Introduction
Very little is known to this day about the activities undertaken by the secret services of both capitalist and Communist countries in the so-called Third World during the Cold War due to the unavailability of archives. In 2004, a law was passed in the Czech Republic facilitating access to the archival documents of the Státní Bezpečnost (State Security, StB), the intelligence service of Communist Czechoslovakia. When this new legislation was enacted, virtually no consideration was given to protecting personal data and almost all the archival material has been made accessible to the public without any filters, including documents containing sensitive information about people still active in public life. As a result of such liberal legislation, studies have been published recently that bring to light surprising interactions between the StB and local politicians, intellectuals and journalists.Footnote 1
The case that has resonated most strongly in Latin America is that of Vivian Trías, a member of the Partido Socialista de Uruguay (Socialist Party of Uruguay, PSU), who was an agent of the StB between 1964 and 1977. The cooperation between Czechoslovak intelligence and this prominent politician and intellectual, who defined himself as a Latin Americanist and Third-Worldist and who explicitly distanced himself from the Communist world, has given rise to much debate and several studies.Footnote 2 This example has shown that, while the opening of the Czechoslovak intelligence archives has been an invaluable asset for historians, it has also led to these documents being used to discredit specific individuals. Therefore, it is necessary to approach their content from a very critical perspective: the documents produced by StB officials often do not make it possible to see what the real motivation of the local contacts was for forging the links and carrying out the collaboration.Footnote 3
While offering us a new vision of the personal histories of some well-known figures, the StB archives represent, above all, a unique source that reveals the objectives and mechanisms of the Communist secret services in many countries around the world. In the case of Latin America, they allow us to understand the dynamics of the Cold War in this region after the Cuban Revolution from a hitherto little-known perspective. At the same time, they shed light on a subject that, up to now, has not been given due attention: the role played by minor countries and minor actors in this conflict.
In the first place, Czechoslovakia played a particular role, due to its special position in the diplomatic field. It had maintained close ties with Latin America since the interwar period, establishing a wide network of legations. In the early 1960s, this network was wider than that of the USSR or of any other Communist country. In addition, Czechoslovakia was perceived in the region as an industrial and culturally advanced country, which had a tradition of democracy and was closer to Western Europe.Footnote 4 Thus, after the Cuban Revolution, which considerably increased the USSR's interest in Latin America, Czechoslovakia became the main intermediary through which Soviet influence was exerted in the region.
Czechoslovakia played a key role in Castro's government in the earliest years after the Revolution. As the supplier of heavy industry, weapons and expert services in various areas, Czechoslovakia had undoubtedly played a key role in helping Castro's government to power.Footnote 5 This pro-Cuban policy, imposed by the USSR, represented a major drawback for Czechoslovakia because it threatened its diplomatic and commercial interests in the region.Footnote 6
In the early 1960s, Czechoslovak spies were operating in nine Latin American countries. Although the StB was formally independent of the Soviet Union's intelligence apparatus, its operations were supervised and occasionally even directed by the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security, KGB). In Latin America the StB relied on a network of local collaborators to fulfil its objectives – mostly driven by the demands of the USSR, which was keen to maintain its influence on the island of Cuba. The Czechoslovak secret services were forbidden from cooperating with members of Communist parties or with organisations under their direct influence: such relations were managed by the KGB. The StB therefore focused on finding ‘progressive nationalists’ with an anti-United States stance.Footnote 7
In Uruguay, the StB maintained contact with all political parties except the Communist Party. Over time, its most effective cooperation was established with the PSU, which, although it had rather limited political power, had intellectual capital that the StB could use for its operations. This cooperation was based on the ideological proximity resulting from the rapprochement between Cuba and the Soviets, which had in turn led to considerable tension and a shift within the non-Communist Left. The Soviet Union had previously been unanimously seen as an imperialist threat but, from 1961 – when Castro proclaimed that the Revolution was Marxist-Leninist and expressed his alliance with the Soviet Bloc – the voices that began to consider the USSR as a power capable of defending the peoples of the Third World against US aggression gained momentum.Footnote 8
Trías was one of those who reassessed their position towards the Soviet Bloc. This politician and intellectual was of extraordinary value to the Czechoslovaks not only because of his publications and political analyses, but also because of Uruguay's significance for the work of the Communist secret services in the 1960s.Footnote 9 While the KGB's rezidentura (intelligence station) had been operating in Uruguay – the country with the highest urbanisation and literacy rates in Latin America – since the 1950s, the StB's was established only at the end of 1960. Uruguay was chosen for the StB's rezidentura in Latin America because of its liberal political environment, its socio-cultural proximity to Europe, and the large number of its intellectuals and periodicals with an anti-imperialist slant.Footnote 10 These favourable conditions for conspiracy activities contrasted with developments in neighbouring Argentina and Brazil, where authoritarian regimes came to power in the following years and the possibilities for the StB to act were very limited. The coup d’état in March–April 1964 in Brazil, which until then had been the epicentre of Czechoslovak espionage activities in the region, proved to be a particular setback.Footnote 11 From mid-1964 onwards, Uruguay took over this role. Its importance was reinforced by the fact that the most important leaders of the Brazilian opposition, former President João Goulart and the governor of Rio Grande do Sul, Leonel Brizola, were granted political asylum there.Footnote 12
In the early years, the dominant line of work of the rezidentura in Montevideo was aimed at obtaining information on government policy, especially regarding international affairs. For this reason, the StB was mainly interested in people linked to the ruling parties, the National (Blanco) and Colorado parties.Footnote 13 In September 1964, following the recommendation of the Organization of American States (OAS), Montevideo broke diplomatic ties with Havana, so Uruguayan policy towards Cuba became less significant. However, the StB's activities were redirected towards active measures, i.e. undercover operations aimed at influencing public opinion in an effort to weaken the ‘main enemy’, the United States.
The literature on the active measures of the Soviet Bloc countries is very limited.Footnote 14 Ladislav Bittman worked in the StB department in charge of the application of such measures during the 1960s. After emigrating to the United States in 1968, he was the first to introduce the subject of active measures to the Western public.Footnote 15 Although there are some more recent studies on the active measures of the StB, based on archive research, these are more general and make no mention of their implementation in any specific region.Footnote 16
Despite the opening of the archives, only a few fragments of the documents dedicated to active measures have survived. Because many of these papers contained sensitive information about the system's details and modus operandi, they were almost completely destroyed immediately after the political changes that took place in November and December 1989.Footnote 17 However, a partial reconstruction is possible thanks to the surviving folders containing mail about the operations of the První Správa Sboru Národní Bezpečnosti (First Intelligence Directorate of the National Security Corps, I. Správa SNB) responsible for foreign espionage, which contain documents related to the internal administration of the Oddělení Aktivních Opatření (Department of Active Measures), assessments of its work plans and details on cooperation with intelligence services of the other Soviet Bloc countries.
