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Segmented Party–Voter Linkages in Latin America: The Case of the UDI*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 July 2010

JUAN PABLO LUNA
JUAN PABLO LUNA
Affiliation:
Juan Pablo Luna is Associate Professor at the Instituto de Ciencia Política of the Pontificia UniversidadCatólica de Chile. Email: jpluna@icp.puc.cl.
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Abstract

By analysing the socially segmented party–voter linkages deployed by the Unión Demócrata Independiente (Independent Democratic Union, UDI), a Chilean conservative party, this article demonstrates the usefulness of combining Kitschelt's party–voter linkage framework with Gibson's conceptual approach to conservative party electoral coalition-making. In Latin America, parties take advantage of social fragmentation and the availability of non-state campaign financing to combine multiple linkage types and thus attract socially diverse constituencies. Although it is an opposition party, UDI's historical trajectory and organisation have enabled it to receive private funds from its traditional and party-identified core constituency (business and conservative sectors), whose programmatic preferences and interests it represents, and then use these resources in a ‘charismatic’ mobilisation approach and particularistic exchanges with a non-core constituency (low-income, non-traditional voters of the radical right), in a segmented, but nationally integrated, electoral strategy.

Abstract

Mediante el análisis de los vínculos segmentados partido–votante desarrollados por la Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI), un partido conservador chileno, este artículo demuestra la utilidad de combinar el esquema de vínculos partido–votante de Kitschelt con el enfoque conceptual de Gibson sobre las características de las coaliciones electorales conservadoras. En Latinoamérica los partidos aprovechan la fragmentación social y la disponibilidad de financiamiento no estatal de campañas electorales para desarrollar múltiples tipos de vínculos con bases sociales diversas y segmentadas. Aunque la UDI es un partido de oposición, su trayectoria histórica y organización le han permitido recibir fondos privados de su electorado tradicional (sectores empresariales y conservadores), identificado con el partido y cuyas preferencias programáticas e intereses representa en el congreso. Dichos fondos fueron utilizados para desarrollar una estrategia de movilización carismática y la implementación de intercambios particularistas con una nueva base electoral (votantes no tradicionales de la derecha radical, en sectores de bajo ingreso), dando lugar a una estrategia electoral segmentada pero nacionalmente integrada.

Abstract

Ao analisar as conexões socialmente segmentadas entre partido e eleitor empregadas pela Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI), um partido chileno conservador, este artigo demonstra a utilidade de unir a estrutura das conexões partido-eleitor de Kitschelt com a abordagem conceitual de Gibson para analisar o processo de coalizão eleitoral dos partidos conservadores. Na América Latina, partidos aproveitam a fragmentação social e a disponibilidade de financiamento de fontes privadas para campanhas para realizarem múltiplas espécies de ligações, atraindo, dessa forma, um eleitorado socialmente diverso. Embora seja um partido de oposição, a trajetória e organização da UDI possibilitaram com que recebesse fundos privados de seu eleitorado tradicional e fiel (setores empresariais e conservadores), cujas preferências e interesses programáticos são representados pela UDI. Em uma estratégia eleitoral segmentada, mas nacionalmente integrada, em seguida utilizou-se desses recursos em abordagem ‘carismática’ de mobilização e em intercâmbios clientelísticos com o eleitorado ‘flutuante’, eleitores de baixa renda que tradicionalmente não elegem a direita radical.

Keywords

ChileUDIconservative partiesparty–voter linkagesclientelismChileUDIpartidos conservadoresvínculos entre votaciones partidistasclientelismoChileUDIpartidos conservadoresconexões partido-eleitorclientelismo
Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Latin American Studies , Volume 42 , Issue 2 , May 2010 , pp. 325 - 356
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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References

1 Talavera, Arturo Fontaine, ‘Chile's Elections: The New Face of the New Right’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 11, no. 2 (2000), pp. 70–7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 Manuel Antonio Garretón, ‘Atavism and Democratic Ambiguity in the Chilean Right’, in Kevin J. Middlebrook (ed.), Conservative Parties, the Right, and Democracy in Latin America (Baltimore, 2000), p. 79.

