Inconsistency may well be the hallmark of the teenage years. Frequently, teenagers are serious and adult-like, yet just as often, they are callow and unpredictable. Generally, they are all of these things, in no particular order. They studiously observe the adults in their lives, adopting certain values and behaviors, while wholly rejecting others. Their moods shift without warning, leaving entire households with the sensation that they are living on a roller-coaster. As a result, it is not entirely surprising that the legal system has had difficulty deciding how to respond to them. The laws devised to govern teenagers are layered, reflecting society's alternating perceptions of teenagers as adult-like and child-like, and our accompanying impulses to respect as well as to protect this population. Read together, these laws defy any consistent description of adolescent capacity. We have lived with these inconsistencies for so long, though, that they have grown rather familiar to us, and that we hardly recognize the puzzle in the fact that we trust eighteen year olds enough to let them fight and die in the military, but not enough to let them drink alcoholic beverages.

With breathtalung speed, traditional criminal prohibitions against assisted suicide have been declared unconstitutional in twelve states, including California and New York. This poses great promise and great peril. The promise is that competent terminally ill patients, as a compassionate measure of last resort, will have the option of putting an end to their suffering by physician-assisted suicide (PAS). More sigmficant, legally permitting this controversial option may be a catalyst for doctors, health care institutions, and society to improve the care of the dying. PAS should be limited only to those relatively few competent patients who continue to suffer intolerably despite unrestrained efforts to palliate and who face a continued existence that they regard as worse than death. When dying patients know they will not be abandoned to miserable and pointless suffering if palliative care fails, they will be fortified to cope better with the process of dying.

The immediate peril is that PAS will become a quick fix, available on demand to any patient diagnosed as terminally ill, thus bypassing palliative care and producing premature deaths.

Pain can be a body-wrenching curse. Yet it is often a life-defining and supporting blessing!

Pain is a distinct physiological event, yet it is also an emotional, social, spiritual, and economic force. Pain in its more destructive form alters lives, changes relationships, and disrupts families.

Quality pain management should not be just a pharmacological response to a medical situation; it must also be a theological, ethical, and societal response to human need. Appropriate pain management is a gift to both the receiver and the provider. As a parish priest, a supervisor of pastoral services, and an ethics resource specialist, I have seen many pain-filled situations that have involved multiples of these dimensions.

Born in 1969, Casey died in 1995, just a few months after his twenty-sixth birthday. Casey was an intelligent, charismatic college student, strong in religious faith, who had few problems … at least until one day in the summer of 1994. That day he began to suffer extreme pain in his lower stomach and bowels.

At age twenty-nine, while a graduate student in computer science at the University of Pennsylvania, Mark Albertson was diagnosed with lymphosarcoma. He died four months later, leaving a wife and two young daughters—Robin, three years old, and Kim, three months. Sandra Albertson, a Quaker, writes about their family’s experience with death and renewal.

The following is reprinted from Sandra Albertson, Endings and Beginnings (New York: Random House, 1980; Ballantine, 1983): chs. 9, 10.

Two contemporary strategies in cadaver organ transplantation, both with the potential to affect significantly expanding organ transplant waiting list sizes, have evolved: elective ventilation (EV) and use of nonheart-beating donors (NHBDs). Both are undergoing a period of critical review. It is not clear how widely EV is practiced around the world. In Great Britain, the Royal Devon and Exeter Hospital was the first hospital to develop an EV protocol (the Exeter Protocol), in 1988, after which other British hospitals followed suit. In the 1980s, new NHBD protocols of two distinct types were implemented worldwide, although both rely on death confirmed by traditional cardiopulmonary criteria. The first type involves the removal of organs immediately after death, the preeminent example being the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center Protocol (the Pittsburgh Protocol). The second involves the perfusion and cooling of kidneys immediately following death and subsequent organ removal. Protocols of this type have sprung up in Holland, Great Britain (for example, at Leicester General Hospital), Italy, France, Spain, Japan, and the United States (for example, the Regional Organ Bank of Illinois).

As I write, I hear that Dr. Jack Kevorluan has delivered another victim to the emergency room of his local Michigan hospital. Why do physicians and terminally ill patients feel we need to change the law with respect to assisted suicide when a rogue pathologist, who has been stripped of his medical license, is allowed to pursue his appetite for providing his clients with inhalation treatments of carbon monoxide gas? If no court will convict this outlaw, what makes the physicians and patients who brought Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington and Quill v. Vacco fear that any court would ever convict a licensed physician of assisting in a suicide when he/she writes one of her established patients a prescription for a short-acting barbiturate? Moreover, it is not even clear that laws against assisted suicide in most jurisdictions were ever intended to apply to the actions of licensed physicians. Nonetheless, the plaintiffs in the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals were clearly seeking some kind of redress, some kind of protection from potential legal claims they feared might be made against them.

