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When Informality Matters: Participatory Security Reform and Mechanisms of Social Embeddedness in Nezahualcóyotl, Mexico

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 June 2021

Françoise Montambeault  and
Annabelle Dias Félix
Françoise Montambeault*
Affiliation:
Associate professor, Political Science Department, Université de Montréal
Annabelle Dias Félix
Affiliation:
PhD candidate, Political Science Department, Université de Montréal
*
*Corresponding author. E-mail: francoise.montambeault@umontreal.ca
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Abstract

What are the conditions underlying successful implementation of participatory security mechanisms? Drawing on the case of Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl and from the notion of social embeddedness, we argue that participatory security reforms that aim to include citizens in defining security priorities allow for better adoption of reforms in practice. Local level reforms are not implemented in a social vacuum but rather in pre-existing social networks that are key to their adoption in practice by citizens. However, not all social networks are equal, nor do they operate in the same manner. In ‘Neza’, it is through existing clientelistic networks and socially embedded local brokers that the redes vecinales were implemented and adopted by citizens, leading to varied reform adoption patterns at the very local level.

Spanish abstract

Spanish abstract

¿Cuáles son las condiciones subyacentes de una exitosa implementación de mecanismos de seguridad participativos? Basándonos en el caso de Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl y desde la noción de enraizamiento social, señalamos que las reformas para la seguridad participativa que buscan incluir a los ciudadanos en la definición de sus prioridades de seguridad permiten una mejor adopción de dichas medidas en la práctica. Las reformas a nivel local no son implementadas en un vacío social sino en redes preexistentes que son clave para su adopción ciudadana en la práctica. Sin embargo, no todas las redes sociales son lo mismo ni operan de la misma manera. En ‘Neza’, es a través de redes clientelares existentes y de intermediarios socialmente enraizados que las redes vecinales fueron adoptadas e implementadas por sus habitantes, lo que llevó a la adopción de las reformas a niveles muy locales.

Portuguese abstract

Portuguese abstract

Quais são as condições subjacentes à implementação bem-sucedida de mecanismos participativos de segurança? Com base no caso da Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl e na noção de inserção social, argumentamos que as reformas de segurança participativa que visam incluir os cidadãos na definição das prioridades de segurança permitem uma melhor adoção das reformas na prática. As reformas em nível local não são implementadas em um vácuo social, mas sim em redes sociais pré-existentes que são fundamentais para sua adoção na prática pelos cidadãos. No entanto, nem todas as redes sociais são iguais, nem funcionam da mesma maneira. Em ‘Neza’, é por meio de redes clientelistas existentes e negociadores locais socialmente integrados que as ‘redes vecinales’ foram implementadas e adotadas pelos cidadãos, levando a padrões de adoção de reforma variados em nível local.

Keywords

public participationcommunity-oriented policing (COP)public securitysocial embeddednessMexicoparticipación públicapolíticas orientadas a la comunidadseguridad públicaincorporación socialMéxicoparticipação públicapoliciamento orientado para a comunidadesegurança públicaimersão socialMéxico
Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Latin American Studies , Volume 53 , Issue 3 , August 2021 , pp. 465 - 492
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

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2 Ibid.

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17 While our focus on clientelistic social networks and security reform implementation is new, the question of how violence can be somewhat mediated by clientelistic networks has been discussed in Tina Hilgers and Laura Macdonald (eds.), Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean: Subnational Structures, Institutions, and Clientelistic Networks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), and especially in the Introduction (by Hilgers and Macdonald) and in Chapter 6 (by Lucy Luccisano and Macdonald), where the authors show that local clientelistic networks can work as a security net for criminal activities, for unregulated informal markets and for residents more broadly. Likewise, Chapter 6 demonstrates that the semi-clientelistic nature of the social policies implemented in Mexico City under the municipal PRD government contributed, through work on social cohesion, social capital development and state strength, to lower violence rates.

18 Montambeault, Politics of Local Participatory Democracy.

19 See Annex A, ‘Methodology’.

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33 Julia Preston and Sam Dillon, Opening Mexico: The Making of a Democracy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004); Uildriks, Mexico's Unrule of Law, p. 2; Müller, ‘Community Policing in Latin America’, p. 24.

34 Müller, ‘Addressing an Ambivalent Relationship’, pp. 325 and 328; Nelia Tello, ‘Police Reforms: The Voice of Police and Residents in Mexico City’, Policing and Society, 22: 1 (2012), pp. 14–27.

35 Müller, ‘Community Policing in Latin America’, p. 32.

36 As Alvarado Mendoza shows (‘Reformas policiales’), Neza's homicide rate was 47 dead for every 100,000 inhabitants in 1995. It declined to 15.5 in 2018 and has remained around that level, which is higher than the average for the metropolitan area of Mexico City.

37 Interview with Municipal President A, 2018.

38 With reference to Nezahualcóyotl, the terms ‘municipal president’ and ‘mayor’ are interchangeable.

39 Interview with Municipal President B, 2018. President B participated in the movement that opposed the PRI in the 1990s and then assumed multiple elected functions (including municipal president) in the city.

40 Interviews with Municipal Presidents A and B, 2018.

41 Interview with Municipal President A, 2018.

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43 Amador explained to us that the funding for this investment in police training – part of the overall police budget – comes partly from federal contributions, although these are minor, and partly from municipal taxes.