3 For a theoretical discussion of ‘dual-representation strategies’ see Kitschelt, Herbert, ‘Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities’, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 33, no. 5/6 (2000), pp. 845–79CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 Marcelo Pollack, The New Right in Chile 1973–1997 (London, 1999); Carlos Huneeus, El régimen de Pinochet (Santiago, 2000); Morales, Mauricio and Bugueño, Rodrigo, ‘La UDI como expresión de la nueva derecha en Chile’, Estudios Sociales, no. 107 (2001), pp. 215–48Google Scholar; Klein, Markus, ‘The Unión Demócrata Independiente and the Poor (1983–1992): The Survival of Clientelistic Traditions in Chilean Politics’, Jahrbuch für Geschichte Lateinamerikas, vol. 41 (2004), pp. 301–24Google Scholar.

5 The effects of the binominal electoral system (along with other ‘authoritarian enclaves’) are frequently treated as a contributing factor to the UDI's electoral development. Although these cannot be discounted, the primary focus of this article is the strategy developed by the UDI vis-à-vis other parties. After all, the electoral system itself cannot explain why parties competing under it adapt to it in different ways. Even if systematic biases favouring the Alianza por Chile (the rightist electoral pact, commonly known as ‘the Alianza’) were present, the electoral system would still not explain why until recently the UDI was rapidly superseding Renovación Nacional (National Renewal, RN) as the more electorally successful right-wing party. See Middlebrook (ed.), Conservative Parties, p. 33. On the binominal electoral system see Zucco, César, ‘Where's the Bias? A Reassessment of the Chilean Electoral System’, Electoral Studies, vol. 26 (2007), pp. 303–14CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Navia, Patricio, ‘La transformación de votos en escaños: leyes electorales en Chile, 1833–2004’, Política y Gobierno, vol. XII, no. 2 (2005), pp. 233–76Google Scholar.

6 However, Douglas Chalmers, Maria do Carmo Campello de Souza and Atilio Borón (eds.), The Right and Democracy in Latin America (New York, 1992), Edward Gibson, Class and Conservative Parties: Argentina in Comparative Perspective (Baltimore, 1996) and Middlebrook (ed.), Conservative Parties are notable exceptions. In the remainder of this article I address their theoretical contributions and seek to contribute to the research agenda they outlined.

7 Both Middlebrook and Gibson highlight this comparative commonality in contemporary rightist mobilisation strategies. In Chile, mainstream newspapers are under the hegemonic control of economic groups tied to conservative and business interests. See Carlos Huneeus, The Pinochet Regime (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 2007), pp. 434–5.

8 Middlebrook (ed.), Conservative Parties, p. 49. The importance of the Partido Conservador (Conservative Party, 1851–1949), the Partido Nacional (National Party, formed by the merger of the Conservative Party and the Liberal Party in 1966), and the presence of a sizeable group of Social-Christian Conservatives in the founding of the Partido Demócrata Cristiano (Christian Democratic Party, PDC) in 1957 illustrate the historical strength of conservative forces in the country.

9 The literature has highlighted factors such as the erosion of rural clientelism, the presence of a strong Christian left, and a reduced ideological convergence between religious conservatism and upper-class interests. See Edward Gibson, ‘Conservative Electoral Movements and Democratic Politics: Core Constituencies, Coalition Building, and the Latin American Right’, in Chalmers et al. (eds.), The Right and Democracy, pp. 13–42; and Middlebrook (ed.), Conservative Parties.

10 Gibson, ‘Conservative Electoral Movements and Democratic Politics’, pp. 31–2; Middlebrook (ed.), Conservative Parties, pp. 286–9.