Nursing prides itself on a commitment to caring for patients and their families. Daily, nurses support patients and their families as they face life-threatening disease and injury and help them through the painful decisions to initiate or remove ventilators, artificial nutrition and hydration, and other life-sustaining technology.

The opinions of the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals, in Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington and Quill v. Vauo, strike at the heart of the nursing value system. If the United States Supreme Court upholds either opinion, physicians will be legally allowed to help patients die, and nurses will be called on to assist with this process, just as nurses have assisted with electroconvulsive treatment, abortion, and other controversial procedures. Advanced practice nurses (APNs), who are licensed to prescribe drugs, may also be allowed by law to assist patients to end their own lives.

During the past decade, debate has intensified about the role of long-term opioid therapy in the management of chronic nonmalignant pain. Specialists in pain management have discussed the issues extensively and now generally agree that a selected population of patients with chronic pain can attain sustained analgesia without significant adverse consequences. This perspective, however, is not uniformly accepted by pain specialists and has not been widely disseminated to other disciplines or the public. Rather, the more traditional perspective, which ascribes both transitory benefit and substantial cumulative risk to long-term opioid therapy, continues to predominate. According to this perspective, the inevitability of tolerance limits the possibility of sustained efficacy, and other pharmacological properties increase the likelihood of adverse outcomes, including persistent side-effects, impairment in physical and psychosocial functioning, and addiction. If accurate, these outcomes would indeed justify the withholding of opioid therapy for all but the most extreme cases of chronic nonmalignant pain.

Pharmacists, physicians, and other health care personnel practice within an integrated system of laws and regulations that influence many treatment modalities. Capitation, managed care, and other controls strain these relationships by mandating greater oversight of how health care is delivered. From a pharmacists’s perspective, any use of medication requites knowledge of three omnipresent factors: regulatory control, formularies (product selection), and economic decision making. My objective is to raise awareness of these issues as they relate to the prescription of pain medication and to pain management generally.

All practice-oriented drug law and regulation is based on the federal Controlled Substances Act of 1970. The Act, also known as Title II, is part of a much larger piece of legislation, the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (CSA). CSA was enacted to regulate the manufacturing, distribution, dispensing, and delivery of drugs or substances that are subject to, or have the potential for, abuse or physical or psychological dependence.

The use of statistics in medical research has been compared to a religion: it has its high priests (statisticians), supplicants (journal editors and researchers), and orthodoxy (for example, p <.05 is significant). Although the comparison may be more unfair to religion than to research, a useful lesson can nonetheless be drawn: the practice of clinical research may benefit—as does the spirit—from critical self-examination. Arguably, no aspect of the conduct of clinical trials is currently more controversial—and thus in as dire need of critical examination—than the use of placebo controls. The ethical and scientific controversies associated with placebo-controlled trials, never far below the surface, have once again seized public attention. Clearly, concern about these issues within the professional community runs deep and wide, as evidenced by the volume of response generated by Kenneth Rothman and Karin Michels's recent Critique. Criticisms of the use of placebo controls in clinical research are scattered through the literatureo; our objective is to present the case against placebos in a compendious form that takes account of scientific and statistical as well as normative issues.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held, in Murrey v. United States (73 F.3d 1448 (7th Cir. 1996)), that claims for a physician's failure to obtain a patient's informed consent are not barred by the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) as a species of misrepresentation. The court further held that the claim was not barred by the failure to include the issue of informed consent in the administrative claim. This decision reduces the burden on plaintiffs to state every cognizable claim consistent with the facts in an administrative proceeding; the failure to do so would prevent them from raising the claim in court.

The patient, Thomas Murrey, a sixty-eight-year-old U.S. veteran, sought treatment at a Veteran's Administration (VA) hospital in North Chicago, Illinois. VA doctors diagnosed him with prostate cancer, and advised him to undergo surgery to remove his entire prostate.

Placebo-controlled trials are held by many, including regulators at agencies like the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA), to be the gold standard in the assessment of new medical interventions. Yet the use of placebo controls in clinical trials has been the focus of considerable controversy. In this two-part article, we challenge a number of common beliefs concerning the value of placebo controls. Part I critiques statistical and other scientific justifications for the use of placebo controls in clinical research. The continued use of placebo controls in clinical trials on diseases for which accepted treatment exists raises equally important ethical, legal, and regulatory issues for which various justifications have been given. Defense of this practice relies on normative as well as empirical myths.

In their attack on the prevailing use of placebo controls, Kenneth Rothman and Karin Michels emphasize that this practice stands in violation of the World Medical Association's guidelines on the ethics of human experimentation, most commonly known as the Helsinki Declaration.