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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 April 2015
The Symposium on The Religious Foundations of Civil Rights Law originated in response to an apparent crisis that has emerged in the Nation's understanding of civil rights law. The character of the crisis could be discerned in the exchange on abortion that took place between democratic vice-presidential candidate Geraldine Ferraro and Roman Catholic Archbishop John O'Connor in the 1984 presidential campaign. Brief mention of this political event provides a useful point of departure for reflection on the symposium.
The exchange between Ferraro and O'Connor caused protracted public debate about the correct relation of religion and politics. The purview of the debate extended to the relation of civil rights and religion, since abortion affected the rights of women and unborn children, and the candidate and the Archbishop had each related religion to these rights. But, as most commentators agreed, the debate did not shed appreciable light on the meaning or validity of civil rights law, nor did it notably elucidate the relation of civil rights and religion.
© 1988, The Catholic University of America.
1. Sponsored by the Interdisciplinary Program in Law and Religion, The Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America, on April 19-20, 1985. See Destro, , Introduction: The Interdisciplinary Program in Law and Religion, 5 J. Law & Relig. 3 (1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
2. O'Connor initiated the exchange, when he criticized Ferraro's position on abortion to reporters at a Pennsylvania Pro-Life Federation convention on Saturday, September 8, 1984. He repeated his criticism in brief remarks after celebrating Mass in St. Patrick's Cathedral on Sunday, September 9, 1984. The Archbishop previously had stated publicly that he did not believe a Catholic in good conscience could vote for a candidate who approved of abortion. Ferraro had cosigned a letter that accompanied material from “Catholics for a Free Choice” addressed to congressional legislators. O'Connor criticized this letter for saying that Catholic teaching on abortion was “not monolithic” and permitted a “range of personal and political responses to the issue.” Ferraro responded with a telephone call to the Archbishop on Sunday, September 9, 1984. She was still responding to the Archbishop in the vice-presidential debate with George Bush on Thursday, October 11, 1984. N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1984, at 1, col. 3; Sept. 10, 1984, at 1, col. 5; Sept. 11, at 1, col. 3; and Oct. 13, at 8, col. 4. O'Connor has subsequently been elevated to cardinal. N.Y. Times, April 25, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
3. For an excellent commentary on the debate, see Politics, Religion and the 1984 Campaign, 44 Christianity and Crisis 391–406 (1984)Google Scholar (a symposium). The symposium's six short pieces include: Bellah, Toward Clarity in the Midst of Conflict, id. at 391-94; Bettenhausen, Personal and Political Private and Public, id. at 394-96; Bennett, Partisanship and Piety; Rights and Restraints, id. at 397-99; Elshtein, Muddled Language Makes for Wearying Debate, id. at 399-401; Lekachman, An Agnostic's Advice: Keep the Rulest id. at 401-04; Surlis, Is Religion the Only Basis for Morality?, id. at 404-06. A central theme in this collection is the unsatisfactory level of the public discussion. As Robert Bellah states,
[t]he most significant fact about the debate over religion and politics in the 1984 presidential campaign is its intensity. After over 200 years of the Constitutional separation of church and state in America, that intensity is telling us something, even if the content of the debate on the whole is not telling us much.
Id. at 391 (emphasis added). Elizabeth Bettenhausen concurs, stating:
Ringing the changes on religion and politics, morality and social policy, personal belief and public responsibility, church and state is, in this election year, as deafening and nearly as deadening as it was the for the unsuspecting in Dorothy Sayers’ The Nine Tailors. This peal of catchwords from sundry ecclesial and political belfries is best heard from a distance.…
Id. at 394 (emphasis added).
4. The period of Supreme Court jurisprudence in question corresponds more or less with the Warren Court (193צ to 1969). Clearly, the most significant civil rights opinion issued during the period was Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The crisis in understanding rights at issue here has been accompanied by an intensified debate over norms of constitutional interpretation. For a general discussion, see Ely, J., Democracy and DisTrict: A Theory of Judicial Review 1–72 (1980)Google Scholar.
