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Evidence: Discovery and “Medical Peer Review” Committee Privileges

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Aviva Halpern
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Information
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 28 , Issue 4 , Winter 2000 , pp. 406 - 407
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2000

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References

See 2000 WL 1591005, at *1 (Tex. Oct. 26, 2000).Google Scholar
See id.Google Scholar
Id.Google Scholar
See id.Google Scholar
See id. The court of appeals denied the Health Center's petition for writ of mandamus without an opinion.Google Scholar
See id. at *4.Google Scholar
See id. at *1.Google Scholar
See id. Article 4495b embodies the Medical Practice Act as it was contained within the Revised Civil Statutes of Texas. Article 4495b was repealed and recodified in the Texas Occupation Code. The recodification was effective as of September 1, 1999. Id.Google Scholar
Id. at *2 (stating that “All proceedings and records of a medical peer review committee are confidential, and all records of, determinations of, and communications to a committee are privileged and are not discoverable, with certain exceptions not relevant here”).Google Scholar
Id.Google Scholar
Id.Google Scholar
See id. at *4. The Supreme Court of Texas concluded that the trial court's release of the documents did not constitute a privilege waiver by the Health Center. The Supreme Court explained that the privilege belonged to the Health Center and the trial court's production rendered the Health Center's production involuntary. Id. The trial court gave the plaintiffs documents, without notice to the Health Center, that the Health Center had submitted at an in camera hearing. Once the Health Center objected, the trial court ordered the documents' return. See id. at *1.Google Scholar
Id. at *3. The Supreme Court found that the Health Center had not waived its privilege under any of the three contentions made by the plaintiffs. The Health Center made the appropriate and timely objections and any admissions made by the Health Center did not constitute a waiver by the Committee, partially because such waiver was required in writing under the former statute. Moreover, the Supreme Court noted that the burden was on the plaintiffs to prove that the Health Center had waived its privilege.Google Scholar
See “Peer Review Privilege Protects Accident Reports,” Health Law Reporter, 7, no. 10 (May 2000): at 9 (finding that an accident report prepared for a quality assurance committee was privileged while a security services incident report was not privileged). See also “Product Liability/Gammagard: Hendrick Center v. Tyson,” Pharm. L. Rep., 13, no. 5, (May 1998): At 10 (appellate court conditionally issuing a writ of mandamus for a trial court judge to rescind her order requiring the production of memos privileged under the Texas Medical Practice Act).Google Scholar
See supra note 1, at *1.Google Scholar