Based on the analysis of the StB archives and the Uruguayan press of the time, this study has two main objectives. The first is to expose the nature and aims of the active measures, as well as their specific implementation in this South American country. In the mid-sixties, Uruguay was the centre of the Soviet Bloc's disinformation campaigns in the region, which were carried out through several journalists and local newspapers, the most important collaboration being that with the newspaper Época. The second objective is to show, through this link between the StB and a newspaper that proclaimed itself to be politically and economically independent, the several challenges faced by the Uruguayan non-Communist Left in the 1960s. In particular, it focuses on the issue of the economic support received by the newspaper from abroad, which was essential for the opposition's activity but which could lead to questions about its self-declared independence.
Active Measures
The term ‘active measures’ was adopted from the KGB's lexicon (Russian: ‘aktivye meropriyatiye’) and used by the intelligence services of other Soviet Bloc countries. These top-secret operations were an important tool in Soviet offensive policy. They typically consisted of the dissemination of political, military and economic disinformation aimed at discrediting the capitalist states on a global scale. Most of these measures were carried out through the mass media. According to the StB's ‘Directive on Agency Operative Work Abroad’, active measures were to be based not entirely on lies but on at least partially true information that could be verified and, thus, generate credibility.Footnote 18
Meanwhile, the CIA had already begun to work intensively in this field since the 1950s, buying advertising in the press and radio in different areas across Latin America. Historian Roberto García, for example, described how the Uruguayan newspapers El País, La Mañana and El Plata were part of intense secret actions aimed at the local public, where it was stated that the government of Guatemala's Jacobo Árbenz posed a threat of Sovietisation in the region.Footnote 19 In turn, the Soviet Bloc began to be more actively involved in this field from the 1960s onwards, which was when these active measures reached their peak.
Active measures were designed, managed and coordinated by Department ‘D’, established in 1959 within the First Directorate of the KGB (responsible for KGB operations abroad); the more important measures were discussed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.Footnote 20 Following the example of Department ‘D’, which was made up of between 50 and 70 people, sections specialising exclusively in active measures were created within the secret services of the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria between 1962 and 1964. The KGB played the role of central coordinator, but also established direct operational contacts between the various Communist intelligence services. This massive and coordinated apparatus of the Soviet Bloc countries (excluding Romania) implemented the mass production of ‘active measures’.
In February 1964, Department 8 of I. Správa SNB, the Czechoslovak body engaged in active measures, was established, comprising 18 staff members. The implementation of ‘influencing activities’ thus became a field of work independent of the StB, one that was based on thorough documentation. The following period, until the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact (WP) troops in August 1968, was characterised by an increase in the quantity and, above all, in the quality of these actions. In 1965, the services of all Soviet Bloc countries carried out more than 400 active measures, and the StB participated in more than 100 of them, demonstrating the key importance of Czechoslovak intelligence. The StB had a long reach and its technical equipment was of a very high standard, evidenced by the fact that, between 1964 and 1966, no Czechoslovak counterfeits were detected.Footnote 21
The main battleground in the psychological warfare against the West was in Third World countries. National liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America were increasing in strength, and the emergence of new independent states with strong anti-Western sentiments and prejudices provided fertile ground for the disinformation campaigns of the Soviet Bloc.Footnote 22 Active measures were adapted to local operational and cultural conditions. In more developed Latin American countries with a deeply rooted tradition of literacy, active measures based on the press were more often used, while in African countries with a high rate of illiteracy letters were sent to specific addresses, or the radio service was used.Footnote 23
As for printed active measures – which made up the majority – the mechanism usually consisted of printing material in a newspaper or magazine through local contributors. The aim was to create a chain reaction that would be reproduced by other media. News from provincial newspapers in Third World countries was picked up by the Soviet news agency and, through it, reached other countries around the world. Therefore, in the early 1960s, the Communist secret services began to invest capital secretly in various newspapers, magazines and small news agencies to continuously use them as disinformation channels.
The active measures carried out by the StB reached their peak between 1964 and 1967. Although they did not increase in quantity, their quality improved considerably.Footnote 24 The huge scope of the StB's active measures is illustrated by the fact that, in the 1964–6 period alone, it had at its disposal 210 local confidential agents or contacts, as well as 35 press channels (newspapers, magazines, or others) for their implementation.Footnote 25
In 1968, the Czechoslovak intelligence service had rezidenturas in 39 of the 72 countries where it operated. Approximately half of these were in developing countries. Nevertheless, with changes in the political context, Department 8 was reducing its activity in 1968. Most of the members of the agency, until recently the showcase of Czechoslovak intelligence, became supporters of the reformist ideas that had emerged during the Prague Spring, and expressed criticism of the WP occupation in August. In addition to major personnel changes, Bittman's defection, mentioned above, also dealt a severe blow to the StB.Footnote 26 Activities were completely paralysed for several months and, in the following period, a major restructuring took place. Czechoslovakia and its intelligence services shifted from being the ally that faithfully fulfilled the tasks assigned to it by the Soviets to an object of surveillance.Footnote 27
At its peak, the section most valued for its active measures was the Americký Odbor (America Department), which included the entire western Hemisphere. Although it did not carry out a large number of operations, it was noted for its high quality. The most significant of its active measures were those with a continental scope. Those assessed to be the best, in terms of their results, were the rezidenturas in Brazil (until the 1964 coup), Mexico and Uruguay.Footnote 28 This was because they had highly effective contacts, although the Prague Directorate maintained that they were repeating a certain pattern of work, always dealing with the same people and using the same methods.Footnote 29
The StB was aware that local journalists would not participate in its active measures without imposing conditions. Therefore, Czechoslovaks focused on the anti-imperialist press, where it was easier to publish content. Besides having the same political stance as Czechoslovakia, these media outlets also appreciated small financial rewards. The fact that their readership was limited was not so important for StB. The success of the active measures consisted first and foremost in the subsequent dissemination of the information that was published.
From 1962 onwards, the StB began to implement active measures in Uruguay in El Sol, the PSU's weekly newspaper. In addition, through Ángel Rama, the StB managed to publish its articles in Marcha, spreading them beyond the borders of Uruguay. However, publication in this weekly was more difficult, because several attempts at publication were rejected by the founder and director Carlos Quijano. From 1964, when active measures came to represent most of the work of the StB, the rezidentura in Montevideo began to focus almost exclusively on the newspaper Época.