5. 28 U.S.C. §1447, 42 U.S.C. §§1971, 1975 et seq. 2000a et seq. Richard John Neuhaus concurs that the legal developments of the late 1950's and early 1960's are implicated in a special way in the current crisis. He calls this period the “base line” in our thinking about civil rights. Neuhaus, , Nihilism Without the Abyss: Law, Rights, and Transcendent Good, 5 J. Law & Relig. 61 (1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
6. This was illustrated with a certain poignancy in the confirmation hearings on William Rehnquist's appointment as Chief Justice. While alaw clerk to Justice Robert H. Jackson in 1952-53, Rehnquist had written a memorandum entitled “A Random Thought on the Segregation Cases” which emphatically supported the “separate but equal” doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). When the memorandum was brought to his attention, Rehnquist responded that “his best recollection was that the memo was prepared at Jackson's request for a conference with the other justices and that it reflected Jackson,s views, not his own” (emphasis added). Wash. Post, July 20, 1986, at 1, col.5, Jackson's personal secretary, Elsie Douglas, emerged from retirement to contest Rehnquist's explanation, saying that Jackson did not ask his clerks to express his views and that Rehnquist had smeared the reputation of a great man. N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1986, at 14, col.6. Regardless of whom one believes, the incident shows that a disavowal of Brown v. Board of Education, supra note 4, is now a “smear,’ no one can publicly endure.
7. The focal point of this disagreement is Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.113 (1973). See, e.g., Neuhaus, supra note 5, at 4-8.
8. I assume that the meaning and validity of the law must be grounded in relation to some nonlegal reality to which I refer throughout my paper somewhat interchangeably as “horizon,” “ground,” and “foundation.” This assumption is itself the threshold to important questions of semantics and hermeneutics which, however, are not directly the topic of the symposium. See, e.g., Dworkin, R., Law's Empire 1–86 (1986)Google Scholar.
9. The principle of separation of church and state unfortunately is not infrequently used to justify the exclusion of religion from political discussion, as well as from state action.
10. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., who founded the Southern Christian Leadership Conference in 1956, was an ordained Baptist minister. Encyclopedic Dictionary of Religion 1986 (1978). King's religious philosophy is described in his book Strength to Love (1963). On November 2, 1983, President Reagan signed Public Law 98-144, making the birthday of Martin Luther King, Jr. a holiday. The day was first celebrated as a national holiday on January 20, 1986.
11. Paul Tillich, for instance, has described religion as:
at home … in the depth of all functions of man's spiritual life. Religion is the aspect of depth in the totality of human spirit. What does the metaphor of depth mean? It means that the religious aspect points to that which is ultimate, infinite, unconditional in man's spiritual life. Religion, in the largest and most basic sense of the word, is ultimate concern. And ultimate concern is manifest in all creative functions of the human spirit. It is manifest in the moral sphere as the unconditional seriousness of the moral demand.
Tillich, P., Theology of Culture 7–8 (1959)Google Scholar. Tillich's definition of religion was cited by the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163,180 (1965).
12. According to Gallup, 91% of Americans currently state a religious preference, 68% say they are members of a church or synagogue, 65% express a “great deal or quite alot of” confidence in the church or organized religion, and 56% say religion is “very important” in their lives. The proportion of Americans who see religion as increasing its influence has trebled since 1969 and is now at 48%. Gallup, G. Jr., The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1986 120–21 (1986)Google Scholar.
13. This question for discussion was included in the original invitation sent to participating scholars, the announcement sent to the members of local university faculties who composed the symposium's audience, and the brochure distributed at the symposium.
14. E.g., Kelsen, H., Pure Theory of Law 1–69 (1967)Google Scholar. While the question as formulated leaves room for discussion with the form of positivism adopted by H.L.A. Hart, Hart and his followers would probably not find a wide range for meaningful analysis within this formulation. See Hart, H.L.A., The Concept of Law 187–207 (1961)Google Scholar.
15. This viewpoint frequently encountered in the contemporary public discussion helps account for the impasse in the debate. For a treatment of the source and meaning of this trend toward the privatization of religion, see Neuhaus, R., The Naked Public Square (1984)Google Scholar.
16. This, too, is a viewpoint encountered with some frequency in the public discussion, most often among evangelical and fundamentalist Protestants. It once characterized Puritan thought on law, since the Puritans saw the Pentateuch as a comprehensive source of civil law. Haskins, G.L., Law and Authority in Early Massachusetts 141–62 (1960)Google Scholar. However, as Harold Berman notes, the relative autonomy of law has been seen as a fundamental postulate of Western legal systems dating to the twelfth century or earlier. Berman, , Conscience and Law: The Lutheran Reformation and the Western Legal Tradition, 5 J. Law & Relig. 177 (1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
17. In arranging the discussion, we also recognized Harold Berman and John Noonan as historians. We asked Robert Cover to represent a particular theological perspective. In fact, all eight participating scholars were versatile thinkers with expertise in several of the relevant fields.
