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Managed Care Takes to the Highway: Implications for Insureds

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Barbara J. Gilchrist
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Extract

Automobile insurance companies are joining the move to managed care in the hopes of reducing health-care expenditures arising out of automobile accidents. Industry interest is strong enough that large managed care organizations, such as Concentra Managed Care, Inc., and HNC Insurance Solutions, are beginning to offer their existing network of providers to persons seeking medical care for automobile accident injuries and their evaluation software to insurers.

While insurance companies have successfully pressed four state legislatures and one commissioner of insurance for authorization to offer consumers a managed care option in automobile insurance policies, these efforts have not gone unchallenged. Vocal opponents, primarily lawyer and chiropractic organizations, question whether persons injured in accidents will receive care when needed (especially if the accident occurs when the policyholder is away from home), what the quality of care received will be, and whether any savings will be passed on to consumers.

Type
Article
Information
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 29 , Issue 2 , Summer 2001 , pp. 203 - 219
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2001

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