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Pharmaceuticals, Political Money, and Public Policy: A Theoretical and Empirical Agenda

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Paul D. Jorgensen
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Extract

The point, for the 946,326th time is that people get elected to office by currying the favor of powerful interest groups. They don’t get elected for their excellence as political philosophers.

Congress has consistently failed to solve some serious problems with the cost, effectiveness, and safety of pharmaceuticals. In part, this failure results from the pharmaceutical industry convincing legislators to define policy problems in ways that protect industry profits. By targeting campaign contributions to influential legislators and by providing them with selective information, the industry manages to displace the public’s voice in developing pharmaceutical policy.

Type
Symposium
Information
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 41 , Issue 3 , Fall 2013 , pp. 561 - 570
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2013

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References

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