18. We had hoped to include sociology as a fifth discipline, but were unable to arrange it. in retrospect, another discipline would have overtaxed the structure of the already complex discussion.
19. The texts of these panels are included below. 5 J. Law & Relig. 95, 149, 213, and 225 (1987)Google Scholar.
20. I would like to thank Professor Benjamin Mintz for his editorial advice in the phrasing of these questions.
21. The warm and generous hospitality and the beautiful daily liturgy provided by Prior Charles Farrell and the friars of the Dominican House of Studies greatly enhanced the symposium. I would like no acknowledge personally also the assistance, with many practical details, provided by Bart de la Torre, Stephen Hayes, and Greg Rocca.
22. Neuhaus, supra note 5, at 1-3.
23. Gewirth, , Morai Foundations of Civil Rights Law, 5 J. Law & Relig. 128–31 (1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
24. Berman, supra note 16, at 201-202; Cahill, , The Catholic Tradition: Religion, Morality, and the Common Good, 5 J. Law & Relig. 75, 77 (1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Theological Perspectives: Concluding Panel Discussion, 5 J. Law & Relig. 105–106 (1987)Google Scholar [hereinafter Theological Perspectives] (Remarks of L. Cahill); **Cover, Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order, 5 J. Law & Relig. 66 (1987)Google Scholar; Dougherty, , Puritan Aspiration: Puritan Legacy—An Historical/Philosophical Inquiry, 5 J. Law & Relig. 121–23 (1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Final Panel Discussion, 5 J. Law & Relig 239 (1987)Google Scholar (Remarks of J. Dougherty); Noonan, , Principled or Pragmatic Foundations for Freedom of Conscience?, 5 J. Law & Relig. 212 (1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Final Panel Discussion, 5 J. Law & Relig. 237 (1987)Google Scholar (Remarks of P. Noonan); and Tierney, , Religion and Rights: A Medieval Perspective, 5 J. Law & Relig. 163 (1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
25. Harold Berman does not deal expressly with this problem in his present paper, but he appears to presuppose it. See Berman, H., Law and Revolution: The Formation of Western Legal Tradition v. 33 (1983)Google Scholar; Lisa Cahill and Robert Cover sat on a panel with Richard John Neuhaus, and challenged him on various points, but neither questioned Neuhaus' fundamental claim that such a problem exists. See Theological Perspectives, supra note 24, at 95-108; Alan Gewirth does not acknowledge such a problem in so many words, but he sees it was necessary to justify the justificatory primacy of morality. Gewirth, supra note 23, at 125, 128-31; John Noonan stresses the failures of post-enlightenment moral philosophy and, thus, indirectly alludes to the problem. Final Panel Discussion, supra note 24, at 237-38; and Brian Tierney sat on the final panel without challenging Neuhaus or Dougherty's claim, although Tierney was willing to make direct challenges at other times. Compare Final Panel Discussion, supra note 24, at 225-47; Historical Perspectives: Concluding Panel Discussion, 5 J. Law & Relig. 213–24 (1987)Google Scholar [hereinafter Historical Perspectives] (Remarks of B. Tierney); and Philosophical Perspectives: Concluding Panel Discussion, 5 J. Law & Relig. 152–53 (1987)Google Scholar [hereinafter Philosophical Perspectives] (Remarks of B. Tierney).
26. Neuhaus, supra note 5, at 53-60; Dougherty, supra note 24, at 109-120.
27. I designate participants as relatively optimistic or pessimistic based on their remarks at the symposium. This is not a claim about the general tenor of any participant's work, but merely a convenient benchmark for charting the contours of the present discussion.
28. This concern is implicit in Professor Herman's present paper. He explicitly develops the nature of his concern elsewhere, in the following terms:
That the Western legal tradition, like Western civilization as a whole, is undergoing in the twentieth century a crisis greater than it has ever known before is not something that can be proved scientifically. It is something that is known, ultimately, by intuition. I can only testify, so to speak, that I sense that we are in the midst of an unprecedented crisis of legal values and of legal thought, in which our entire legal tradition is being challenged—not only the so-called liberal concepts of the past few hundred years, but the very structure of Western legality, which dates from the eleventh and twelfth centuries.
Berman, supra note 16, at 33.
