Scholar.

104 Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Bolivia, Opiniones chilenas y peruanas sobre el problema del Pacífico (La Paz: Imprenta Edelman & Co., 1927)Google Scholar.

105 The attraction of Bolivian foreign trade was one of the main justifications of the railway line Mollendo–Arequipa–Puno. See Contreras, Carlos, ‘La economía del transporte en el Perú’, Apuntes, 66 (2010), 59–81 Google Scholar.

106 See Galindo, Alberto Flores, Plaza, Orlando and Oré, María Teresa, ‘Oligarquía y capital comercial en el sur peruano’, Debates en Sociología, 3 (1978), pp. 53–75 Google Scholar; Nomak, Fabián and Namihas, Sandra, Las relaciones entre el Perú y Bolivia (1826–2013) (Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2013)Google Scholar.

107 The use of official values and their potential to misreport the real value of Bolivian imports may affect the reliability of the tariff level of each category or product presented in Table 5. However, if we assume that the inability to fairly account for Bolivian import values was uniform across each category or product, the structure of Bolivian tariffs would remain the same and, consequently, the conclusions. Likewise, interestingly enough, the comparison of the 1912 tariff structure with the 1937 tariff structure, which, given the political context of the time, could be a priori labelled as a protectionist one, reflects relatively small changes. The 1937 tariff structure is available from the author upon request.

108 The earliest observation in the table is from the 1940s due to the absence of price data for all capital cities for previous years.

109 CEPAL (Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe), Análisis y proyecciones del desarrollo económico, IV. El desarrollo económico de Bolivia (México, DF: CEPAL, 1958)Google Scholar, p. 40; Sandoval et al., Santa Cruz, p. 15. Bolivian official foreign trade statistics show that sugar imports were around 10,838 and 12,413 tons in 1912 and 1925, respectively. Sugar imports increased up to 43,470 tons in 1951 and reached their maximum level in 1959 (46,082 tons). Dirección Nacional de Informaciones, Bolivia: 10 años de revolución 1952–1962 (La Paz: Dirección Nacional de Informaciones, 1962), p. 165 Google Scholar.

110 Before the 1952 revolution, sugar production was around 1,467 tons. After the revolution, sugar production increased slightly, up to 4,441 tons in 1956. Thereafter, sugar production climbed and national production in 1961 (41,152 tons) was for the first time higher than imports. Ibid, p. 165.

111 Zondag, Cornelius, The Bolivian Economy, 1952–65; The Revolution and its Aftermath (New York: Praeger, 1966)Google Scholar.

112 See Clemens and Williamson, ‘Why Were Latin America's Tariffs So Much Higher?’, pp. 15–22.