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Litigation in Clinical Research: Malpractice Doctrines versus Research Realities

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

E. Haavi Morreim
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Human clinical research trials, by which corporations, universities, and research scientists bring new drugs, devices, and procedures into the practice and marketplace of medicine, have become a huge business. The National Institutes of Health (NIH) doubled its spending over the past five years, while in the private sector the top twenty pharmaceutical companies have more than doubled their investment in research and development over a roughly comparable period. To date, some twenty million Americans have participated in clinical research trials that now are as common in the private practice setting as in academia.

For many years human clinical trials received relatively little public attention. In the wake of several well-publicized research abuses, Congress created in 1974 the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research to formulate recommendations to protect human research subjects. The Commission’s 1979 Belmont Report helped to guide the Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) that review the ethics of federally funded research.

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Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 32 , Issue 3 , Fall 2004 , pp. 474 - 484
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Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2004

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