29. Theological Perspectives, supra note 24, at 106 (Remarks of R. Cover).
30. Id. at 106; Cover, supra note 24, at 69.
31. Cahill, supra note 24, at 76; Theological Perspectives, supra note 24, at 96 (Remarks of L. Cahill).
32. Theological Perspectives, supra note 24, at 96 (Remarks of L. Cahill).
33. Id. at 106.
34. Philosophical Perspectives, supra note 25, at 153-54 (Remarks of A. Gewirth); Gewirth, supra note 23, at 131-35.
35. Historical Perspectives, supra note 24, at 222 (Remarks of B. Tierney); Final Panel Discussion, supra note 24, at 232-33 (Remarks of B. Tierney). Since I place Tierney among the optimists, I do not take him entirely at face value when he says that human depravity explains the decline of civilizations. Final Panel Discussion, supra note 24, at 228.
36. Noonan, supra note 24, at 212; Historical Perspectives, supra note 25, at 221(Remarks of J. Noonan).
37. More optimistic interpretations of the situation may either see greater value in alternative philosophies that have gained currency in the recent past, or may emphasize the human capacity for creating new forms of thought that will allow civilization to transcend its present crisis.
38. Neuhaus, supra note 5, at 53-63; Dougherty, supra note 24, at 109-123.
39. Neuhaus, supra note 5, at 59 (citing Stackhouse, M., Creeds, Society, and Human Rights (1984)Google Scholar; Dougherty, supra note 24, at 112 and 114 (Dougherty is somewhat cautious about the degree to which Calvinism prevailed over other Protestant creeds in shaping the American synthesis).
40. Dougherty, supra note 24, at 117 (citing R. Nisbet).
41. Neuhaus, supra note 5, at 59; Dougherty, supra note 24, at 115.
42. Final Panel Discussiony supra note 24, at 237-38 (Remarks of J. Noonan).
43. Neuhaus, supra note 5, at 59; Dougherty, supra note 24, at 114.
44. Neuhaus, supra note 5, at 56; Dougherty, supra note 24, at 122.
45. Neuhaus, supra note 5, at 56.
46. Dougherty, supra note 24, at 113 (Dougherty uses the word “heresy”).
47. Berman, supra note 16, at 186-202.
48. Neuhaus, supra note 5, at 59-60; Dougherty, supra note 24, at 115-20.
49. Dougherty, supra note 24, at 119, 121; Neuhaus, supra note 5, at 59.
50. Neuhaus, supra note 5, at 60; Dougherty, supra note 24, at 116.
51. Neuhaus, supra note 5, at 55-58 and 60.
52. Final Panel Discussion, supra note 24, at 240 (Remarks of J. Noonan).
53. Neuhaus, supra note 5, at 60 (Regarding legal realism) and at 61 (Regarding legal positivism). Neuhaus and Dougherty criticize the judiciary for having attacked the moral values residing in mediating social structures under the influence of this ideology, especially during the past forty years. Neuhaus, supra note 5, at 55-58 and 61-62 and Dougherty, supra note 24, at 114 and 122. Curiously enough, the courts are also said to have contributed during this same period to an authentic moral renewal of civil rights. It would be interesting to explore this paradox further elsewhere.
54. Berman, supra note 16, at 177-202; Noonan, supra note 24, at 203-12; and Tierney, supra note 24, at 163-75.
55. Berman, supra note 16, at 177; Tierney, supra note 24, at 163.
56. Tierney, supra note 24, at 163-64.
57. Id. at 166-69.
58. Tierney, supra note 24, at 166-67; Final Panel Discussion, supra note 24, at 228-29.
59. Tierney, supra note 24, at 166-67.
60. Id. at 164-66.
61. Id. at 166.
62. Id. at 165.
63. Id. at 169-74.
64. Id. at 172-74.
65. Berman, supra note 16, at 177-202.
66. Tierney, supra note 24, at 166.
67. Berman, supra note 16, at 190-202.
68. Id. at 194-99.
69. Id. at 196-201.
70. Id. at 201-202.
71. Noonan, supra note 24, at 209-210.
72. Id.
73. Id at 210.
74. Historical Perspectives, supra note 25, at 218 (Remarks of J. Noonan).
75. Noonan, supra note 24, at 209-210.
76. Id. at 209-11.
77. Final Panel Discussion, supra note 24, at 225-26 (Remarks of J. Neuhaus), at 232 (Remarks of L. Cahill), and at 226 (Remarks of R. Cover).
78. Neuhaus, supra note 5, at 70-71; Final Panel Discussion, supra note 24, at 225-26 (Remarks of J. Neuhaus), at 226 (Remarks of R. Cover), and at 232 (Remarks of L. Cahill).
