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It is convenient to regard the mental part of man, or his ego, as being made up of feeling, will, and thought. Feeling I place first, because it takes precedence in evolution, and because it may be said to constitute the foundation of mind.
∗ 1 It is convenient to make the feelings embrace both the sensations and the emotions, although all psychologists do not do so.—(2) Owing to the equivocal meaning attaching to the term “ill-feeling”—which naturally suggests itself as the opposite of “well-feeling”—I am obliged to substitute the term “malaise,” by which I mean to express a widely diffused feeling of unwell-ness, no matter whether this occurs in connection with well-marked disease or not.—(3) Some, indeed, appear to think that all associations take place through the feelings. See Ribot, , The Psychology of the Emotions, p. 173. —(4) This restraining power itself constitutes an impulse, and is of the nature of a feeling.—(5) I say nothing of “muscular sense.” Google Scholar
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