The StB and Época
Despite its relatively short existence between 1962 and 1967, the daily newspaper Época has an important place in the political and cultural history of Uruguay.Footnote 30 Besides being closely linked to names of great renown in the pantheon such as Quijano, Eduardo Galeano, Mario Benedetti and Carlos María Gutiérrez, the newspaper made a very important contribution to unifying the non-Communist Left. Its foundation was the result of an agreement between different groups linked to the PSU and other minor sectors. Its proclaimed political and economic independence was reflected in the intention to generate a plurality of opinions, that is, in its effort to give a space to all representatives of the political Left. This diversity could be seen in the newspaper's editorial board, which included Socialists, anarchists and individuals linked to guerrilla groups. Época played an important role in shaping the revolutionary Left. Some activists of El Coordinador – a popular defence movement which later gave rise to the Tupamaros urban guerrilla group – also helped to run the newspaper as printers and journalists, writing notes and articles.Footnote 31
Through its 20 pages, the newspaper provided written and graphic information on foreign and national events. Extensive coverage was given to issues related to the process of renewal undergone by the Uruguayan Left in the previous years – Third Worldism, anti-imperialism and defence of liberation struggles. International news, mainly focused on criticising US imperialism, was given special attention. One of the most important topics was the Cuban Revolution – its diffusion and expressions of support and solidarity. Defending Castro's government was a major unifying element for the various heterogeneous groups that ran the newspaper.
Unlike Marcha, which was aimed at an intellectual public, and El Sol, directed at Socialist activists, Época targeted at broader sectors. It did not focus solely on strictly political issues, as could be seen in the culture and sports sections, which had the largest number of pages. With this strategy, the newspaper tried to penetrate the daily life of apolitical readers and bring them closer to national and international events.Footnote 32 Its initial print run of 6,000 copies progressively increased to 25,000.Footnote 33
The bond that was forged between the newspaper and Czechoslovak intelligence was based not only on the convergent interests between the two parties, namely, the objective of weakening US influence in Uruguay and Latin America, but also on economics. Época came into being as the property of the Editorial Independencia SA corporation, made up of a large number of small shareholders, especially activists, workers and intellectuals.Footnote 34 The purpose of this format was to guarantee political independence; however, the fact that the newspaper was not backed by any organisation or economically strong individual meant that it faced serious financial problems throughout its existence. The income from donations and share offers was not enough to consolidate and secure the project. Therefore, the newspaper's bosses saw in the Czechoslovaks a way of solving these continuous financial problems.
Trías, mentioned above, whose code name was Ríos,Footnote 35 was key at the outset of this relationship. Contact between him and a Czechoslovak intelligence officer was made in July 1961 and intensified after the very poor showing of the PSU (as part of the Unión Popular coalition) in the elections of November 1962. Trías lost his parliamentary seat, resigned as General Secretary of the PSU, and for a few years withdrew from political life. In June 1964, Trías accepted an offer to become an agent of the StB. This process must be seen in a broader context: the recruitment of this intellectual, whose enormous literary production was mostly dedicated to condemning US imperialism, took place only four months after the StB established Department 8 and a little more than two months after the coup in Brazil.
After Trías's recruitment as an agent, his work shifted in another direction – first and foremost, to political analysis and the writing of books. A few months later the main contact with Época became Guillermo Bernhard, code name Rajka, Chief Accountant of the Frigorífico Nacional company and advisor to the Ministry of Economy. In addition to being a renowned economist, Bernhard was also a journalist and author of several pamphlets dedicated to the meat industry and agrarian reform. Despite his anti-imperialist orientation and close ties with the PSU, Bernhard never joined the party. The first contact between him and the StB was made in January 1963. In November 1964, Bernhard was elected chairman of Época, which would further spark the Czechoslovaks’ interest in him. Contact would reach its apogee in May of the following year, when Bernhard became an StB agent.
Active Measures Carried Out in Época
Because documents dedicated to active measures have been destroyed, it is difficult to identify which articles published in Época were part of these operations. In most cases, we do not have information on the exact date of any specific publication, nor of the title of the articles. Moreover, Época published many articles condemning US policy, whether or not under the heading of ‘active measures’. However, based on the documents available now, we can reconstruct the situation to some extent. Through mentions of the author, the approximate date of publication and the subject of the active measure, it is sometimes possible to identify specific articles.
The first active measure implemented in Época was called Plamen; it was aimed at denouncing the events that took place in Panama in 1964.Footnote 36 On 9 January, during the so-called ‘Flag Riots’, thousands of demonstrators demanded that the Panamanian flag be flown in the Canal Zone territory. The protests were violently repressed by the US authorities. This reaction was strongly criticised throughout Latin America and the StB wanted to take advantage of this atmosphere to whip up this anti-imperialist spirit.
Trías promised to try to publish an article on the subject in Marcha through his friend, Galeano. In parallel, Miloš Veselý, a rezident of the StB, officially Second Secretary of the Legation, followed Trías's recommendation to publish in Época, and gave material to the editor, Alberto Caymaris, so that he could write an article. Caymaris valued the information provided by Veselý, whom he believed to be a diplomat. They made an agreement that would result in the publication of an article describing US interventions in Panama's internal affairs since the establishment of the country. These were to be based both on reports approved by Veselý and on foreign news summaries favourable to Panama. The StB documents mention that articles were published in Época and Marcha within the framework of Plamen.Footnote 37 However, neither a date of publication nor any indication of the content is provided. Identifying these articles seems almost impossible, given that Época and Marcha devoted a great deal of space to Panamanian events independently of the StB.
According to the Czechoslovak documents, in addition to publications, the PSU, encouraged by Trías, organised events – namely student demonstrations and speeches on Radio Nacional – as part of this active measure.Footnote 38 It is open to debate whether the StB had a direct influence on these events, but implementation of Plamen was highly appreciated by the Directorate in Prague. Other rezidenturas in Latin America also took part in the operation. Letters of protest were sent and debates organised through local contacts. The StB thought it indisputable that its materials were useful to the Latin American press, and that they only needed to be adapted to the conditions in each country, e.g. in the wording and phrases used. The Montevideo rezidentura was rated as the best in Latin American by the Directorate in Prague. Specific mention was made of its use of radio, since this was the first incorporation of this medium into an StB operation in the region.Footnote 39
Yet another of the active measures carried out in Uruguay was related to the coup in Brazil. Immediately after the fall of Goulart's government, the Communist secret services took on the task of developing an information campaign to condemn the coup and emphasise the role of the United States in it. Thomas Mann, Assistant Secretary of State and special advisor to President Lyndon B. Johnson, was the focus of the Communist secret services’ special attention. The active measure carried out by the StB in this case was code-named Rachot, with the Directorate in Prague deciding that the most suitable conditions for its implementation were to be found in Uruguay, because of the large number of Brazilian exiles there. The key figure in carrying out this operation was to be Trías. ‘We order that, through Ríos, a revelation about the coup be secured (preferably in Época) in the most shocking way. We must get the front page or a special one-page edition of the newspaper. If necessary, we will pay whatever costs this may entail.’Footnote 40 Trías accepted the request but rejected the idea of a special edition because of its high monetary cost.
