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‘(Virtually) conceptually necessary’

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 December 2003

PAUL M. POSTAL
PAUL M. POSTAL
Affiliation:
New York University, New York
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Abstract

One often reads today (see below) that certain properties of natural language (NL) or certain methods of describing NLs are (VIRTUALLY) CONCEPTUALLY NECESSARY. I take the negative view that such usages are an illegitimate, purely rhetorical way of seeking to justify assumptions which cannot be supported on genuine factual or theoretical grounds. Put differently, such claims are a way of suggesting that specific and actually highly controversial assumptions more or less follow from some very general and uncontroversial features of NL. The problem is that the suggestion is not, and, I claim, could not be, backed up with genuine evidence or argument showing that it is true.

Type
Notes and Discussion
Information
Journal of Linguistics , Volume 39 , Issue 3 , November 2003 , pp. 599 - 620
Copyright
2003 Cambridge University Press

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Footnotes

I would like to thank Robert D. Borsley for a number of very useful comments on earlier versions of this article, which have greatly improved this version. I would also like to thank an anonymous JL referee. No blame for deficiencies accrues to anyone but the author.