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Autonomy and Connectedness: A Re-evaluation of Georgetown and its Progeny

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Rosamund Scott
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Extract

In the late twentieth century the United States experienced a wave of cases concerning compelled obstetric interventions, cases which attracted much legal and philosophical interest. Behind and alongside them, however, lies a little known strand of authorities which concerns a parent wishing to refuse life-sustaining treatment and a hospital seeking to prevent this on the basis of the State's interest in protecting innocent third parties, usually the patient's dependent minor children. This issue appears to be unique to the United States. Although the leading case in point was influential in cases concerning compelled obstetric intervention, it has received little examination in its own right. This is a shame, since it spawned an intriguing line of cases worthy of reflection today.

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Article
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Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 28 , Issue 1 , Spring 2000 , pp. 55 - 66
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2000

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References

Perhaps the most notable U.S. case was Re A.C. 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. App. 1987); 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. App. 1990).Google Scholar
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