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Contemporary Transplantation Initiatives: Where's the Harm in Them?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

David P.T. Price
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Two contemporary strategies in cadaver organ transplantation, both with the potential to affect significantly expanding organ transplant waiting list sizes, have evolved: elective ventilation (EV) and use of nonheart-beating donors (NHBDs). Both are undergoing a period of critical review. It is not clear how widely EV is practiced around the world. In Great Britain, the Royal Devon and Exeter Hospital was the first hospital to develop an EV protocol (the Exeter Protocol), in 1988, after which other British hospitals followed suit. In the 1980s, new NHBD protocols of two distinct types were implemented worldwide, although both rely on death confirmed by traditional cardiopulmonary criteria. The first type involves the removal of organs immediately after death, the preeminent example being the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center Protocol (the Pittsburgh Protocol). The second involves the perfusion and cooling of kidneys immediately following death and subsequent organ removal. Protocols of this type have sprung up in Holland, Great Britain (for example, at Leicester General Hospital), Italy, France, Spain, Japan, and the United States (for example, the Regional Organ Bank of Illinois).

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Article
Information
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 24 , Issue 2 , Summer 1996 , pp. 139 - 149
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Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 1996

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References

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