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Phantom Tumors and Hysterical Women: Revising our View of the Schloendorff Case

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Paul A. Lombardo
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Extract

Over the past thirty years, the doctrine of informed consent has become a focal point in discussions of medical ethics. The literature of informed consent explores the evolution of the principle of autonomy, purportedly emerging from the mists of 19th Century medical practice, and finding its earliest articulation in legal cases where wronged citizens asserted their rights against medical authority. A commonplace, if not obligatory, feature of that literature is a reference to the case of Mary Schloendorff and the opinion written by Judge Benjamin Cardozo by which the case is remembered. Commentators today applaud the prescience of Cardozo for an early articulation of what eventually would become bioethical orthodoxy concerning informed consent and its place as a bulwark of patient autonomy. They inevitably quote Cardozo's famous statement, “Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body.”

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Article
Information
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 33 , Issue 4 , Winter 2005 , pp. 791 - 801
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2005

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