Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-fbnjt Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-14T04:54:21.771Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Should a Personality Disorder Qualify as a Mental Disease in Insanity Adjudication?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Richard J. Bonnie
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

In his accompanying article, Dr. Kinscherff has convincingly demonstrated why a categorical exclusion of personality disorders from the definition of “mental disease” in insanity defense adjudication is arbitrary, both conceptually and clinically. He explains his position in the context of a vignette involving a hypothetical defendant, Wilhelmina Sykes, charged with ramming her car into another car obstructing her path, causing serious injury to its driver. Dr. Kinscherff correctly points out that the determinative issue in applying the insanity defense in any case, including the hypothetical case involving Ms. Sykes, is whether the defendant experienced a legally relevant functional impairment at the time of the offense. In many states — and in the hypothetical jurisdiction in which Ms. Sykes is being prosecuted — the relevant functional impairments are those that could have affected her ability “to appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct” or “to conform her conduct to the requirements of the law.

Type
Symposium
Information
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics , Volume 38 , Issue 4 , Winter 2010 , pp. 760 - 763
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2010

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Kinscherff, R., “Proposition: A Personality Disorder May Nullify Responsibility for a Criminal Act,” Journal of Law Medicine & Ethics 38, no. 4 (2010): 745–759.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Epright, M. C. and Sade, R. D., “Introduction: Conundrums and Controversies in Mental Health and Illness,” Journal of Law Medicine & Ethics 38, no. 4 (2010): 722–726.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
See generally, Bonnie, R. J., Coughlin, A. M., Jeffries, J. C. Jr., and Low, P. W., Criminal Law, 3rd ed. (Foundation Press, 2010): At 604–605.Google Scholar
See generally, Moore, M., “Responsibility and the Unconscious,” Southern California Law Review 53, no. 6 (1980): 1563–1675; Moore, M., “Causation and the Excuses,” California Law Review 73, no. 4 (1985): 1091–1149; Morse, S., “Culpability and Control,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 142, no. 5 (1994): 1587–1660.Google Scholar
See, Bonnie, R. J., “The Moral Basis for the Insanity Defense,” American Bar Association Journal 69, no. 2 (1983): 194–197.Google Scholar
Id.Google Scholar
Id.Google Scholar
American Law Institute, Model Penal Code (Official Draft, 1962), Section 4.01(2).Google Scholar