11 Pollack, The New Right in Chile; Huneeus, El régimen de Pinochet; Morales and Bugueño, ‘La UDI como expresión de la nueva derecha en Chile’; Hipsher, Patricia, ‘The New Electoral Right in Chile and the Poor: Strange Bedfellows’, South Eastern Latin Americanist, vol. 39, no. 3/4 (1996), pp. 17–34Google Scholar; Angel Soto, ‘La irrupción de la UDI en las poblaciones, 1983–1987’, paper presented at the Conference of the Latin American Studies Association (Washington DC, 2001); Emmanuelle Barozet, ‘Movilización de recursos y redes sociales en los neopopulismos: hipótesis de trabajo para el caso chileno’, Revista de Ciencia Política, vol. 23, no. 1 (2003), pp. 39–54; Alfredo Joignant and Patricio Navia, ‘De la política de individuos a los hombres del partido. Socialización, competencia política y penetración electoral de la UDI (1989–2001)’, Estudios Públicos, no. 89 (2003), pp. 129–71; Klein, ‘The Unión Demócrata Independiente and the Poor’.

12 Districts 18 (Cerro Navia, Lo Prado and Quinta Normal), 23 (Las Condes, Vitacura and Lo Barnechea), 24 (Peñalolén and La Reina), 26 (La Florida), and 27 (El Bosque, San Ramón and La Cisterna). The district sample maximises the range of electoral divergence within Santiago's metropolitan area, containing districts with significantly different socio-structural conditions and electoral results. Although the districts were selected in 2000, when considered together the weighted average vote obtained by each coalition in this sample in the congressional elections of 2005 closely approximates that of the entire Metropolitan Region, overestimating the Alianza's share by 1.5 per cent. In 2008, an additional in-depth interview with a long-time party leader was conducted to test the argument's underlying logic and validity.

13 For an application of this approach to the analysis of a leftist party, see Luna, Juan Pablo, ‘Frente Amplio and the Crafting of a Social-Democratic Alternative in Uruguay’, Latin American Politics and Society, vol. 49, no. 4 (2007), pp. 1–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

14 Gibson, ‘Conservative Electoral Movements and Democratic Politics’.

15 Kitschelt, ‘Linkages between Citizens and Politicians’.

16 Ibid., p. 855.

17 On the recent socio-structural transformation of Latin American societies, including Chile, see Rubén Kaztman and Guillermo Wormald (eds.), Trabajo y ciudadanía: los cambiantes rostros de la integración y exclusión social en cuatro áreas metropolitanas de América Latina (Montevideo, 2002). On recent decentralising reforms see Joseph S. Tulchin and Andrew Selee, Decentralization and Democratic Governance in Latin America (Washington DC, 2004).

18 For a comparative analysis of the effects of decentralisation and structural reforms on the nature of party–voter linkages in Chile and Uruguay see Juan Pablo Luna, ‘A Lost Battle? Building Programmatic Party–voter Linkages in Contemporary Latin America: A Comparative Analysis of Chile and Uruguay’, in Guillermo O'Donnell, Joseph S. Tulchin and August Varas (eds.), New Voices in the Study of Democracy in Latin America (Washington, DC, 2008), pp. 153–218.

19 See Kurtz, Marcus J., ‘The Dilemmas of Democracy in the Open Economy: Lessons from Latin America’, World Politics, vol. 56, no. 2 (2004), pp. 262–302.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

20 Within my district sample in the Metropolitan Region of Santiago, district 23 had an average poverty rate of 4.9 per cent (with a standard deviation of 2.9). District 18, also comprising three municipalities, had an average poverty rate of 15.3 per cent (with a standard deviation of 3.5). See Mardones, Rodrigo, ‘Descentralización y transición en Chile’, Revista de Ciencia Política, vol. 26, no. 1 (2006), pp. 3–26.Google Scholar

21 Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson (eds.), Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition (Cambridge, 2007).

22 See also Mona Lyne, The Voter's Dilemma and Democratic Accountability: Explaining the Democracy–Development Paradox (Pennsylvania, 2008).