The copy for the article was to be written based on the thesis that the rezident, Veselý, had passed to Trías. According to the StB's report, Trías considered this article to be a very important contribution to the struggle against the United States. He asked the rezident if he wanted to read the article prior to its publication, to which Veselý replied that he would leave all the responsibility to him, the important thing being to stick to the thesis presented.Footnote 41 In addition, Veselý instructed Trías to say, should the Uruguayan police ask for the newspaper's sources, that the information came from a journal that had been sent to Época's editorial office and that it had been destroyed after use.Footnote 42
In this case, the StB documents mention the date of publication, page number and author, which makes it possible to accurately identify the article: this was finally published on 14 April and trailed on the front page. Its author was Carlos Machado, a close friend of Trías and editor of the international section of the newspaper. In his commentary, he related the coup in Brazil to other US interventions in the region. It began as follows:
Today we have enough data to unravel the threads of the plot and to know how the situation developed. Mr Gordon, the Yankee ambassador, organised the assault. Mr Mann, a sinister figure responsible for the assault against Guatemala in ’54, directed ‘Operation Brazil’. Magalhães, Lacerda, Meneghetti de Barros, Castelo Branco and General Kruel [Brazilian military officers involved in the coup] were but puppets in the operation.Footnote 43
Trías's other task in this operation was to send this news item to the offices of the newspaper Última Hora in Rio Grande do Sul and to the Peronist newspapers Patria Libre and Compañero in Buenos Aires. In addition, 100 copies were delivered in Brazil, via a Socialist youth activist friend of Trías who lived on the border, to contacts linked to Brazilian opposition leaders Luis Carlos Prestes, Francisco Julião and the previously mentioned Brizola. Trías himself sent Machado's article by post to 21 Brazilian nationalist intellectuals.Footnote 44
The Rachot active measure, in which the Czechoslovaks invested US$3,000 through Trías, was deemed a success.Footnote 45 The StB's Brazilian contact, Leocádio de Almeida Antunes, whose code name was Reflejo, reported that former President Goulart himself had indicated that the articles published in Época were of great value and that the campaign was very useful to his resistance movement.Footnote 46 Thanks to the StB's collaborator in Mexico, journalist José Natividad Rosales (code name Alonso), the Czechoslovak materials were published in the influential magazine Siempre. However, the main objective of the active measure, i.e. to directly influence the situation in Brazil, could not be achieved. After the coup, all resistance was eliminated by the military government.Footnote 47
A few weeks later, another operation targeted at Uruguay took place: this was the active measure Eko II, which coincided with the first session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in Geneva; the suffix ‘II’ was a reference to the fact that this was a follow-up to a 1963 operation aimed at promoting Czechoslovak exports to Latin American countries. Its purpose was to promote the Czechoslovak stance that the economic policy of the capitalist countries on the world market was limiting the growth of developing countries. On 6 May 1964, Época published an article by Bernhard describing the Czechoslovak proposals at the conference. It focused mainly on the need for reorganising the world market. Experience had shown that economic exchange between capitalist countries and developing countries did not favour the latter, and it was, therefore, necessary for them to strengthen their ties with the Socialist countries.Footnote 48
In the evaluation of the active measure carried out by the StB, I found information stating that Bernhard was able to have the material he received for preparing the article delivered to a government meeting, which was of great help to the Uruguayan delegation's support for the Czechoslovak proposal at the Geneva Conference. The Directorate in Prague was satisfied with the implementation of the Eko II active measure, as it confirmed that it was possible to influence the political debate, even at the highest levels.Footnote 49
The Moskyt active measure was carried out during the last two weeks of May 1964. This operation followed Toro, initiated in Brazil in February. In order to implement Toro, employees of the newly established Department 8 in Prague prepared false documents masquerading as the official bulletin of the United States Information Service (USIS) in Rio de Janeiro. Their objective was to discredit the new US foreign policy line on Latin America formulated by Assistant Secretary of State Mann. Oswaldo Costa, StB collaborator, published an article deriving from this material on 27 February in the Brazilian magazine O Semanário, of which he was editor. In the article Costa headlined the return to the ‘hard stick’ policy and the fact that the United States would not grant aid to any country that maintained diplomatic relations with Cuba. According to Mann's alleged statement, the Alliance for Progress was to serve as a powerful instrument of US policy. He supposedly said that ‘many countries had the United States to thank for their very existence and survival’, and that, ‘without North American aid, many politicians could not maintain their positions and privileges against the Communist tide’. In the document as reported in the O Semanário article, Mann would also highlight the need for realigning the OAS in order to effectively fight Communism.Footnote 50 The content of the bulletin was announced in the Brazilian Congress. On 3 March, the US embassy in Rio de Janeiro issued a statement denouncing the news as fake.Footnote 51
After the coup in Brazil, this discrediting of Mann gained increasing importance, and the StB showed interest in boosting its dissemination, this time outside Brazil, within the framework of the Moskyt active measure. Through Trías, the information from the false USIS bulletin was published on 20 May in Época in a full-page commentary by Machado. The article begins with the following words: ‘A reader, whom for obvious reasons we cannot identify, has passed to us by hand a document the eloquence of which speaks for itself. Dated in Washington and written in Portuguese, the document emanates from the USIS. The letterhead serves as proof of authenticity.’ The commentary then presents several controversial aspects of the alleged statement of the Assistant Secretary of State, going on to conclude, ‘Mr Mann is appealing – out of self-interest – for a holy crusade where all the puppets play their part. Delenda est Cuba! says the new Cato. But Cubans are not Carthaginians and they will not be alone.’Footnote 52
The content also appeared in Siempre magazine, thanks to Natividad Rosales.Footnote 53 Época again referred to the Mexican publication in its 1 June edition. On the front page and in large print it announced Mann's plans in the region: ‘Coups in Uruguay, Chile, Mexico and Cuba’.Footnote 54
The US Embassy in Montevideo strongly objected to the two Época articles. On 4 June, it refuted them in the newspaper El País, citing its previous complaint against the publications in Brazil (see Footnote note 50) and highlighting the interest of enemies in reviving these false claims in Uruguay.Footnote 55 A day later, on 5 June, the Communist newspaper El Popular mentioned Época's anti-Mann articles in an extensive analysis of US activities in Latin American countries.Footnote 56 At the same time, the General Secretary of the Partido Comunista del Uruguay (Communist Party of Uruguay, PCU), Rodney Arismendi, used this information in an address to Congress.Footnote 57