44 As soon as the PRI returned to power, the COP programme was completely dismantled, and Amador dismissed from his position. During this three-year period of PRI rule, violence and insecurity rates exploded: according to Nezahualcóyotl's DGSC, the six-monthly death rate between 2006 and 2009 due to violent homicide peaked at 76, while it reached 140 in 2012 (at the end of the PRI government). Car theft displayed the same trend: the daily average of 4.2 cars stolen between 2007 and 2009 increased to 9.1 in in the second semester of 2012. DGSC, ‘Modelo de Seguridad Nezahualcóyotl’ (undated), available from http://www.seguridadneza.gob.mx/portal/files/modelo.pdf (last accessed 23 March 2021); homicide data from the INEGI; car theft data from the Oficina Coordinadora de Riesgos Asegurados (Coordinating Bureau of Insured Risks, OCRA).

45 Interview with Municipal President A, 2018.

46 Montambeault, ‘Overcoming Clientelism’.

47 Interviews with COPACI members, 2007 and 2018.

48 The red is considered created once the police officers assigned to the subcuadrante have organised the first meeting with the residents and the subcuadrante's WhatsApp group is functioning.

49 A sector comprises between four and eight cuadrantes; there are 15 sectors in total.

50 Arturo Alvarado Mendoza, El tamaño del infierno: un estudio sobre la criminalidad en la zona metropolitana de la Ciudad de México (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2012); Alvarado Mendoza, ‘Reformas policiales’.

51 According to data from the DGSC (‘Modelo de Seguridad Nezahualcóyotl’), high-impact crimes fell from 10,148 in 2012 to 3,659 in 2016, a reduction of 64 per cent in four years. Likewise, intentional homicides fell from 171 in 2012 to 135 in 2016, a reduction of 21 per cent in the same period. Car thefts have also greatly decreased: there were 7,494 car thefts in 2012 as against 2,595 in 2016.

52 Interview with Municipal President A, 2018.

53 Montambeault, ‘Overcoming Clientelism’.

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56 See Annex A, ‘Meetings between Police and Residents at Cuadrante Level’.

57 Alvarado Mendoza, El tamaño del infierno, p. 15; Alvarado Mendoza, ‘Reformas policiales’.

58 González, ‘Participation as a Safety Valve’, p. 79.

59 Müller, ‘Community Policing in Latin America’, p. 34.

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66 See note 65.

67 Tina Hilgers (ed.), Clientelism in Everyday Latin American Politics, 1st edn (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Hilgers and Macdonald (eds), Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean.

68 Larissa Adler-Lomnitz, Rodrigo Salazar Elena and Ilya Adler, Symbolism and Ritual in a One-Party Regime: Unveiling Mexico's Political Culture (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 2010).

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71 See note 70.

72 Arzaluz Solano, Participación ciudadana, p. 26; Montambeault, Politics of Local Participatory Democracy.

73 Ibid.; Alvarado Mendoza, El tamaño del infierno, p. 15.

74 For example, we attended a weekly sector meeting on a Sunday afternoon (2 Dec. 2018) in the Loma Bonita neighbourhood with close to 100 citizens: here it was clear that the local MOVIDIG coordinators and rutas officials were very close to former PRD mayor and federal member of congress Víctor Bautista López – one of the main speakers at the event alongside the sector coordinator – and his entourage. The physical organisation of the meeting (chairs, sound equipment) was carried out by a group of men wearing PRD t-shirts, who came in a mini-van emblazoned with MOVIDIG and PRD logos side by side. One of the PRD party logos said ‘Víctor Bautista’; the other, ‘Mónica Bautista, diputada federal [federal deputy] del Estado de México’, showing the close association between the two organisations (fieldnotes, 2018).

75 Montambeault, Politics of Local Participatory Democracy.

76 Ibid.; Selee, Decentralization, p. 24.

77 Interview with Guadalupe, COPACI A, 2018.

78 Interviews with MOVIDIG leader, 2018 and with Municipal President B, 2018.

79 Interview with MOVIDIG leader, 2018.

80 Interview with Municipal President B, 2018.

81 Interview with MOVIDIG leader, 2018.

82 Fieldnotes, 2018. A ‘federal deputy’ is a member of the national Chamber of Deputies; a ‘senator’ a member of the national Chamber of Senators.

83 Interview with MOVIDIG administrator, 2018.

84 Susan C. Stokes, Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno and Valeria Brusco, Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

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86 Interview with MOVIDIG leader, 2018.

87 Interview with MOVIDIG leader, December 2018.

88 Interview with Amador, Director, DGSC, 2018.

89 Interviews with Municipal Presidents A and B, 2018.

90 Interview with Amador, Director, DGSC, 2018.

91 González, ‘Participation as a Safety Valve’ and ‘Varieties of Participatory Security’; Yanilda María González and Lindsay Mayka, ‘Mobilizing the Grassroots against Human Rights: The Dark Side of Participatory Security in São Paulo’, unpublished MS.

92 Alvarado Mendoza, ‘Reformas policiales’; México Evalúa, ‘Hot Spot Neza. 10,000 cuadras resguardadas por vecinos’ (2020), available at https://www.mexicoevalua.org/hot-spot-neza-diez-mil-cuadras-resguardadas-por-vecinos/ (last accessed 5 April 2021).

93 Laura Macdonald et al., ‘Spatializing Urban Governance and Clientelism: The Case of the PMByC [Programa de Mejoramiento Barrial y Comunitario, Community Programme for Neighbourhood Improvement] in Mexico City’, unpublished MS.

94 Interview with Juan, member of MOVIDIG, December 2018.

95 Fieldnotes.