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The National Conferences in Benin and Togo Revisited

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 November 2008

Kathryn Nwajiaku
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Extract

As many as seven Conférences nationales (CNs) took place in French-speaking Africa between February 1990 and January 1993, all against the background of the apparent ‘wind of change’ which is sweeping across the continent where democratic governance is eventually to replace authoritarian rule. In Benin, the assembly of delegates that met during 19–28 February 1990 was supposed to be representative of all social, religious, professional, and political interest groups whose aim was to introduce a constitutional liberal democracy. This CN managed to gain acceptance of the sovereignty which it had declared on the second day — namely, that all its decisions would be legal and binding. The authority of President Matthieu Kérékou was thus effectively emasculated, whilst the elections which were timetabled and held a year later, finally unseated him after 20 years in power. In Togo, General Gnassingbe Eyadéma was able to reject the sovereignty claimed. by the CN, held from 8 July to 28 August 1991, as the balance of power was firmly in his favour.

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Articles
Information
The Journal of Modern African Studies , Volume 32 , Issue 3 , September 1994 , pp. 429 - 447
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1994

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References

1 Benin and Congo, February 1990; Gabon, March 1990; Zaïre, February 1991; Togo, July/August 1991; Niger, July 1992; and Chad, January 1993.

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44 Vittin, ‘Crise renouveau’, loc. cit. pp. 37–59.