In October 1964, active measure Galo was carried out on the occasion of Charles de Gaulle's visit to Uruguay. Its implementation was entrusted to Trías. As part of the operation, two articles were published in Época, during the first and second days of the French president's visit, that is to say on 8 and 9 October.Footnote 58 It aimed to present France's intention to carry out an independent policy and, in this way, to foster division among the capitalist states. Although the StB archives do not contain a very detailed description of the articles, it is evident that they were published by Machado in the international commentary section. De Gaulle is depicted as a successful statesman who, unlike those in Great Britain and Germany, seeks a policy that is not subordinate to the United States and is not opposed to increasing trade with Eastern European countries, even with the USSR; Latin American countries could benefit from de Gaulle's policies. As with the other articles, we do not know which part was specifically written in agreement with the Czechoslovak instructions. However, it is worth noting that Machado's article explicitly states the objective of the active measure: ‘[Arising] out of all this, for us is the positive fact that de Gaulle divides the Western bloc and triggers concern among the Americans.’Footnote 59
During 1965, Družba II was the StB's main active measure in Latin America on which all the continent's rezidenturas worked. The suffix ‘II’ was due to the fact that its objectives were similar to those of an operation of the same name carried out in Brazil during 1962 and 1963. This active measure was directed by the KGB and its main objective was to rekindle Latin American solidarity with the Cuban Revolution.Footnote 60 In addition to activities in the media, it was the organisation of conferences that was intended to be the real peak of its activities. StB documents indicate that, while the KGB had already discussed organising a conference in Uruguay with the PCU's General Secretary during his visit to Moscow, the StB had considered the matter mainly with Trías. With his help, a long list of people, newspapers, radio stations and organisations that could be useful to pro-Cuban propaganda was drawn up.Footnote 61 Plans for the conference in Uruguay moved more slowly than expected. The date was initially scheduled for December 1964 or January 1965 but, finally, it was postponed until June.
Meanwhile, in January 1965, the rezidentura in Montevideo carried out active measure Mora, which consisted of the publication of an article in Época on the occasion of the first anniversary of the Panamanian ‘Flag Riots’. The article was written by Machado through Trías, who had given him the Czechoslovak line.Footnote 62 The publication process was monitored by Bernhard. According to the StB documents, the article was published on 10 January in the international commentary section. In his contribution, Machado recalls how events unfolded in Panama and presents Mann's opinion that many Latin American countries should be grateful to the United States for guaranteeing stability against Communism.Footnote 63
Carrying out active measure Družba II became complicated. The pro-Cuba conference was blocked by the Uruguayan government. In June, then, Trías was appointed by the StB to protest in the press. According to Veselý's report on his contact with Trías, Época published several articles as a result of this initiative denouncing the government's actions. At the same time, the rezident entrusted Trías with the organisation of a street protest, which took place on a national holiday, 18 June, and in which both the PSU and the PCU took part. After the plans for the pro-Cuba conference in Uruguay failed, the KGB turned its attention to organising one in Chile. Its rezident in Santiago had yet another task for the StB: disseminating the declaration of the Chilean Preparatory Committee of the Congress for the Defence of Cuba.Footnote 64 In Uruguay, this task was assigned to Trías. Through his offices the Congress's declaration, which was planned for March 1966, was published in Época on 24 July 1965.Footnote 65
Another part of Družba II was to be two articles in Época dedicated to the anniversary of the establishment of the 26th of July Movement, the leading organisation of the Cuban Revolution. The archives indicate that one of these was a note written by Galeano, while the second was written by an unspecified author and occupied a full page.Footnote 66 The 26 July edition contains a large amount of copy dedicated to the Cuban issue, which makes it difficult to identify the specific articles produced within the Družba II framework.
The StB's final operation in the newspaper was active measure Panar. At the end of September 1965, the Czechoslovaks handed over to Bernhard some newspaper articles from Prague. Bernhard's task was to draft an article condemning US expansionism and generating distrust before the OAS Second Special Inter-American Conference, which would take place in Rio de Janeiro in November. It was essential for the StB to incorporate information in this article on a fictitious resolution by the US Senate to intervene anywhere in Latin America if necessary, thereby highlighting US support for the Brazilian coup.Footnote 67 The original intention was to publish the article in Marcha; however, its director Quijano rejected it because of the imposition of Medidas Prontas de Seguridad (Emergency Powers) by the government in the face of political and union unrest: he believed that the publication of such an article would have entailed a threat to his newspaper. So Bernhard was asked to publish the article in Época, which had no problem carrying out the task.Footnote 68 The StB documents make no mention of the date of publication but internal evidence suggests 23 October. It is not possible to accurately recreate the article.
Financial Support
The main controversy over the cooperation of the Uruguayan collaborators with the StB arises from the fact that they received payment in money or kind, despite their being, according to StB documents, very interested in the materials provided by the Czechoslovaks, whose publication in the newspaper was mainly ideologically driven. In exchange for carrying out active measures, contributors usually received rewards, such as cigarettes and whisky. Occasionally, they would receive small amounts of money destined for the newspaper. For example, for carrying out active measure Eko II Bernhard received $U500. This situation changed when a ‘contributor’ became a regular ‘agent’: the higher the level of collaboration, the higher the compensation. While Trías – an agent – received a regular sum of US$150/month, since his work was very important to the StB, Bernhard was rewarded for specific jobs. For example, for active measure Panar he received US$200.Footnote 69
From the very beginning of his collaboration with the StB, even before he became an agent, Bernhard saw the Czechoslovaks as a way of obtaining support for Época, which constantly suffered from major financial problems. The StB, in turn, was at first also very interested in gaining some influence over the newspaper. After Bernhard was elected chairman of Editorial Independencia SA on 23 November 1964, the question of possible financial support for the newspaper became more pressing. According to a statement by the new Executive Committee, ‘the company was in a very parlous condition: no cash, a winding-down mentality and an significant salary backlog’.Footnote 70 Just one day later, on 24 November, the new chairman visited the commercial department of the Czechoslovak Legation to meet Daniel Lhotský, an employee of the rezidentura, who managed the StB's commercial activities. He informed him that the newspaper was in a serious financial situation that had to be resolved within three days; otherwise, Época was in danger of going bankrupt. Bernhard asked for a sum of US$1,300.Footnote 71 Undoubtedly, he was aware that his new position as chairman of Editorial Independencia SA gave him more leverage, which he used to his advantage in an attempt to put pressure on the Czechoslovaks.