23 Features of policymaking under ‘charismatic’ leaderships would also erode the provision of public goods.

24 Private funding could also be provided by illegal organisations seeking judicial immunity. While the electoral funding provided by mafia organisations might undermine the provision of some public goods by eroding transparency, justice and public security, it is less socially visible, and might not immediately translate into the same types of trade-off envisaged when state-financed linkages are presumed.

25 Renato Cristi, El pensamiento político de Jaime Guzmán (Santiago, 2000), pp. 7–13.

26 Ibid., pp. 23–44.

27 Guzmán had nonetheless given birth to the party (‘UDI por el Sí’) in 1983. Carlos Huneeus, ‘La derecha en el Chile después de Pinochet: el caso de la Unión Demócrata Independiente’, The Kellogg Institute Working Papers (South Bend IN, 2001), p. 35.

28 Joignant and Navia, ‘De la política de individuos a los hombres del partido’, p. 158.

29 Miguel Kast, chair of the National Planning Office (ODEPLAN) and gremialista, was very influential in bridging both groups. See Huneeus, ‘La derecha en el Chile después de Pinochet’, p. 9.

30 Ibid.

31 Personal interview (2003) with José Uriarte, UDI's 2001 congressional candidate in Peñalolén.

32 For a more thorough and systematic account of the historical development of the party and its doctrine see Pollack, The New Right in Chile; Cristi, El pensamiento político de Jaime Guzmán; Huneeus, El régimen de Pinochet; Huneeus, ‘La derecha en el Chile después de Pinochet’, and ‘Technocrats and Politicians in an Authoritarian Regime. The “Odeplan Boys” and the “Gremialists” in Pinochet's Chile’, Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 32, no. 2 (2000), pp. 461–501; Morales and Bugueño, ‘La UDI como expresión de la nueva derecha en Chile’; Joignant and Navia, ‘De la política de individuos a los hombres del partido’; Alejandro San Francisco, ‘Political Parties and Democracy Transition in Chile 1989–2001: The Case of the Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI)’, paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research (Edinburgh, 2003).

33 These estimates do not include pro-UDI, but independent, congressional representatives. Based on data from the Servicio Electoral.

34 In the municipal election of 1996, a significant number of later UDI members ran as ‘independents’. Therefore, this percentage is deflated and underestimates the relative electoral presence of the party.

35 Hipsher, ‘The New Electoral Right in Chile and the Poor’.

36 Altman, David, ‘Redibujando el mapa electoral chileno: incidencia de factores socioeconómicos y género en las urnas’, Revista de Ciencia Política, vol. 24, no. 2 (2004), pp. 49–66.Google Scholar

37 I thank Mauricio Morales for facilitating access to this dataset.

38 Personal interview (2003) with Julio Dittborn, UDI Congress member.

39 Personal interview (2008) with anonymous UDI national officer.

40 I thank Giancarlo Visconti for sharing this data and results. See Giancarlo Visconti, ‘Conducta legislativa de la Alianza por Chile: las diferencias entre RN y la UDI’, Santiago de Chile, Taller Continuo de Investigación, Instituto de Ciencia Política, PUC-Chile, manuscript (December 2008).

41 I thank Rafael Piñeiro for providing access to his database on campaign spending.

42 Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos, ‘Seminario: evaluación de la puesta en marcha de la Ley sobre Transparencia, Control, y Límite al Gasto Electoral’ (Santiago, April 2005), p. 56, fig. 4.

43 Ibid., p. 58.

44 Unfortunately, systematic analyses of campaign funding in congressional races are not yet available. However, in the case of the UDI, spending figures for congressional and municipal campaigns coincide. Therefore, there are unlikely to be significant discrepancies between types of campaign regarding the proportion of private donations.

45 Proyecto Probidad, Financiamiento Político en Chile, funded by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and currently in execution by Chile Transparente.

46 Personal interview (2008) with anonymous UDI national leader.

47 Personal interview (2003) with Eliana Caravall, PDC Congress member in District 27.

48 Jorge Schaulsohn, ‘Letter to the Supreme Court from the Partido Por la Democracia’ (Santiago, 2006).

49 Personal interviews with Osvaldo Silva (2003) and with two officers of the División Municipalidades of the Contraloría General de la Nación (2003). This rationale was confirmed to me by several city councillors and by representatives of the Concertación in Congress who invariably complained about UDI's greater economic capacity.