79. Final Panel Discussion, supra note 24, at 232 (Remarks of Cahill).
80. Id. at 225-26 (Remarks of J. Neuhaus).
81. Id. at 225 (Question from the audience).
82. Neuhaus, supra note 5, at 61.
83. Most notably, the French Revolution.
84. Cover, supra note 24, at 65.
85. Final Panel Discussion, supra note 24, at 237-38.
86. Dougherty, supra note 24, at 118 (Dougherty does not appear to adopt this image as his own).
87. Cahill, supra note 24, at 75; Theological Perspective, supra note 24, at 105 (Remarks of L. Cahill).
88. By voluntarism I mean approaches to theological ethics that give a primacy to the Divine Will in grounding moral norms. Voluntarism, 8 Encyclopedia of Philosophy 270–72 (1967)Google Scholar; Bourke, V., Will in Western Thought 11–12 (1964)Google Scholar. By intellectualisme I mean approaches to theological ethics that give a priority to the Divine Intellect and knowledge of the good in grounding moral norms. Intellectualism, Encyclopedic Dictionary of Religion 1818 (1978); Rousselot, P., L'Intellectualisme De Saint Thomas 201–22 (1935)Google Scholar. Although voluntarism has played an important role in the history of both Catholic and Protestant thought (e.g. in the Franciscan tradition and in the Reformers), and although it appears implicit to self-understanding of some forms of contemporary Protestant fundamentalism, this particular group of scholars showed little interest in these strands of Western religious thought.
89. Cahill, supra note 24, at 77; Theological Perspectives, supra note 24, at 105 (Remarks of L. Cahill).
90. Cover, supra note 24, at 65-74.
91. Final Panel Discussion, supra note 24, at 226 (Remarks of A. Gewirth).
92. Cahill, supra note 24, at 75.
93. Neuhaus, supra note 5, at 55-58; Cover, supra note 24, at 71.
94. Cahill, supra note 24, at 82-93.
95. Gewirth, supra note 23, at 137-44.
96. Final Panel Discussion, supra note 24, at 230-31 (Remarks of H. Berman).
97. Cahill, supra note 24, at 88-93; Gewirth, supra note 23, at 138-43.
98. Cahill, supra note 24, at 75.
99. Theological Perspectives, supra note 24, at 100-107.
100. Cahill, supra note 24, at 75.
101. Tierney, supra note 24, at 164.
102. Cover, supra note 24, at 66-68.
103. Berman, supra note 16, at 180.
104. Final Panel Discussion, supra note 24, at 239.
105. Noonan, supra note 24, at 203 and 211-12.
106. Tierney, supra note 24, at 163-75; Berman, supra note 16, at 177-202; and Noonan, supra note 24, at 203-212.
107. For an example of study in this dimension of religion, see Berger, P., The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological of Religion 3–51 (1969)Google Scholar.
108. Theological Perspectives, supra note 24, at 103-104 (Remarks of J. Neuhaus); Historical Panel, supra note 24, at 215-16 (Remarks of H. Berman); Final Panel Discussion, supra note 24, at 230-31 (Remarks of H. Berman); Theological Perspectives, supra note 24, at 100-101 and 103 (Remarks of R. Cover).
109. E.g., Theological Perspectives, supra note 24, at 103-104 (Remarks of R. Neuhaus).
110. Theological Perspectives, supra note 24, at 106-107 (Remarks of R. Cover).
111. Berman, supra note 16, at 201-202.
112. Tierney, supra note 24, at 167.
113. Final Panel Discussion, supra note 24, at 230-31 (Remarks of H. Berman) (stressing importance of community); Cahill, supra note 24, at 88-90 (stressing importance of community); Cover, supra note 24, at 69-74 (stressing importance of community and obligation); Dougherty, supra note 24, at 121-23 (stressing importance of obligation and community of values); Gewirth, supra note 23, at 138-41 (stressing societal obligation); Neuhaus, supra note 5, at 53-54 (stressing importance of obligation); Theological Perspectives, supra note 24, at 103104 (stressing importance of community) (Remarks of J. Neuhaus); Noonan, supra note 24, at 205-206 and 209-210 (stressing obligation to respect conscience of others); and Final Panel Discussion, supra note 24, at 237-38 (stressing obligation derived from revelation) (Remarks of J. Noonan).