Lhotský acted immediately. In principle, it was not possible to grant such an amount without the prior approval of the Minister of the Interior (Lubomír Štrougal), so he sent him a request, mentioning that Época was a nationalist and anti-United States newspaper of considerable influence amongst the middle classes of Montevideo, and that it supported the political stance of the PSU. He also reported that, with the support of the newspaper, the rezidentura had carried out several active measures against the ‘main enemy’, listing Toro, Moskyt and Rachot. He furthermore pointed out that the newspaper would be used as a means to carry out Družba II, an active measure of great importance for the KGB.Footnote 72
The StB took great care in such cases and each proposed investment was rigorously assessed. On this occasion, the organisation found it appropriate to approve the request from the Montevideo rezidentura, since this would create the ideal conditions for recruiting Bernhard as an agent. However, the Directorate made it clear that the loan was intended not for Época, but for Bernhard.
Bernhard received the money and, according to the StB report, registered it as a personal loan to Época from himself. He explained that he had obtained it from friends and that it had been secured against his own assets. He gave Lhotský a signed receipt for a personal loan of US$1,300, which also stated that the origin of the money was secret and that in return he was available for any cooperation with the StB. The StB intended to use this receipt to put pressure on Bernhard and facilitate his recruitment as an agent.Footnote 73
The relationship with the newspaper grew closer, and at the end of 1964 the Directorate in Prague requested more detailed information about Época.Footnote 74 According to the StB's January 1965 report of the interview with Bernhard, the newspaper's initial print run of 6,000 had increased to between 15,000 and 17,000. However, Época continued to have severe financial problems. At the beginning of 1965, the paper showed a deficit of US$5,000.Footnote 75 Bernhard accused the founder and first director, Quijano, of responsibility for this crisis, implying that he had spent all the initial capital on preparing and promoting the newspaper.Footnote 76 As a result, the newspaper had to depend entirely on sponsors in order to continue its activities. Bernhard disclosed to the StB the names of the monthly contributors, who numbered about 50, among them Goulart, Brizola and Darcy Ribeiro. Of these, Goulart was the most generous donor: on one occasion, for example, he donated US$4,000 to the newspaper.Footnote 77 The StB appreciated the importance of the Brazilian exiles for the newspaper; this, in turn, was clearly reflected in its content, since it attacked the Brazilian military regime frequently and fiercely.
Paid articles and advertisements played an important role in the financing of the newspaper. Some of them were officially paid for. Bernhard, for example, stated that the press secretary of the Romanian Embassy came to the editorial office from time to time seeking to publish articles about Romania and, in turn, paid for articles written by Época's editors for the Romanian press; this practice was legal and listed in the official accounts. There was concern about the influence of enemy forces in the StB, especially because of advertisements by the Nativa publishing house that reproduced news from the Chinese agency. In addition, once a week Trotskyist groups, enemies of the USSR, had a page of commercial advertisements in the paper.Footnote 78
According to Bernhard, by early 1965 the newspaper had about 80 employees, plus 12 reporters and seven administrators. The reporters were mostly young people who worked for practically nothing and often had a second job. The newspaper's editorial board consisted of 18 people, who were elected at the Annual General Meeting. According to information provided by Bernhard, the publication and placement of an article were decided by the editor-in-chief, who, at that time, was Galeano. However, thanks to his position, Bernhard could publish anything without explanation.Footnote 79
At the end of January, less than two months after the first loan, Bernhard submitted another request for financial assistance, a considerably larger sum this time, amounting to US$6,000. The Directorate in Prague unanimously rejected it on the grounds that a loan of such a sum would not represent value for money and would therefore, in the future, only reward Bernhard for each assignment. According to the Directorate, such a large amount could only be approved if the number of StB publications in Época were to increase significantly, which was unrealistic:
If we were able and willing to finance the journal in this way, it would have to be compensated in some other way. That would mean providing the journal all the time with materials, so that at least half of the print run, that is, a large part of each issue, would contain our materials. We are not in a position to do this and we cannot ensure it.Footnote 80
The Prague headquarters also restated another important requirement, namely that the active measures should not deviate from Época's political line. ‘The newspaper writes more or less along the same lines we would aim at when offering financial support. That is why we are going to remunerate Rajka directly for specific active measures.’ Moreover, the StB was aware that another of its agents, Trías, could carry out similar actions more economically.Footnote 81 On the other hand, for the StB the most important thing was that the newspaper continued to be published and that it was not banned. Therefore, the StB Directorate was much more concerned about Época's attacks on the Uruguayan and Brazilian governments. Support for the newspaper could have a negative influence on relations with Brazil, Czechoslovakia's most important Latin American economic partner.Footnote 82
Although the loan application was rejected, the rezidentura went ahead with the attempt to recruit Bernhard as an agent. This would free Trías to concentrate on other matters. ‘As far as active measures were concerned, we were greatly assisted by Rajka at the Época newspaper and thus left Ríos out of the implementation of measures at the newspaper.’Footnote 83 The documents also mention that, just like Trías, Bernhard was close to Galeano, editor-in-chief of the newspaper, and Machado, international commentator. Although the collaboration of the latter two was important for the implementation of active measures, neither of them knew that they were part of the operations of the Czechoslovak secret service.Footnote 84
On 10 April, a fire broke out in the newspaper's machine room. The losses from the accident were estimated at $U500,000.Footnote 85 The insurance did not pay for the damage, with catastrophic consequences for the newspaper, which was already suffering huge economic problems. From then on, in practically every issue of Época there are requests for financial support. Immediately after the fire, the ‘reconstruction operation’ began, which consisted of collecting money from various small contributors. Many public figures contributed to the cause and several others sent telegrams of support, among them Salvador Allende.Footnote 86 Music festivals and sales of donation vouchers were also held.Footnote 87
Two weeks after the fire, on 23 April 1965, Bernhard was signed up as an agent of the StB. Following this event, the StB's headquarters instructed Montevideo that active measures in Época would no longer be carried out by Trías but by the new agent Bernhard.Footnote 88 If we take the context into account, there is no doubt that Bernhard's motivations for becoming an agent were primarily economic and driven by the desire to help the newspaper, which was in a serious financial position.