50 Although crucial for understanding subsequent developments, I refer only briefly to the origins of UDI's electoral strategy under Pinochet. For a comprehensive account see Huneeus, El régimen de Pinochet and ‘Technocrats and Politicians in an Authoritarian Regime’, and Klein, ‘The Unión Demócrata Independiente and the Poor’.

51 See Alfredo Rehren, ‘Clientelismo político, corrupción y ética en la nueva democracia chilena’, in Paul Drake and Iván Jaksic (eds.), El modelo chileno. Democracia y desarrollo en los noventa (Santiago, 1999), pp. 465–84.

52 For a description of local politics before 1973, see Arturo Valenzuela, Political Brokers in Chile: Local Government in a Centralized Polity (Durham NC, 1977).

53 Klein, ‘The Unión Demócrata Independiente and the Poor’, p. 303.

54 Huneeus, ‘La derecha en el Chile después de Pinochet’, p. 8; Klein, ‘The Unión Demócrata Independiente and the Poor’, p. 306.

55 Pollack, The New Right in Chile; Huneeus, ‘La derecha en el Chile después de Pinochet’; Morales and Bugueño, ‘La UDI como expresión de la nueva derecha en Chile’; Soto, ‘La irrupción de la UDI en las poblaciones, 1983–1987’; Klein, ‘The Unión Demócrata Independiente and the Poor’.

56 Soto, ‘La irrupción de la UDI en las poblaciones’, pp. 13–17.

57 Ibid.

58 Hipsher, ‘The New Electoral Right in Chile and the Poor’; Morales and Bugueño, ‘La UDI como expresión de la nueva derecha en Chile’; Barozet, ‘Movilización de recursos y redes sociales en los neopopulismos’.

59 Morales and Bugueño, ‘La UDI como expresión de la nueva derecha en Chile’, p. 235.

60 See Timothy Scully, Rethinking the Center: Cleavages, Critical Junctures, and Party Evolution in Chile (Stanford, 1992); Valenzuela, Samuel J., ‘Reflexiones sobre el presente y futuro del paisaje político chileno a la luz de su pasado: respuesta a Eugenio Tironi y Felipe Agüero’, Estudios Públicos, no. 75 (1999), pp. 275–90.Google Scholar

61 Kenneth M. Roberts, Deepening Democracy? The Modern Left and Social Movements in Chile and Peru (Stanford, 1998).

62 Posner, Paul, ‘Popular Representation and Political Dissatisfaction in Chile's New Democracy’, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, vol. 41, no. 1 (1999), pp. 59–85.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

63 Although this might be seen as a global phenomenon, it is particularly strong in Chile, especially among youth. See Huneeus, Carlos, ‘Malestar y desencanto en Chile: legados del autoritarismo y costos de la transición’, Papeles de Trabajo – Programa de Estudios Prospectivos, 54 (Santiago, 1998)Google Scholar; Sergio Toro, ‘De lo épico a lo cotidiano: jóvenes y generaciones políticas en Chile’, Revista de Ciencia Política, vol. 28, no. 2 (2008), pp. 143–60.

64 Roberts, Deepening Democracy?; Posner, ‘Popular Representation and Political Dissatisfaction in Chile's New Democracy’.

65 Barozet, Emmanuelle and Aubry, Marcel, ‘De las reformas internas a la candidatura presidencial autónoma: los nuevos caminos institucionales de Renovación Nacional’, Política, vol. 45 (2005), pp. 165–96Google Scholar.

66 Based on author's interviews.

67 Personal interview (2003) with María Angélica Cristi, former mayor of Peñalolén and RN Congress member, UDI Congress member.

