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Professionalism in Forensic Bioethics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Bethany J. Spielman
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Extract

As the public profile of bioethics rises, and as litigation about issues ranging from assisted reproduction to gene therapy multiplies, the presence of bioethics experts in a litigation context has become more common. Dozens of appellate opinions refer to bioethics testimony in the lower courts. Today's technical advisory services for attorneys advertise bioethics experts along with experts in scientific fields. A single bioethicist has served as an expert in more than fifty cases. In all likelihood, opportunities for bioethicists to fill the role of testifying expert will grow as medicine and biotechnology become more complex. Bioethics experts have also been involved in several other kinds of litigation-related activities, including investigation, consultation with attorneys, preparing reports that express expert opinions, and explaining and defending these opinions by deposition.

Despite the growth of these activities by bioethicists, they have never been free of controversy, have recently been received with little enthusiasm by the judiciary, and could become highly problematic in the future.

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Article
Information
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 30 , Issue 3 , Fall 2002 , pp. 420 - 439
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2002

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