According to StB documents, a few days later Bernhard met with Lhotský to tell him that the newspaper urgently needed to raise $U110,000 (US$3,000) before 24 July, or else it was in danger of going bankrupt.Footnote 89 This information coincides with a report that appeared in the newspaper. The Executive Committee openly announced that, as of 25 June, Época would have to stop printing unless, before that date, the necessary resources were obtained to cover the payment of workers’ wages. Specifically mentioned is the same sum that Bernhard requested from the StB. ‘Either Época gets $U110,000 before next Saturday and manages to cover the operating deficit of $U70,000 per month for the next six months, or else it will have to temporarily cease operations in order to honour its obligations and come back on a sound financial footing’, wrote Bernhard.Footnote 90
With this request, the rezidentura approached the Czechoslovak Minister of the Interior for an urgent resolution of the matter. The reaction of the Minister was swift, and on 24 July, the day Bernhard had indicated as the deadline, it approved the payment of US$3,000. This favourable reaction can be explained mainly by the fact that Bernhard had already reached the rank of agent and had therefore gained more confidence among the Czechoslovaks. The StB's intention, consequently, was to take advantage of Bernhard's work for other, more important activities. When handing over the money, Lhotský reminded Bernhard that the Czechoslovaks would not act as a patron, but would pay only for each task done. The loan was accounted for by Bernhard as a purchase of Época shares in his name, out of money from an inheritance in Argentina.Footnote 91
Decline in Interest in Época
Although Bernhard was recruited as an agent in April 1965, and was expected to use the newspaper Época more frequently for active measures, paradoxically a decline is observed. As mentioned above, the last StB article in the paper was published in October 1965. This was partly because Bernhard had been assigned to other work. One of his main tasks was to obtain information on activities by Brazilian exiles: he lived in the El Pinar resort, as did several of them. More decisive, however, was the growing radicalisation of the newspaper, with which the StB did not agree at all, considering it a risk for Czechoslovak politics.
During the period of increased strikes, as a result of the economic crisis, Época supported the strikers and the unions, harshly criticising the government, especially the Minister of the Interior, Adolfo Tejera. On 7 October 1965 the government declared Emergency Powers. Even though the decree banned support for strikes in the media, Época continued with its criticism, triggering the reaction of the Ministry of the Interior, which had long considered Época a threat. On the night of 14 October the police, by order of Tejera, occupied Época's premises. The building was locked and guarded by police patrols.Footnote 92
In late October, Lhotský told Bernhard again that the Czechoslovaks had a strong interest in keeping the paper in print and that it was therefore necessary to stop attacking the government, particularly the interior minister. He also said that criticism should focus more on the United States. Bernhard agreed but stated that it would take some time to create a new image for the paper. He saw an obstacle in some members of the editorial board, particularly Galeano and Guillermo Chifflet, who held a strongly anti-government position.Footnote 93
At the same time, Lhotský responded to a new request from Bernhard, asking the Prague Directorate whether it was possible to supply 150 tonnes of newsprint to cover the newspaper's needs. The request was rejected because, the Directorate argued, before making any new requests, the newspaper should stop criticising the government. Furthermore, due to the complicated political situation in the country, Prague recommended a temporary suspension of active measures carried out at the newspaper.Footnote 94
The key topic of the November meetings between Bernhard and Lhotský was the financing of Época. According to Bernhard, the newspaper had a monthly budget of $U500,000. Eighty percent of the budget was generally covered by contributions from shareholders and donations, while the monthly deficit amounted to $U100,000 (about US$1,200). Bernhard explained that this situation was due to the rising prices of newsprint: the newspaper consumed 2 tonnes per day. In addition, part of the newsprint destined for Época was given to the socialist weekly El Sol. Amidst this serious situation, Bernhard presented Lhotský with a new proposition: the Czechoslovaks would buy the entire newspaper and keep it under their influence. Knowing in advance what Prague's response would be, the spy immediately rejected the idea, arguing that there were no resources for such an operation.Footnote 95
In explaining the financial situation of the newspaper, Bernhard presented Lhotský with the complete list of contributors. The document is available in the StB archive and includes dozens of names of various political orientations, even members of the traditional (Colorado and Nacional/Blanco) parties. Those who contributed the most money were the Brazilian politicians Goulart, Brizola and Ribeiro. Above all, it was Goulart who donated the largest sums of money to the newspaper. For example, on one occasion he donated US$4,000 to the newspaper.Footnote 96
In January 1966, Bernhard asked Lhotský for US$1,500 to fund salaries and newsprint, which he expected to pay back when the campaign for the upcoming November elections resulted in an improvement in the newspaper's financial position (through the printing of election propaganda). This request was rejected by headquarters in Prague, arguing that it had made a loan of US$3,000 only a few months previously. Moreover, it reminded Lhotský that the aim was to support various active measures and not exclusively this newspaper. The StB was willing to reward Bernhard only if he implemented an active measure at the newspaper:
We cannot justify another loan. The newspaper is always in a weak position, and Rajka will continue to ask for new loans, which he will never return. We should not link Rajka's cooperation with the newspaper. Rajka is not the owner of Época and will have no influence if he loses his current position. It is Rajka's business what he does later with his payment. He can use it to help the newspaper if he wants to.Footnote 97
The Prague headquarters also mentioned that, despite having access to the list of contributors, it was not clear which foreign powers had interests in the newspaper. Analysing the content, the Czechoslovaks suspected that Chinese influence was growing.Footnote 98 Bernhard argued that Época was an independent newspaper and, as such, its objective was to publish different opinions. The intention was not to side with China, the USSR, or Cuba, but to look at problems from another perspective. The StB also disagreed with the large number of articles promoting the Tricontinental Conference in Havana. According to the StB, this issue stirred opposition among official and government circles, as well as in the middle classes, and could serve as a pretext for closing the newspaper. Bernhard explained that these articles had been published by Galeano, who was in close contact with the editor of the Cuban Prensa Latina agency. According to Bernhard, the Cuban agency provided financial support to the newspaper.Footnote 99
Although the Czechoslovaks supported Cuba's interests, they had no information about the activities of its secret services. At the same time, there is no explanation in the StB documents as to how this mechanism worked with respect to the paid articles. It can be assumed that the dynamics were the same as in Czechoslovakia: countries that were interested in publishing favourable copy in the newspaper did so in exchange for financial support.
While the StB Directorate looked at Bernhard's constant requests with growing distrust, Lhotský showed some understanding. ‘I can't blame him for all he asks of us, maybe he thinks that if he asks he might receive something.’Footnote 100 Indeed, the spy was looking for ways to support the newspaper, showing an active interest in its continued existence. One of the possibilities Lhotský thought of was the advertising of Czechoslovak industrial and business products. However, the StB Directorate rejected this proposal, arguing that the newspaper was not aimed at such milieus.Footnote 101 This example shows that pragmatism and rationalism, typical features of Brezhnev's administration – hitherto absent from the StB's approach – were taking over the Czechoslovak state security apparatus.
