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Pain Management: Texas Legislative and Regulatory Update

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

David L. Ralston
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My purpose is to provide an update on recent Texas regulatory and statutory changes adopted , since the passage in Texas of the Intractable Pain Treatment Act in 1989 (Pain Act) (see Table l). First, I describe the rules adopted by the Texas State Board of Medical Examiners (TSBME) that authorize physicians to prescribe opioids for the treatment of pain (Pain Rules) (see Table 2). Second, I detail recent statutory changes that pertain to education of physicians and medical students about pain treatment. All of these changes attempt to create a better legal environment for the treatment of chronic pain in Texas.

Before describing the Pain Rules adopted in Texas, the question Why adopt rules, rather than simply ask TSBME to issue a policy statement? must be answered. Many states, most notably California, have issued policy statements that clarify for physicians the parameters within which they may treat pain? Policy statements, unlike administrative regulations, do not have the force of law.

Type
Article
Information
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 24 , Issue 4 , Winter 1996 , pp. 328 - 337
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 1996

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References

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