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Class Conflict and Military Intervention in Uganda

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 November 2008

John D. Chick
John D. Chick
Affiliation:
School of Social and Economic Development, University of the South Pacific, Fiji
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Extract

In his recent article on ‘The Uganda Coup – class action by the military’ in this Journal, x, 1, May 1972, Dr Michael F. Lofchie points to two apparent paradoxes in the military takeover: Why did the army move against a regime to which it had previously been loyal? And why, in doing so, did it ally itself with the Ganda ‘civil service and coffee growing elite’ towards which it had shown nothing but hostility in the past? The only adequate explanation, we are told, is that these privileged groups were drawn together by a determination to defend their status against the threat implicit in President Obote's commitment to socialism. Confronted by egalitarian pressures they discovered a basis for common action in a class interest which transcended tribal rivalries.

Type
Africana
Information
The Journal of Modern African Studies , Volume 10 , Issue 4 , December 1972 , pp. 634 - 637
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1972

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References

Page 635 note 1 The enigmatic character of Obote himself was certainly a factor of considerable significance.

Page 635 note 2 It must be emphasised that such critical judgements are not based upon any abstract counsel of perfection. Uganda's record in the field of policy implementation compared very unfavourably with that of Tanzania, while her experiments in nationalisation were foreshadowed by none of the careful groundwork which preceded similar measures in Zambia.

Page 635 note 3 Lofchie sometimes refers to the army as a group, and sometimes singles out the officer corps for special mention. The distinction is important, because there were clear signs of conflict between different levels in the military hierarchy. It was both the strength and weakness of General Amin's position that he was much more closely identified with the non-commissioned officers and men than he was with his senior officers, most of whom were considerably younger and better educated than he was. The first broadcast after the takeover was made by an N.C.O., and there were numerous promotions from the ranks in the following weeks to replace officers killed or detained during the fighting which accompanied the coup. Lofchie does not comment on this dimension of the intervention, which raises fascinating issues for any attempt to discuss the episode in terms of social stratification.

Page 636 note 1 It soon became apparent, for example, that General Amin had no intention of allowing the Ganda to recapture the autonomy which Obote had destroyed, and which some of their leaders believed that they could demand as the price of their support.

Page 636 note 2 After the coup the soldiers broadcast a list of 17 failings of the civilian regime which were said to have ‘left the people angry, worried, and very unhappy‘, and to have justified military intervention. Three of these were directly concerned with the status of the army, including complaints about lack of equipment, confusion in the apparatus of control, and attempts to weaken the military by the establishment of rival security services. See the Uganda Argus(Kampala), 26 01 1972.Google Scholar