In April 1966, the Directorate again expressed its disagreement with the direction the paper was taking and argued that any financial support on its part should be conditional on ideological change. ‘We want it to be an anti-American, Latin American, and nationalist newspaper, which should be geared in this direction.’Footnote 102 As this change was not carried out, a few months later the rezidentura was instructed to look for other newspapers and local collaborators to implement active measures. Given the political situation in the country, it was recommended that they should not be linked to leftist parties, which were facing increasing pressure from the government.Footnote 103
Época's situation was getting more and more difficult. The new Colorado government ended state subsidies to the newspaper, so that on 16 February 1967 Época, economically exhausted and politically increasingly divided, was forced to close. The reasons for this closure were explained by Bernhard in a article published in Marcha, in which he emphasised the inability of the national Left to maintain a project, and criticised it for not being able to achieve unification, and for not achieving resonance among the workers.Footnote 104 At the same time, Bernhard explained the reasons for Época's closure in an analysis prepared for the StB, in which he highlighted the economic factor as crucial.Footnote 105
The newspaper reappeared on 7 December 1967. The so-called ‘Acuerdo de Época’ was published in its editorial; its main objective was to ‘promote from a journalistic point of view more mature conditions for the revolution in Uruguay’ within the context of revolution in Latin America as evidenced in the newspaper's adherence to the founding declaration of the recently established Organización Latinoamericana de Solidaridad (Latin American Solidarity Organisation, OLAS). According to Trías, bringing Época back to life was possible thanks to the financial support of Cuba, specifically mentioning a contribution of US$5,000. This sum was supposed to reach the newspaper every month, thus guaranteeing its existence.Footnote 106 However, this expectation was not fulfilled. On 12 December, the new government of Jorge Pacheco Areco published the decree that closed down Época and El Sol, arrested the members of their editorial board, and outlawed the political groups that had signed the Acuerdo. In this way, practically all the non-Communist Left now became outlawed.Footnote 107
It is quite telling that the aforementioned reopening of Época is not mentioned in the StB documents. The Czechoslovaks had distanced themselves from the newspaper, which was linked to groups that were increasingly in favour of armed struggle, since its support for them could threaten the diplomatic and economic interests of the Soviet Bloc. At the same time, the rezidentura of the StB in Montevideo stopped focusing on press articles and began to give more support to books, which could have a more significant impact: La crisis del dólar (The Dollar Crisis) and La crisis del imperio (Crisis of Empire) by Trías, and Los monopolios y la industria frigorífica (Monopolies and the Refrigeration Industry) and El problema de la carne (The Meat Problem) by Bernhard.Footnote 108 Despite these publications, the StB reduced its contact with Bernhard after Época closed down. The economist was facing grave family and economic crises, and his work was not showing satisfactory results. He left Frigorífico Nacional in 1972 and started working as an accountant for a small agricultural cooperative. By then he was living alone, with serious alcohol problems. His contribution to StB became increasingly limited. The relationship ended definitively in July 1973. During a collaboration lasting ten years, 112 meetings had been held. His remuneration from the StB amounted to $U410,000, plus six cases of whisky and packets of cigarettes. In addition, Bernhard had received US$4,300 as aid for Época, plus US$200 for the Panar active measure.Footnote 109
Conclusion
The Czechoslovak intelligence rezidentura in Montevideo showed remarkable development in its operation. From being a minor base, it soon became one of the most important rezidenturas in Latin America. In the article, I try to reconstruct how active measures – consisting of the publication of articles stirring up anti-United States sentiment – were carried out. In the mid-1960s, a key role in this activity, not only in Uruguay but in all of Latin America, was played by the newspaper Época. Its anti-imperialist orientation, the endemic economic crises that the newspaper experienced throughout its existence, as well as the need to seek funds, led some of its representatives to establish contact with the Czechoslovaks. At first, they considered them to be diplomats: they had no idea that these foreigners, who so valued their strongly anti-imperialist orientation, were also spies. In due course the most active collaborators, Trías and Bernhard, became StB agents, which would ensure more organised and more effective contact. At the same time, both began to receive money for their activities.
Probably the main motivation for Época's chairman, Bernhard, to accept the proposal to become an StB agent was the fact that he saw in the Czechoslovaks some hope for saving the paper from economic collapse. However, despite his numerous funding requests, support was limited grants of only US$1,300 and US$3,000. The main argument of the StB Directorate in rejecting Bernhard's requests for loans was the growing radicalisation of the newspaper. When it was founded, Época was a publication of the nationalist Left, aligned with the Cuban process, which seemed also to align with the StB's interests. However, especially after the PSU's failure to gain any seats in the elections of November 1966, the newspaper's support for armed struggle and its critical stance towards the Uruguayan government became increasingly evident. This led to a distancing from the StB, due to the threat it posed to its political and economic position in the country. There was also concern that this approach would lead to the closure of the newspaper, which finally came to pass.
The newspaper Época belonged to a minority left-wing movement and therefore had a relatively limited circulation, which could have been the main cause of its financial problems; these intensified after the fire in the machine room and following the government's decision to end subsidies. StB documents suggest that the newspaper Época received money from various channels. In addition to suspicions about economic support from China, Bernhard explicitly mentioned financing from Cuba and Brazilian exiles, who, in turn, had great influence on the newspaper. This information makes one believe that the newspaper's self-proclaimed economic and political independence was an objective that, in the political context of 1960s Uruguay, was difficult to achieve in practice. However, consider the example of the weekly Marcha, with a larger print run: it is believed that it was politically and economically independent and that it did not receive financing from abroad. This thesis is confirmed by the fact that its director, Quijano, refused to publish articles paid for by the Czechoslovaks.
The StB archives show the Czechoslovak secret services’ growing interest in influencing public opinion after the Cuban Revolution. Although through these documents we can reconstruct some of the Communist secret services’ ways of working, the real impact of particular active measures, which were often of a continental scope and part of broader Soviet intelligence operations, is unknown because – with a few exceptions – we do not have access to the KGB archives. On the other hand, the story of the link between the Czechoslovak secret services and a newspaper which stressed its independence and aimed to be the voice of the national Left not only makes it easier to understand the role of the Latin American press in the Cold War, but also demonstrates that the Czech archives can be of great use in elucidating the dilemmas that nationalist and anti-imperialist sectors faced during this conflict.
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