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Individual Responsibility for Promoting Global Health: The Case for a New Kind of Socially Conscious Consumption

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Nicole Hassoun
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Abstract

The problems of global health are truly terrible. Millions suffer and die from diseases like tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, and malaria. One way of addressing these problems is via a Global Health Impact labeling campaign (http://global-health-impact.org/). If even a small percentage of consumers promote global health by purchasing Global Health Impact products, the incentive to use this label will be substantial. One might wonder, however, whether consumers are morally obligation to purchase any these goods or whether doing so is even morally permissible. This paper suggests that if the proposal is implemented, purchasing Global Health Impact labelled goods is at least morally permissible, if not morally required. Its argument should, moreover, be of much more general interest to those considering different kinds of ethical consumption.

Type
Independent Articles
Information
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 44 , Issue 2: Ethical and Legal Issues in Pediatrics , Summer 2016 , pp. 319 - 331
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2016

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