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Consolidation of Prosecutor Offices

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 October 2022

Claudio Detotto  and
Bryan C. McCannon
Claudio Detotto
Affiliation:
University of Corsica
Bryan C. McCannon*
Affiliation:
West Virginia University
*
Contact the corresponding author, Bryan C. McCannon, at bryan.c.mccannon@gmail.com.
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Abstract

We investigate the impact of the consolidation of local agencies publicly providing services, focusing on the prosecution of crime. In many states in the United States, prosecution is a county office with a head prosecutor directing decisions. Other states merge counties into prosecutorial districts. We show that, along with the cost savings that arises, the evidence suggests that prosecutorial services benefit from increasing returns to scale. The efficiency of prosecutorial output is higher in consolidated districts. Further, we show that it is not owing to differing outcomes of the criminal justice system but to fewer inputs used.

Type
Articles
Information
Journal of Law and Courts , Volume 8 , Issue 2 , Fall 2020 , pp. 229 - 246
Copyright
© 2020 by the Law and Courts Organized Section of the American Political Science Association. All rights reserved.

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