114. Neuhaus, supra note 5, at 58; Theological Perspectives, supra note 24, at 98-100.
115. Gewirth, supra note 23, at 126 (calling the need for a moral warrant “especially pressing”).
116. Cahill, supra note 24, at 84-85.
117. Cover, supra note 24, at 65-67.
118. Id. at 69.
119. Id. at 66.
120. Id. at 68-69.
121. Id. at 69-70 (citing Maimonides).
122. Theological Perspectives, supra note 24, at 101 (Remarks of R. Cover.).
123. Cover, supra note 24, at 68-69.
124. Id. at 71-72.
125. Id. at 69 (referring to the “nation state with its almost unique mastery of violence over extensive territories”); Theological Perspectives, supra note 24, at 106 (Remarks of R. Cover) (referring to what we “conceive to be the rightful granting of physical power, violence—to the organs of government”).
126. Cover, supra note 24, at 73-74; Theological Perspectives, supra note 24, at 101(Remarks of R. Cover); Final Panel Discussion, supra note 24, at 235 (Remarks of R. Cover).
127. Neuhaus, supra note 5, at 53-54; Theological Perspectives, supra note 24, at 96-98 (Remarks of R. Neuhaus).
128. Noonan, supra note 24, at 209-12.
129. Gewirth, supra note 23, at 135-36.
130. Philosophical Perspectives, supra note 24, at 160 (Remarks of A. Gewirth).
131. Dougherty, supra note 24, at 122; Final Panel Discussion, supra note 24, at 239-40 (Remarks of J. Dougherty).
132. Theological Perspectives, supra note 24, at 101-102 (Remarks of L. Cahill); Final Panel Discussion, supra note 24, at 231-32 (Remarks of L. Cahill).
133. Cahill, supra note 24, at 75; Final Panel Discussion, supra note 24, at 236-37 (Remarks of J. Dougherty).
134. Id.
135. Gewirth, supra note 23, at 125-47; see also Final Panel Discussion, supra note 24, at 236 (Remarks of J. Dougherty).
136. Cahill, supra note 24, at 75-76 and 80-81.
137. Final Panel Discussiony supra note 24, at 237-38 (Remarks of J, Noonan).
138. Philosophical Perspectives, supra note 25, at 152-53 (Remarks of B. Tierney).
139. Berman, supra note 16, at 186-202.
140. Theological Perspectives, supra note 24, at 96-98 (Remarks of R. Neuhaus).
141. Cover, supra note 24, at 68-69; Theological Perspectives, note 24, at 100-103 (Remarks of R. Cover).
142. Final Panel Discussion, supra note 24, at 232-33 (Remarks of B. Tierney) and at 233 (Remarks of A. Gewirth).
143. Id. at 232-33 (Remarks of B. Tierney).
144. Id. at 231-32 (Remarks of L. Cahill).
145. Id. at 233 (Remarks of R. Neuhaus).
146. Theological Perspectives, supra note 24, at 98-100 (Remarks of R. Neuhaus).
147. Cahill, supra note 24, at 75; Theological Perspectives, supra note 24, at 101-102 (Remarks of L. Cahill). Cahill recommends modifying traditional Thomist political categories precisely to give greater importance to consensus seeking as a critical phase in the political process. Cahill, supra note 24, at 76.
148. Cover, supra note 24, at 68-69; Theological Perspectives, supra note 24, at 100-103 (Remarks of R. Cover); and Final Panel Discussion, supra note 24, at 235 (Remarks of R. Cover).
149. Theological Perspectives, supra note 24, at 96-98 (Remarks of R. Neuhaus).
150. Neuhaus, supra note 5, at 61;Theological Perspectives, supra note 24, at 95 (Remarks of R. Neuhaus) and at 95 (Remarks of R. Cover.)
151. Final Panel Discussion, supra note 24, at 235-36 (Remarks of A. Gewirth) and at 236-37 (Remarks of J. Dougherty).
152. Noonan, supra note 24, a t 203-212.
153. Id. at 205 and 212.
154. Id. at 212.
155. Noonan, supra note 24, at 203-206; Historical Perspectives, supra note 25, at 215.
156. Noonan, supra note 24, at 210-212; Historical Perspectives, supra note 25, at 213-24 (Remarks of B. Tierney, H. Berman, and J. Noonan); and Final Panel Discussion, supra note 24, at 238 (Remarks of A. Gewirth.)
157. Noonan, supra note 24, at 212; Historical Perspectives, supra note 25, at 221(Remarks of J. Noonan) and at 222 (Remarks of B. Tierney).
158. Historical Perspectives, supra note 25, at 220-21 (Remarks of A. Gewirth).
159. Id. at 220.