68 Patricio Silva, ‘Toward Technocratic Mass Politics in Chile? The 1999–2000 Elections and the Lavín Phenomenon’, European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, no. 70 (2001), pp. 25–39.

69 Memo: ‘20 preguntas a un gremialista’, and participant observation of a youth education seminar in La Florida, July 2003.

70 The gremialistas have provided no evidence for such a claim. See Huneeus, El régimen de Pinochet, pp. 345–53.

71 UDI adopted this new slogan in July 2002. See www.udi.cl.

72 Silva, ‘Toward Technocratic Mass Politics in Chile?’

73 Joaquín Lavín was elected mayor of Las Condes in 1992 with 31 per cent of the vote and re-elected in 1996 with 78 per cent. In 2000 he ran for the mayoralty of Santiago, obtaining 61 per cent of the vote.

74 Personal interviews with Eugenio González (2003) and José Luis Uriarte (2003).

75 The municipal elections of La Florida and Nuñoa are a case in point, as well as UDI's expansion through the south, traditionally dominated by RN.

76 Personal interview, Maria Angélica Cristi, 2003. The internal strains between transfugas, rightist hardliners sympathetic to UDI, and RN's liberal wing, represented by the party's national leadership, sparked an internal crisis in RN.

77 Morales, Mauricio, ‘La primera mujer Presidenta de Chile: ¿qué explicó el triunfo de Michelle Bachelet en las elecciones de 2005–2006?’, Latin American Research Review, vol. 43, no. 1 (2008), pp. 7–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

78 Personal interview (2003) with José Jara, UDI's 2001 congressional candidate in La Florida.

79 Social operatives organised by gremialista student organisations (particularly at the Universidad Católica) during summer and winter holidays also work towards this goal.

80 The involvement of Catholic networks in these social operatives might also explain the greater enthusiasm, energy and mysticism that characterises the operativos de terreno implemented by UDI youth.

81 Personal interview (2003) with Rodrigo Bordachar, UDI's youth leader in La Florida.

82 They are recruited from top private and Catholic universities (usually from law faculties) and have been sent to pursue internships both at the Leadership Institute in Washington DC and at the Universidad de Navarra in Spain (personal interviews with José Jara and José Uriarte, 2003).

83 Personal interview, Rodrigo Bordachar, 2003.

84 Personal interview (2003), with Eugenio González, Lavín's 2000 campaign strategist.

85 Participant observation in congressional districts and author's interviews with Margarita Cofre (2003) and Osvaldo Silva (2003).

86 Hipsher, ‘The New Electoral Right in Chile and the Poor’.

87 Joignant and Navia, ‘De la política de individuos a los hombres del partido’, p. 161.

88 Personal interview, José Uriarte, 2003.

89 Personal interview, Eugenio González, 2003.

90 Independently of this centralised allocation, each candidate is free to seek and spend his or her own resources.

91 This is due both to the party's historical relationship to the Pinochet regime and to more recent events such as the party's handling of the Spiniak affair in 2003. In that scandal, one historic leader of the UDI (Senator Jovino Novoa) was accused of frequent participation in a network involved in sexual abuse against children and drug use. The party's initial handling of this slander case weakened Lavín's presidential candidacy in 2005, as well as the unity of the Alianza, which ended up presenting two separate presidential candidacies that year. Hostility against the UDI is also present in important segments of RN.

92 Kitschelt, ‘Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities’; Kitschelt and Wilkinson (eds.), Patrons, Clients, and Policies.

93 See Beatriz Magaloni, Alberto Díaz-Cayeros and Federico Estévez, ‘The Erosion of Party Hegemony, Clientelism, and Portfolio Diversification: The Programa Nacional De Solidaridad (Pronasol) in Mexico’, in Kitschelt and Wilkinson (eds.), Patrons, Clients, and Policies, pp 182–205; Calvo, Ernesto and Murillo, Victoria, ‘Who Delivers? Partisan Clients in the Argentine Electoral Market’, American Journal of Political Science, vol. 48, no. 4 (2004), 742–57CrossRefGoogle Scholar.